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INTRODUCTION
It is nothing new to say that criminals are responsible for the
crimes they commit. Yet given the continued epidemic (albeit de-
clining) number of crimes committed in the United States each year,1
there is an increased focus on the responsibility of actors other than
the criminals themselves-for example, gun manufacturers that sup-
ply weapons; police departments that fail to enforce laws; and busi-
nesses that spend money protecting valued merchandise but not
customers.2 In the civil context, both courts and legislatures have ini-
tiated efforts to broaden civil responsibility to crime victims. In the
legislature, state and federal governments have enacted legislation ex-
panding such liability.3 In the courts, a growing roster of cases alleges
defendants' negligence in failing to use reasonable care to protect
1 See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZA-
TION IN THE UNITED STATES, 2000 STATISTICAL TABLES, 2002 NCJ 188290, Table 26:
Personal Crimes (2002), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cvusOO.pdf
(last visited Nov. 18, 2002) (estimating that 5,815,540 incidents of completed, at-
tempted or threatened crimes of violence took place in the United States in 2000);
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN THE
UNITED STATES, 1999 NCJ 18493 (2001) (reporting that 6,723,930 crimes of com-
pleted, attempted or threatened violence took place in the United States in 1999);
Jeremy Travis, Foreword to Symposium: Why Is Crime Decreasing?, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRImI-
NOLOGY 1173, 1173 (1998) ("Violent crime rates are at their lowest levels since the
early 1970s.").
2 See, e.g, Hutcherson v. City of Phoenix, 961 P.2d 449 (Ariz. 1998) (involving a
suit against 911 operator for misclassifying a domestic violence call at a lower priority
than training manual guidelines would have accorded the call); Merrill v. Navegar,
Inc., 28 P.3d 116 (Cal. 2000) (involving a suit against manufacturer of semi-automatic
weapons for negligent manufacture and marketing of weapon used in a shooting at
an office building); McClung v. Delta Square Ltd. P'ship, 937 S.W.2d 891 (Tenn.
1996) (involving a suit against Wal-Mart and shopping center for failure to police
their parking lot despite company data that crimes against patrons could be reduced
by such patrols).
3 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2000) (creating federal civil law remedies for wo-
men victimized by violence, held unconstitutional in part by United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598 (2000), on the ground that the Commerce Clause did not provide Con-
gress with authority to enact civil remedy provision); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611A.79
(West 2001) (holding parents or guardians liable for civil damages stemming from
their children's "bias offenses" unless the parent or guardian "made reasonable ef-
forts to exercise control over the minor's behavior").
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against intentional torts.4 A significant body of scholarship supports
this trend.
5
But while courts, legislatures, and scholars are contemplating ex-
panded obligations to victims of intentional torts, there is little discus-
sion (or perhaps even recognition) of a legal change that could
quietly negate these efforts. For the first time in history, a significant
number of state courts and legislatures are permitting liability to be
apportioned between some types of intentional and negligent fault.
6
This doctrinal turn is not simply one more change in the con-
stantly shifting landscape of state tort law. Nor is apportionment a
mere procedural issue of secondary importance. Instead, apportion-
ment of intentional and negligent fault is an issue of critical signifi-
cance. 7 Including intentional torts in apportionment systems may
effectively repeal the very defendant duties that states intend to
create.
4 Robert L. Rabin, Enabling Torts, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 435, 445-50 (1999) (exam-
ining growing legal liability of individuals and enterprises that set the stage for inju-
ries by third parties); Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible End of the Rise of
Modern American Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REV. 601, 649 (1992) (stating that "during recent
years there have been several areas in which liability has expanded," including "liabil-
ity for inadequate security against crime").
5 See, e.g., Rachana Bhowmik et al., A Sense of Duty: Retiring the "Special Relation-
ship" Rule and Holding Gun Manufacturers Liable for Negligently Distributing Guns, 4 J.
HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 42, 43 (2000) (arguing that gun makers "owe a duty to use
reasonable care in distributing guns and can be held liable for negligently distribut-
ing them"); Mari Matsuda, On Causation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 2195, 2209 (2000) (ad-
vocating "a broadly collectivist notion of cause and responsibility" in the negligent
security context as well as other contexts).
6 See, e.g., Rodenburg v. Fargo-Moorhead Young Men's Christian Ass'n, 632
N.W.2d 407, 418 (N.D. 2001) (holding that the trial court did not err when it deter-
mined that the jury must compare the fault of a negligent tortfeasor-the YMCA that
did not revoke a person's membership for throwing a weight and threatening another
member, with the fault of an intentional tortfeasor-a member who subsequently
shot the other YMCA member he had threatened). Of course, a certain comparison
is implicit even in previous rules not to compare intentional and negligent torts. See
Guido Calabresi & Jeffrey 0. Cooper, New Directions in Tort Law, 30 VAL. U. L. REV.
859, 868-72 (1996) (noting a deep change in tort law compensation from "all-or-
nothing to splitting," but also noting that a comparison of fault and non-fault is im-
plicit under all-or-nothing rules); see also Leonard Charles Schwartz, The Myth of
Nonapportionment Between a Plaintiff and a Defendant Under Traditional Tort Law and Its
Significance for Modern Comparative Fault, 11 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 493, 503
(1989) (tracing apportionment by causation of loss rather than blameworthiness
under traditional tort law).
7 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 1 cmt. a
(2000) ("Comparative responsibility has a potential impact on almost all areas of tort
law.").
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The case of Brandon v. County of Richardson8 is illustrative. Teena
Brandon ("Brandon") presented herself to others as a man.9 After a
county sheriff made public comments about Brandon's gender and
called her an "it," Brandon was brutally raped and beaten by two men
who threatened to kill her. Brandon promptly reported the rape to
the Richardson County Sheriffs Department. 10 The heriff con-
ducted a series of long and emotionally abusive interviews with Bran-
don, but made no effort to arrest the rapists or otherwise protect
Brandon. Within the week, the same men who had raped Brandon
murdered her.1'
While the murderers were prosecuted in the criminal courts,
Brandon's mother filed a civil suit against the County for its negligent
failure to make reasonable efforts (or any efforts) to protect her
daughter.' 2 In a landmark ruling, the Nebraska Supreme Court held
that the County had a duty to protect Brandon once she had reported
the rape to the Sheriffs Department and had agreed to aid in the
prosecution of the attackers. 13
The case was then tried in the lower court. The court concluded
that the County was negligent.' 4 However, the Court apportioned
damages among all of the parties-the County, the murderers and the
plaintiff.1 5 In the apportionment process, the court assigned liability
for eighty-five percent of the plaintiffs $80,000 non-economic damage
award to the murderers. After a one-percent reduction for the plain-
8 624 N.W.2d 604 (Neb. 2000) (Brandon II).
9 Id. at 611. This case description uses female pronouns because they were used
in the Nebraska Supreme Court's opinion. The fluidity of Brandon's gender identity
reveals the problematic aspects of categorization. See Katherine M. Franke, The Cen-
tral Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation of Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L.
REV. 1, 60 (1995) (criticizing legal and social requirements that compel a person to
comply with rigid gender norms); see also Katherine M. Franke, What Does a White
Woman Look Like? Racing and Erasing in Law, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1231, 1232-34 (1996)
(addressing the perils inherent in legally determining racial identity).
10 Brandon, 624 N.W.2d at 610-11 (Brandon 11).
11 Id. at 611-14. The underlying facts of this case form the basis for the award-
winning movie, Boys DON'T CRY (Fox Searchlight Pictures 1999).
12 Brandon v. County of Richardson, 566 N.W.2d 776 (Neb. 1997) (Brandon I).
13 Id. at 780 ("We conclude that Brandon has stated facts sufficient to qualify for
an exception to the no-duty rule because the victim witnessed a crime and agreed to
aid the police. A special relationship was created when the victim went to law enforce-
ment officials and offered to testify and aid in the prosecution.").
14 Brandon, 624 N.W.2d at 618 (Brandon II).
15 Id.
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tiff's unspecified negligence, the court entered judgment against the
County for $17,360.97.16
On rehearing, the Nebraska Supreme Court reversed the district
court's allocation of damages on the ground that Nebraska's compara-
tive negligence law did not permit apportionment between negligent
and intentional tortfeasor defendants.' 7 Had the Nebraska Supreme
Court reached a different conclusion, the County would have been
liable to Brandon's estate for only a small percentage of the adjudi-
cated damages that stemmed from its actionable negligence.
This Article examines cases like Brandon v. County of Richardson in
which state courts must decide whether to compare defendants' inten-
tional and negligent torts for purposes of apportionment., Though
just a decade ago courts rarely questioned the established rules that
prevented such comparisons, 19 questions about comparison of de-
fendants' intentional and negligent torts have now emerged on state
court dockets in nearly half of the states in this country.2 0 The num-
16 That calculation takes into account the $6223.20 of economic damages
awarded by the court that had not been apportioned. Id. The court's 1% reduction
for plaintiff's alleged fault was subsequently overturned. Id. at 629. For a discussion
of problems that stem from blaming rape victims for rape, even in lawsuits against
third-parties rather than rapists, see Ellen M. Bublick, Citizen No-Duty Rules: Rape Vic-
tims and Comparative Fault, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1413 (1999).
17 Brandon, 624 N.W.2d at 629 (Brandon II).
18 As discussed more fully in Part I, despite broad rhetoric about comparison of
"intentional and negligent fault," court holdings rarely permit comparison of inten-
tional and negligent fault between a plaintiff and a defendant. As such, this Article
primarily addresses comparison of defendants' intentional and negligent fault. At
times courts permit comparison of intentional and negligent fault between parties
that are not formally designated as defendants in the litigation. See, e.g., Rosner v.
Denim and Diamonds, Inc., 937 P.2d 353 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996) (involving a suit
brought by bar patron against bar for negligent failure to adequately train employees
to handle altercation in which the bar's negligence was compared with the fault of the
unknown nonparty attacker); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTION-
MENT OF LIABILITY § 17, at 151-57 (2000) (assembling a state-by-state list of jurisdic-
tions that include nonparties in assignment of comparative responsibility shares). In
this Article, the term "defendants" generally includes nonparties when state law au-
thorizes them to stand in the place of named defendants.
19 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 1090 (2000) (noting the "traditional view" of
courts in refusing to compare defendants' intentional and negligent torts).
20 State courts that have recently examined the question of whether to compare
by percentages one defendant's intentional fault with another defendant's negligence
include: Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana,
Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Jersey, New
Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. See,
e.g., Hutcherson v. City of Phoenix, 961 P.2d 449 (Ariz. 1998); Ortega v. Pajaro Valley
Unified Sch. Dist., 64 Cal. App. 4th 1023 (1998); Slack v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 5 P.3d
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ber of jurisdictions considering these questions is likely to continue to
grow.21
This Article reviews the current state controversy about whether
to include intentional torts within comparative apportionment sys-
tems. 22 The Article contends that the states' perceived need for inten-
tional-negligent fault comparison stems from a number of mistaken
beliefs about the dictates of causation and fairness. When these mis-
perceptions are set aside, states can directly examine the effects of
comparison, which are often undesirable, or if desired, are better
achieved by direct substantive rules.
280 (Colo. 2000); Bhinder v. Sun Co., 717 A.2d 202 (Conn. 1998), superseded by statute
as noted in Lufi v. Islami, No. CV980334075S, 2001 WL 808394, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct.
June 19, 2001); Palafrugell Holdings Inc. v. Cassel, No. 3D99-1596, 2001 WL 20824
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Jan. 10, 2001); Ozaki v. Ass'n of Apartment Owners, 954 P.2d 644
(Haw. 1998); Rausch v. Pocatello Lumber Co., 14 P.3d 1074 (Idaho Ct. App. 2000);
Paragon Family Rest. v. Bartolini, 769 N.E.2d 609 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002); Wood v. Groh,
7 P.3d 1163 (Kan. 2000); Roman Catholic Diocese of Covington v. Secter, 966 S.W.2d
286 (Ky. Ct. App. 1998); Morrison v. Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity, 738 So. 2d 1105 (La.
Ct. App. 1999); Flood v. Southland Corp., 616 N.E.2d 1068 (Mass. 1993); Dawson v.
Townsend & Sons, Inc., 735 So. 2d 1131 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999); Brandon, 624 N.W.2d
at 604 (Brandon 11); Martin v. Prime Hospitality Corp., 785 A.2d 16 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2001); Barth v. Coleman, 878 P.2d 319 (N.M. 1994); Chianese v. Meier, 98
N.Y.2d 270 (2002); Rodenburg v. Fargo-Moorhead Young Men's Christian Ass'n, 632
N.W.2d 407 (N.D. 2001); Turner v. Jordan, 957 S.W.2d 815 (Tenn. 1997); Field v.
Boyer Co., 952 P.2d 1078 (Utah 1998); Welch v. Southland Corp., 952 P.2d 162
(Wash. 1998); Bd. of County Comm'rs of Teton County ex rel. Teton County Sheriff's
Dep't v. Bassett, 8 P.3d 1079 (Wyo. 2000).
21 In some states, comparative fault acts recently have been amended, but state
appellate or supreme courts have not yet addressed issues regarding comparison of
defendants' intentional and negligent fault in their decisions. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT.
§ 09.17.900 (Michie 1999); TEX. Civ. PAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 33.001-017 (Vernon
1997). In other states, local commentators have urged courts to consider inten-
tional/negligent fault comparisons in light of existing comparative fault acts and the
lead of other jurisdictions' interpretations. See, e.g., Paul S. Swedlund, Negligent Hiring
and Apportionment of Fault Between Negligent and Intentional Tortfeasors: A Consideration of
Two Unanswered Questions in South Dakota Tort Law, 41 S.D. L. REv. 45, 47-48 (1996)
(noting that a case that raised the issue of intentional-negligent comparisons in South
Dakota was settled before trial and suggesting that South Dakota reconsider that issue
in future cases). Perhaps a symbol of the emerging trend, when the Connecticut
Supreme Court reviewed the intentional-negligent fault comparison issue, the three
most senior Justices opposed comparisons, while the four newest members of the
court supported it. See Thomas Scheffey, Lawmakers Unmake Bhinder, CONN. L. TRIB.,
May 24, 1999, at 1.
22 See Michael Green & William Charles Powers, Jr., Apportionment of Liability, 10
KANJ. L. & PUB. PoL'Y 30, 32 (2000) (noting that "[o]ne controversial issue" in com-
parative apportionment systems "is including intentional torts").
2003]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
Part I examines how courts arrived at present questions about
comparison of intentional and negligent fault, and attempts to ex-
plain state court answers to these questions on their own terms-to
address what courts say about the choices they make.
Part 11 shifts the dialogue away from courts' reasoning toward the
effects of court comparison of defendants' intentional and negligent
fault. Comparison of defendants' intentional and negligent fault can
decrease negligent defendants' liability to plaintiffs in cases involving
intentional harm-the driving force behind such comparisons.23 But
such comparison can also create a number of other unintended ef-
fects, such as diminishing intentional tortfeasors' responsibility to
both plaintiffs and other negligent defendants. The actual impact of
comparing defendants' intentional and negligent fault depends on
the interplay of a number of complementary rules, particularly rules
regarding the joint and several liability of intentional and negligent
tortfeasors, and the joinder of nonparty and sometimes unknown
defendants.
Part III then examines the rationales for comparing defendants'
intentional and negligent fault in light of the effects of those compari-
sons. Although courts place much emphasis on issues of causation
and coherence, those issues are ultimately unhelpful in resolving the
question of whether to include intentional torts in comparative appor-
tionment systems. Courts' use of percentages assigned in the appor-
tionment process to reflect a true share of the harm that each party
caused reflects a misunderstanding of the meaning of apportionment
percentages. Moreover, coherence problems remain both in systems
that compare intentional and negligent fault and those that do not.
This Part concludes that rather than focusing on issues of causation or
coherence, courts should consider the interrelationship of apportion-
ment with other substantive tort law objectives.
In light of this evaluation, Part IV provides guidance for courts
and legislatures navigating the complex terrain of intentional and
negligent fault comparisons. Both the National Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws' Uniform Apportionment of Tort Responsibility Act and
the American Law Institute's Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment
of Liability have systematically examined a number of intentional-negli-
gent tort apportionment questions and provide approaches that are
preferable to current approaches taken in many of the states that
23 See, e.g., Slack, 5 P.3d at 288 (reducing compensatory damages owed by insurer
that negligently required plaintiff policyholder to see a doctor who had previously
been accused of sexual assault and who subsequently sexually assaulted the plaintiff,
on the basis that the jury apportioned 60% of the fault to the doctor).
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compare intentional and negligent fault.24 The Restatement approach,
which includes intentional fault in some comparisons but creates a
number of ameliorative doctrines, may be particularly helpful to
courts that work within statutorily mandated comparative apportion-
ment systems, but nevertheless seek to minimize some of the harshest
effects of intentional-negligent tort comparisons. 2 5 However, the Na-
tional Commissioners' approach, which excludes intentional fault
from default comparisons and reallocates uncollectible shares, creates
a fairer and more internally consistent system than would several of
the permissible Restatement tracks.
And yet, the best approach to this issue may not involve appor-
tionment at all, but rather direct substantive consideration of parties'
legal responsibilities. This Article suggests that jurisdictions should
not compare intentional and negligent fault, but should instead di-
rectly confront and resolve the concerns that animate calls for com-
parison-particularly concerns about excessive negligent tortfeasor
liability, the blurring of boundaries between intentional and negligent
fault, and the coherence of comparative fault regimes.
Ironically, looking at intentional and negligent fault comparisons
in this end game of tort reform-a setting in which comparisons can
abundantly achieve the liability-limiting objectives of legislatures-
may actually undermine support for tort reform statutes. When states
examine the problems with apportionment and several liability stat-
utes in the context of intentional/negligent fault comparisons, they
may not only decide to bar comparison of intentional and negligent
fault, but may also decide to rethink and revise their tort reform stat-
utes in other contexts as well.
26
24 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 8 (2000);
UNIF. APPORTIONMENT OF TORT RESPONSIBILTY Acr, at 2-7 (Final Draft 2002) (on file
with author).
25 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 14
(creating joint and several liability for tortfeasors who are liable because of their "fail-
ure to protect the [plaintiff] from the specific risk of an intentional tort").
26 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572h(o) (West 2002) (excluding, with
lirbited exceptions, apportionment "between parties liable for negligence and parties
liable on any basis other than negligence including, but not limited to, intentional,
wanton or reckless misconduct, strict liability or liability pursuant to any cause of ac-
tion created by statute" following the Connecticut Supreme Court's decision in
Bhinder v. Sun Co., 717 A.2d 202 (Conn. 1998), which had permitted comparison of
intentional and negligent fault in the defendant-defendant context).
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I. AT THE COURTHOUSE: IN THE STATES
Many courts have taken steps away from the traditional rules that
have routinely barred intentional-negligent fault comparison. This
Part briefly traces the origin of the intentional-negligent fault compar-
ison question and then examines the fault lines along which states are
currently divided.
A. Background
The rule that intentional and negligent fault are not explicitly
compared has been firmly established in American jurisprudence.
2 7
Noncomparison rules have been incorporated as the norm in major
tort authorities including the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the Uniform
Comparative Fault Act, and leading treatises.
28
27 This rule has at least five constituent parts: (1) that a negligent tortfeasor de-
fendant cannot assert another defendant's intentional tort as a way to diminish his
liability to the plaintiff; (2) that an intentional tortfeasor defendant cannot assert an-
other defendant's negligence as a way to diminish his liability to the plaintiff; (3) that
an intentional tortfeasor defendant cannot assert another defendant's negligence to
diminish his liability for indemnity or contribution; (4) that an intentional tortfeasor
defendant cannot assert the plaintiff's contributory negligence as a defense to his
intentional tort; and (5) that a plaintiff guilty of intentional fault cannot recover from
a negligent defendant. In certain jurisdictions these rules may apply to wrongdoers
not named as parties to the action. See infra note 28.
28 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 875 (1977) ("Each of two or more per-
sons whose tortious conduct is a legal cause of a single and indivisible harm to the
injured party is subject to liability to the injured party for the entire harm."); id. § 481
("The plaintiff's contributory negligence does not bar recovery against a defendant
for a harm caused by conduct of the defendant which is wrongful because it is in-
tended to cause harm to some legally protected interest of the plaintiff or a third
person."); id. § 886A(3) ("There is no right of contribution in favor of any tortfeasor
who has intentionally caused the harm."); UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 1 cmt., 12
U.L.A. 123, 128 (1977) ("The Act does not include intentional torts. Statutes and
decisions have not applied the comparative fault principle to them."); DOBBS, supra
note 19, at 517-18, 1090 ("[M]ost courts ...have carried these rules over to the
regime of contributory negligence, holding or assuming that the plaintiff's compara-
tive fault cannot be used to reduce the liability of an intentional tortfeasor."); 4
FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS 293 (2d ed. 1986) (stating that "'if the
consequences of which the plaintiff complains were intended by the defendant, con-
tributory negligence is out of the case"' (quoting GLANVILLE L. WILLIAMSJOINT TORTS
AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE 198 (1951))); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 476 (5th ed. 1984) ("Certain categories of joint
tortfeasors traditionally have been precluded from obtaining contribution and con-
tinue to be so even after the adoption of comparative negligence: those guilty of in-
tentional misconduct, willful and wanton negligence, and those liable for punitive
damages." (footnotes omitted)).
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Nevertheless, with tort reform a sea change had begun. As part
of tort reform agendas in the late 1980s, many states, usually via state
legislatures, restricted tort remedies, for example, limiting joint and
several liability and curtailing strict products liability by including
"strict" products claims within comparative fault regimes.29 While stat-
utes that compared parties' negligent acts were often termed compar-
ative negligence or comparative fault statutes, statutes that included
causes of action beyond negligence, like strict liability, began to be
referred to as comparative apportionment or comparative responsibil-
ity systems.
30
As comparative fault statutes were amended or interpreted to in-
clude non-fault claims such as strict liability, the comparative en-
deavor began to change. If negligence could be compared to strict
liability despite the lack of an equivalent "fault" denominator, why not
compare strict liability, negligence, and recklessness as well?3' Al-
though some courts refused to incorporate recklessness, gross negli-
gence, and willful and wanton conduct into various aspects of
comparison schemes, 32 other states did include such conduct.33 With
29 See, e.g., Brief of American Law Professors in Support of Respondent at 20-24,
Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. Freeman Ayers, 122 S. Ct. 1434 (2002) (No. 01-963)
(stating that "[t]he shifts away from pure joint and several liability almost all occurred
as a result of legislative action during the 1980s and early 1990s," and listing the six-
teen states that have adopted pure proportionate several liability as well as the many
states that have adopted several liability in particular circumstances); William J. Mc-
Nichols, The Relevance of the Plaintiff's Misconduct in Strict Tort Products Liability, the Ad-
vent of Comparative Responsibility, and the Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts, 47
OKL.A. L. REV. 201, 234 (1994) (noting that courts have applied comparative appor-
tionment to strict products liability claims as a result of the tort reform movement of
the 1980s).
30 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 1 cmt.
b (2000) ("This Restatement applies to all claims to recover compensation for death,
personal injury, or physical damage to tangible property, including intentional torts,
negligence, strict liability, nuisance, breach of warranty, misrepresentation, or any
other theory of liability.").
31 SeeJim Hasenfus, The Role of Recklessness in American Systems of Comparative Fault,
43 OHIO ST. L.J. 399, 404-17 (1982) (discussing early state cases considering whether
to include recklessness in comparative fault systems); William J. McNichols, Should
Comparative Responsibility Ever Apply to Intentional Torts, 37 OKLA. L. REv. 641, 641-43
(1984) (asking whether, in light of expansion of comparative responsibility in strict
product liability context, the "genie" of comparative responsibility would be released
from its bottle).
32 See, e.g., Zeroulias v. Hamilton Am. Legion Assocs., 705 N.E.2d 1164, 1166
(Mass. App. 1999) (dram shop defendant could not reduce liability based on compar-
ison with drunk driver's fault because state comparative negligence statute does not
include "willful, wanton, or reckless conduct"); Hampton Tree Farms, Inc. v. Jewett,
974 P.2d 738, 746 (Or. Ct. App. 1999) (stating that "from the text of the statute and
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the decisions of some courts to include recklessness in comparative
systems, the further question-whether intentional fault might be ad-
ded to the comparison mix-was not far behind.34
Negligent defendants' economic incentives to expand compari-
son ensured that the negligent-intentional fault comparison question
would be raised. - 5 With the combination of several liability and the
inclusion of the fault of nonparties (and sometimes even unknown or
immune nonparties) ,36 negligent tortfeasor defendants could reap
significant financial benefits from their ability to compare negligence
with other forms of fault, such as intentional torts. For example, ab-
sent joint and several liability, an apartment complex owner that
could split its liability for negligent security with a murderer's fault for
an intentional homicide might conceivably eliminate its entire respon-
sibility to compensate the victim's estate.
3 7
Accordingly, questions about comparison of intentional and neg-
ligent torts were driven by defendant interests and fairness arguments.
Specifically, in light of a perceived lack of need for an equivalent fault
denominator for comparisons, tort reform's liability limiting objec-
tives, and defendants' financial incentives to compare intentional and
negligent fault, questions about comparison of intentional and negli-
the cases that construe it, comparative fault does not apply to a plaintiff's recovery
when a defendant is liable because of willful misconduct").
33 See, e.g., Bd. of County Comm'rs of Teton County ex reL Teton County Sheriff's
Dep't v. Bassett, 8 P.3d 1079, 1084 (Wyo. 2000) (comparing one defendant's reckless-
ness with another defendant's negligence); Poole v. City of Rolling Meadows, 656
N.E.2d 768, 771 (I11. 995) (reversing an earlier ruling and holding that "a plaintiff's
contributory negligence may be compared to a defendant's willful and wanton mis-
conduct, if that willful and wanton misconduct was committed recklessly, rather than
intentionally").
34 See, e.g., Hutcherson v. City of Phoenix, 961 P.2d 449, 452 (Ariz. 1998) (consid-
ering whether to include intentional torts in comparative fault system in light of "re-
cent cases [that] have permitted a comparison of reckless, willful, or wanton conduct
with negligent conduct"); Blazovic v. Andrich, 590 A.2d 222, 227-28 (N.J. 1991) (not-
ing that in NewJersey comparative fault had been applied to strict liability and willful
and wanton conduct, and then considering whether comparative negligence should
be extended to include intentional torts).
35 SeeJoseph A. Page, Deforming Tort Reform, 78 GEO. L.J. 649, 654-55 (1990) (as-
serting that the new tort reform, unlike the old, "is fueled by the economic self-inter-
est of those who perceive themselves as adversely affected by the tort system").
36 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 17, at
151-59 (2000) (listing jurisdictions that have adopted several liability and that in-
clude nonparty fault). See, e.g., DaFonte v. Up-Right, Inc., 828 P.2d 140, 146 (Cal.
1992) (holding that the proper fault comparison is between "all fault responsible for
the plaintiff's injuries," not merely that of the defendants named in the lawsuit (em-
phasis omitted)).
37 See Ozaki v. Ass'n of Apartment Owners, 954 P.2d 644, 649-50 (Haw. 1998).
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gent fault have -been raised with increasing frequency over the last
decade.
B. Current Questions and the Importance of Context
Courts in at least twenty-two states have recently faced questions
about comparison of defendants' intentional and negligent fault.3 8
State legislatures have faced similar questions. 39 Moreover, a number
of state courts have examined comparison of intentional and negli-
gent fault between plaintiffs and defendants. 40 That so many state
courts are now seriously grappling with questions related to inten-
tional/negligent fault comparisons is striking because only a decade
ago courts had rarely questioned the justice and efficacy of the firmly
established rules that prevented such comparisons.
41
Now that courts are actively considering intentional/negligent
fault comparisons, they often view the question of whether to permit
comparison of intentional and negligent fault as a simple yes or no
question-a court either compares these varieties of fault or it does
not. Yet while some courts use broad language about comparing "in-
tentional and negligent fault," the actual holdings suggest that this
broad rhetoric is inapt.4 2 The reality of state court holdings is far
more confined and context-dependent.
With few exceptions, the cases that permit comparison of inten-
tional and negligent fault compare the intentional and negligent fault
of two defendants. 43 Even when jurisdictions compare intentional
38 See supra note 20.
39 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.900 (Michie 1999) (enacting legislation to in-
clude intentional acts in comparative apportionment statute); 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 7102 (West 2002) (enacting "comparative negligence" statute after consider-
ing a bill proposing "comparative responsibility").
40 See, e.g., Whitlock v. Smith, 762 S.W.2d 782, 783 (Ark. 1989) (holding that in
battery case the trial court "correctly refused to give the instruction on comparative
fault"); Poole v. City of Rolling Meadows, 656 N.E.2d 768, 770 (111. 1995) (holding
that a plaintiff's contributory negligence may not be compared to a defendant's in-
tentional misconduct).
41 See DOBBS, supra note 19, at 1090 (noting the "traditional view" that courts
refuse to compare one defendant's intentional harm with another's negligence).
42 See, e.g., Bd. of County Comm'rs of Teton County ex rel. Teton County Sheriff's
Dep't v. Bassett, 8 P.3d 1079, 1084 (Wyo. 2000) (permitting intentional and negligent
fault of defendants to be compared and distinguishing a prior case that rejected com-
parisons on the ground that in the prior case "the comparison was of the conduct of
only the plaintiff and the defendant driver-not the conduct of another 'actor").
43 Compare Martin v. United States, 984 F.2d 1033, 1039-40 (9th Cir. 1993) (hold-
ing that defendants' intentional and negligent torts should be compared under Cali-
fornia's comparative fault act), with Heiner v. Kmart Corp., 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 854, 864
(Ct. App. 2000) (refusing to allow batterer to assert plaintiff's negligence); compare
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and negligent fault in this context, they frequently prevent compari-
son in other contexts. 44 Thus, although courts and commentators
often fail to differentiate between comparison of intentional and neg-
ligent fault between defendants and comparisons of intentional and
negligent fault between plaintiffs and defendants, 45 the distinction is
critical.
46
Courts rarely permit intentional tortfeasor defendants, such as
the murderers in the Brandon case, to compare their conduct with a
plaintiffs negligence. 4 7 The exceptions in which such comparisons
have been permitted or urged in this context primarily involve low-
culpability intentional torts or high-culpability negligent torts.48 For
example, when the defendant's intentional tort did not involve an in-
tent to harm others, as can be the case in some property torts like
also Rausch v. Pocatello Lumber Co., 14 P.3d 1074 (Idaho Ct. App. 2000) (comparing
defendants' intentional and negligent torts), with Fitzgerald v. Young, 670 P.2d 1324,
1326 (Idaho Ct. App. 1983) (refusing to compare defendant's intentional tort with
plaintiff's negligence).
44 See Bd. of County Comm'rs of Teton County, 8 P.3d at 1084.
45 See, e.g., id. at 1084 n.2 (citing cases barring comparisons between plaintiffs and
defendants as contrary to case barring comparison between defendants); see also
Christopher M. Brown & Kirk A. Morgan, Comment, Consideration of Intentional Torts
in Fault Allocation: Disarming the Duty To Protect Against Intentional Conduct, 2 Wvo. L.
REV. 483, 502 (2002) (stating that "[t]wenty-five jurisdictions have held that their
comparative fault statutes do not permit the comparison of intentional and negligent
conduct" but including in that tabulation a state such as Idaho, which bars an inten-
tional tortfeasor from asserting the plaintiff's negligence but nevertheless permits
comparison between intentional and negligent tortfeasor defendants).
46 Reginald R. White, III. Comparative Responsibility Sometimes: The Louisiana Ap-
proach to Comparative Apportionment and Intentional Torts, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1501, 1520
(1996) ("Application of comparative apportionment to a suit involving an intentional
tortfeasor depends on whose fault is being compared. Plainly, different considera-
tions are involved when comparing the fault of the intentional and negligent
tortfeasor; the victim and the negligent tortfeasor; and the victim and the intentional
tortfeasor.").
47 See Kellerman v. Zeno, 983 S.W.2d 136, 141 (Ark. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that
malicious prosecution is an intentional tort and that comparative fault instruction was
properly rejected on that basis despite broad wording of fault in state comparative
fault statute); RESTATEMENT (TuIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILrrY § 1 (C)
(2000) ("Although some courts have held that a plaintiff's negligence may serve as a
comparative defense to an intentional tort, most have not."); DOBBS, supra note 19, at
520 ("[F]ew cases so far seem to have reduced a personal injury defendant's liability
for his own intentional wrongdoing merely because the plaintiff was guilty of contrib-
utory negligence."); Allan L. Schwartz, Annotation, Applicability of Comparative Negli-
gence Principles to Intentional Torts, 18 A.L.R.5TH 529, 533 (1994) ("The clearly
prevailing view is that comparative negligence principles are not applicable to inten-
tional torts.").
48 See infra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
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nuisance, or when the intent to harm others is harbored by a low-
culpability actor like a child, a court may permit an intentional
tortfeasor defendant to compare its intentional fault with a plaintiffs
negligence. 49 In situations of heightened plaintiff culpability-for ex-
ample, when the plaintiff, like the defendant, has committed an inten-
tional tort-a court may also permit intentional/negligent fault
comparisons.
50
Similarly, few courts permit a plaintiff guilty of intentional fault to
compare that fault with the defendant's negligence. So even though
Brandon's estate could sue the sheriff who failed to use reasonable
care to prevent the murder, ordinarily the murderers could not file a
similar suit claiming that the sheriffs negligence led to their incarcer-
ation. 51 The exceptions in this context generally concern diminished
49 See Shields v. Cape Fox Corp., 42 P.3d 1083, 1088 (Alaska 2002) (holding that
because defendant's "fault giving rise to liability for conversion could be mere negli-
gence" it was plain error for trial court not to have provided the defendant's compara-
tive negligence instruction");Jake Dear & Steven E. Zipperstein, Comparative Fault and
Intentional Torts: Doctrinal Barriers and Policy Considerations, 24 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1,
32-38 (1984) (urging plaintiff comparative fault as a defense to the intentional tort of
nuisance); Gail D. Hollister, Using Comparative Fault To Replace the All-or-Nothing Lottery
Imposed in Intentional Torts Suits in Which Both Plaintiff and Defendant Are at Fault, 46
VAND. L. REv. 121, 151-52 (1993) (urging comparisons in the case of a person who
shot a dog believing it was a (presumably unprotected) wolf, a situation in which the
intent to act did not include an intent to harm a legally cognizable interest); McNich-
ols, supra note 31, at 644-46 (advocating some plaintiff comparative fault defenses to
intentional torts and using illustrations concerning intentional torts committed by
children as in Ellis v. D'Angelo, 253 P.2d 675 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1953), and Vosburg v.
Putney, 50 N.W. 403 (Wis. 1891)).
50 See, e.g., Bonpua v. Fagan, 602 A.2d 287 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992) (in-
volving a plaintiff who physically attacked the defendant during the altercation);
Johnson v. City of Philadelphia, 2002 WL 31119177, at *5 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Sept. 26,
2002) (holding that if both plaintiff's and defendant's conduct was reckless, the jury
could compare the parties' conduct). Some courts and commentators have suggested
that provocation should be a defense to an intentional tort. See, e.g., Comeau v. Lucas,
455 N.Y.S.2d 871 (App. Div. 1982); B. Scott Andrews, Premises Liability-The Compari-
son of Fault Between Negligent and Intentional Actors, 55 LA. L. REV. 1149, 1164 (1995)
(suggesting that when apportioning fault between a negligent plaintiff and an inten-
tional tortfeasor "[i]f the act is a result of provocation, comparison will be appropri-
ate"). Most of the cases that permitted verbal provocation to serve as a defense came
from Louisiana. See, e.g.,Jones v. Thomas, 557 So. 2d 1015 (La. Ct. App. 1990). How-
ever, Louisiana has now overruled those cases by statute. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art.
2323(c) (West 1997) ("[I]f a person suffers injury, death, or loss as a result partly of
his own negligence and partly as a result of the fault of an intentional tortfeasor, his
claim for recovery of damages shall not be reduced.").
51 See, e.g., Adkinson v. Rossi Arms, Co., 659 P.2d 1236, 1240 (Alaska 1983) (hold-
ing that a convicted killer was not allowed to sue gun manufacturer on claim that
gun's defect caused its discharge which led to his prison sentence).
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capacity plaintiffs who have intentionally harmed themselves rather
than others. An example would be in-patient and prisoner suicide
cases. 52 In addition, when the negligent tortfeasor's very duty is to
protect even an intentional tortfeasor, as in civil rights cases, plaintiffs
guilty of intentional fault have also been allowed to recover from neg-
ligent defendants.
53
Because court holdings that compare intentional and negligent
fault are largely confined to comparisons of that fault between inten-
tional and negligent defendants, this Article focuses on the comparison
of intentional and negligent fault solely within that context.
C. Whether To Compare Defendants' Intentional and Negligent Fault by
Percentages: Two Competing Views
While most states still refuse to compare intentional and negli-
gent fault even in the context of two tortfeasor defendants, 54 a grow-
ing minority of states has broken with precedent and permitted such
comparisons. In the twenty-two states in which courts have recently
reexamined rules regarding intentional-negligent fault comparison
between defendants, the courts of fourteen states have determined
that defendants' intentional and negligent fault should be compared
52 SeeWyke v. Polk County Sch. Bd., 129 F.3d 560, 567-68 (11th Cir. 1997) (hold-
ing that mother of high school student who committed suicide at home after school
failed to tell parent that student had attempted suicide twice at school could bring
§ 1983 and wrongful death claim against school board and school officials); Joseph v.
State, 26 P.3d 459, 477 (Alaska 2001) ("IT]he intentionality of a prisoner's suicide
does not preclude a claim that a jailer negligently failed to prevent that suicide.");
Robert K. Jenner, Overcoming Contributomy and Comparative Negligence in Suicide and Self-
Inflicted Harm Cases, in 2 ATLA ANNUAL CONVENTION REFERENCE MATERIALS 1985, at
1993 (2000) ("Negligent health care providers should not even have access to the
doctrines of contributory negligence or assumption of the risk where the psychiatric
staff's duties include preventing the self-destructive act that causes the patient's
death." (emphasis omitted)).
53 See DoBBs, supra note 19, at 523 n.2 (citing McCummings v. New York City
Transit Auth., 613 N.E.2d 559 (N.Y. 1993) (holding that a plaintiff may recover if he is
negligently injured by a police officer even though he was running away from a mug-
ging)); see also Gail D. Hollister, Tort Suits for Injuries Sustained During Illegal Abortions:
The Effects of Judicial Bias, 45 VILL. L. REV. 387, 389 (2000) (arguing that women in-
jured during illegal abortions should be permitted to sue for injuries tortiously in-
flicted during the abortion).
54 See infra note 59 and accompanying text.
[VOL. 78:2
THE END GAME OF TORT REFORM
in at least some types of cases. 55 Eight of those states, on the other
hand, continue to bar such comparisons.
56
Precisely who is making decisions about comparing intentional
and negligent fault in this context-courts or legislatures-can be dif-
ficult to pinpoint. The conclusions of state courts often flow, more or
less naturally, from interpretations of statutory comparative-fault
schemes. Both state courts that compare intentional and negligent
fault and those that do not, rely extensively on interpretation of state
comparative-fault acts. Consequently, differences in the wording and
scope of state comparative-fault acts play an appropriately important
role in the conflicting nature of state law rules in this area.
57
55 State courts that have recently chosen to compare some defendants' inten-
tional fault with other defendants' negligence include: Arizona, California, Colorado,
Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York,
North Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming. See, e.g., Hutcherson v. City of Phoenix, 961 P.2d
449 (Ariz. 1998); Ortega v. Pajaro Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 64 Cal. App. 4th 1023 (Ct.
App.1998); Slack v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 5 P.3d 280 (Colo. 2000); Ozaki v. Ass'n of
Apartment Owners; 954 P.2d 644 (Haw. 1998); Rausch v. Pocatello Lumber Co., 14
P.3d 1074 (Idaho Ct. App. 2000); Paragon Family Rest. v. Bartolini, 769 N.E.2d 609
(Ind. Ct. App. 2002); Roman Catholic Diocese of Covington v. Secter, 966 S.W.2d 286
(Ky. Ct. App. 1998); Morrison v. Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity, 738 So. 2d 1105 (La. Ct.
App. 1999); Martin v. Prime Hospitality Corp., 785 A.2d 16 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2001); Barth v. Coleman, 878 P.2d 319 (N.M. 1994); Chianese v. Meier, 98 N.Y.2d 270
(2002); Rodenburg v. Fargo-Moorhead Young Men's Christian Ass'n, 632 N.W.2d 407
(N.D. 2001); Field v. Boyer Co., 952 P.2d 1078 (Utah 1998); Bd. of County Comm'rs
of Teton County ex rel. Teton County Sheriff's Dep't v. Bassett, 8 P.3d 1079 (Wyo.
2000). Although some state statutes have been amended to include intentional con-
duct in comparative apportionment systems, state courts have not yet ruled whether
those statutes also include intentional harms.
56 The states whose courts have recently determined that those states do not com-
pare the negligent fault of one defendant with the intentional fault of another defen-
dant are: Connecticut, Florida, Kansas, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Nebraska,
Tennessee, and Washington. See, e.g., LtIfi v. Islami, No. CV980334075S, 2001 WL
808394, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 19, 2001); Palafrugell Holdings Inc. v. Cassel,
No. 3D99-1596, 2001 WL 20824 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Jan. 10, 2001); Wood v. Groh, 7
P.3d 1163 (Kan. 2000); Flood v. Southland Corp., 616 N.E.2d 1068 (Mass. 1993); Daw-
son v. Townsend & Sons, Inc., 735 So. 2d 1131 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999); Brandon v.
County of Richardson, 624 N.W.2d 604 (Neb. 2001) (Brandon /); Turner v. Jordan,
957 S.W.2d 815 (Tenn. 1997); Welch v. Southland Corp., 952 P.2d 162 (Wash. 1998).
Many other states may have chosen not to reconsider the issue because of a desire to
maintain their existing bans on such comparisons.
57 Compare CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-572h(o) (West Supp. 2002) ("Except as pro-
vided in subsection (b) of this section, there shall be no apportionment of liability or
damages between parties liable for negligence and parties liable on any basis other
than negligence including, but not limited to, intentional, wanton or reckless miscon-
duct .... ), with TEX. CIv. PiAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 33.003 (Vernon 1997) ("The
trier of fact, as to each cause of action asserted, shall determine the percentage of
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However, statutory differences are not the sole factor in differing
judicial analyses, as statutes with similar language have been inter-
preted to hold contrary "plain" meanings. 58 Accordingly, this Part ex-
amines both statutory and non-statutory rationales proffered by state
courts.
1. The Majority: Courts That Do Not Compare Defendants'
Intentional and Negligent Torts By Percentages
Most states have not explicitly compared one defendant's inten-
tional fault with another defendant's negligence. 59 In many states,
responsibility, stated in whole numbers, for the following persons with respect to each
person's causing or contributing to cause in any way the harm for which recovery of
damages is sought, whether by negligent act or omission, by any defective or unrea-
sonably dangerous product, by other conduct or activity that violates an applicable
legal standard, or by any combination of these: (1) each claimant; (2) each defen-
dant; (3) each settling person; and (4) each responsible third party who has been
joined ....").
58 Compare ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2506 (West 1994) ("Fault means an actiona-
ble breach of legal duty, act or omission proximately causing or contributing to injury
or damages sustained by a person seeking recovery, including negligence in all of its
degrees, contributory negligence, assumption of risk, strict liability, breach of express
or implied warranty of a product, products liability and misuse, modification or abuse
of a product."), as interpreted by Hutcherson v. City of Phoenix, 961 P.2d 449, 451-53
(Ariz. 1998) (holding that the "plain meaning" of the term "fault" included inten-
tional torts), with WASii. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.22.015 (West 1988) ("'Fault' includes
acts or omissions, including misuse of a product, that are in any measure negligent or
reckless toward the person or property of the actor or others, or that subject a person
to strict liability or liability on a product liability claim. The term also includes breach
of warranty, unreasonable assumption of risk, and unreasonable failure to avoid an
injury or to mitigate damages."), as interpreted by Welch v. Southland Corp., 952 P.2d
162, 164-66 (Wash. 1998) (holding that the unambiguous statutory definition of
"fault" does not include intentional acts).
59 The majority-states that have not compared by percentages one defendant's
intentional fault with another defendant's negligence-is a diverse group. The group
includes states that have not enacted comparative fault. See, e.g., Sawyer v. Comerci,
563 S.E.2d 748, 752 (Va. 2002). The group also includes states that have enacted
comparative fault but have expressly decided to exclude intentional torts from com-
parisons. See infra notes 63, 71. In addition, a number of states that have not directly
discussed the issue of comparison by percentages apparently exclude intentional torts
from comparisons in practice. See, e.g., Doe v. Wal-Mart Stores, 558 S.E.2d 663 (W. Va.
2001) (addressing store's liability to victim of parking lot abduction without any com-
parison of abductor and store's responsibility). Still other states have directly dis-
cussed and rejected comparison of defendants' intentional and negligent fault by
percentages, but have made these rulings in special contexts. See, e.g., Gomilla v.
Libertas, No. 99-2436, 2000 Wis. Ct. App. LEXIS 1119, at *9 (Nov. 21, 2000) (unpub-
lished opinion) (ruling that "comparison principles do not allow the intentional con-
duct of the employee to be compared with the negligent conduct of the employer");
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years-old prohibitions against comparison have been retained without
recent reexamination.60 In these states, courts have provided little ex-
planation for their continued practices-perhaps reflecting the view
that challenges to the noncomparison rule are not sufficiently serious
in these jurisdictions even to require extended consideration.
In at least eight states, however, courts have recently addressed
and deliberately retained rules barring comparison of defendants' in-
tentional and negligent torts.61 Court determinations in these states
have been grounded on three main rationales: the requirements of
state statutes, the importance of the negligent defendant's duty, and
the belief that intentional and negligent conduct are "different in
kind." Dissenting opinions in states that have elected to compare de-
fendants' intentional and negligent torts mirror and enhance these
rationales.
62
a. Reliance on State Statutes
In all of the states that have explicitly considered and rejected
intentional-negligent defendant fault comparisons, state statutes
played a role in court decisions. In three states-Connecticut, Flor-
ida, and Mississippi-explicit statutory language excludes "inten-
tional" misconduct from the definition of "fault" in comparative fault
systems. 63 Not surprisingly, state court decisions in these states relied
Farmers State Bank of Darwin v. Swisher, 631 N.W.2d 796, 801 (Minn. 2001) (stating
that Minnesota's comparative fault act applies to negligent or reckless acts or omis-
sions but not intentional torts and therefore disallows the defendant's proposed setoff
based on the other defendant's settlement). Finally, additional states directly state
that they exclude intentional torts from comparisons but have made those broad
statements in cases that do not involve two tortfeasor defendants. See, e.g., Johnson v.
City of Philadelphia, 808 A.2d 978, 983 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002) (stating that "the only
conduct that is statutorily authorized to be compared is negligent conduct," but ad-
dressing that issue in the context of a plaintiff and a defendant).
60 See, e.g., Richardson v. QuickTrip Corp., 81 S.W.3d 54, 67 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002)
(holding that convenience store had a duty to patron raped in ladies room without
suggesting that such a duty could be compared to the rapist's fault).
61 See supra note 56.
62 See, e.g., Slack v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 5 P.3d 280, 288-95 (Colo. 2000) (Rice, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the pro-rata liability statute was not intended to allow for
apportionment of liability between a negligent tortfeasor and an intentional
tortfeasor).
63 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-572h(o) (Supp. 2002) ("[T]here shall be no appor-
tionment of liability or damages between parties liable for negligence and parties lia-
ble on any basis other than negligence including, but not limited to, intentional
misconduct .. "); FLA. STAT ANN. § 768.81(4) (b) (West 1997 & Supp. 2002) ("[Com-
parative fault] does not apply . . . to any action based upon an intentional tort.");
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almost exclusively on statutory language, 64 whether the state legisla-
tion overruled a court's prior intentional/negligent fault compari-
sons, as in Connecticut, 65 or was designed to reinforce prior judicial
decisions, as in Florida.
66
However, explicit statutory language excluding intentional acts
from comparison has not precluded all intentional-negligent compari-
son questions. In Mississippi, the state statute governing "[j]oint tort-
feasors, liability, and contribution" explicitly provides that "'[f]ault'
shall not include any tort which results from an act or omission com-
mitted with a specific wrongful intent."67 And yet, one Mississippi
court felt that to resolve the "hybrid case" of intentional/negligent
fault comparisons, the court needed to look beyond the statutory text
itself,68 to extrinsic evidence of legislative intent such as statutory
drafts and revisions, 69 and to policy considerations y
°
When state comparative fault or apportionment statutes lack spe-
cific language concerning intentional fault, courts have examined leg-
islative intent but generally have placed less reliance on that factor. In
the five states that bar comparison of defendants' intentional and neg-
ligent fault without explicit statutory language that mentions inten-
tional fault-Kansas, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Tennessee, and
Miss. CODE ANN. § 85-5-7 (1999) ("'Fault' shall not include any tort which results
from an act or omission committed with a specific wrongful intent.").
64 But see Dawson v. Townsend & Sons, Inc., 735 So. 2d 1131, 1142 (Miss. Ct. App.
1999) (stating that the issue of comparison between defendants was open in Missis-
sippi despite explicit statutory language excluding intentional torts).
65 In Bhinder v. Sun Co., 717 A.2d 202, 204 (Conn. 1998), a wrongful death suit in
which a gas station attendant who worked at a store with a history of assaults was killed
by an armed robber, a narrowly divided Connecticut Supreme Court elected to per-
mit comparison of the gas station's negligence with the robber's intentional tort. Just
nine months after the decision, the Connecticut legislature retroactively amended its
comparative fault statute to overrule the Bhinder decision by stating explicitly that
"there shall be no apportionment of liability or damages between parties liable for
negligence and parties liable on any basis other than negligence including, but not
limited to, intentional, wanton or reckless misconduct, strict liability or liability pursu-
ant to any cause of action created by statute." CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-572h(o) (Supp.
2002) (providing limited exceptions).
66 In Florida, the legislature amended its comparative fault statute to preclude
the application of comparative fault to "any action based upon an intentional tort."
FLA. STAT ANN. § 768.81(4)(b) (West 1997 & Supp. 2002). That amendment rein-
forced that state's earlier court rulings. See, e.g., Stellas v. Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc., 702
So. 2d 232, 233-34 (Fla. 1997) (holding that "it was an error to permit both defend-
ants' names to appear on the verdict form").
67 Miss. CODE ANN. § 85-5-7 (1999).
68 Dawson, 735 So. 2d at 1136.
69 Id. at 1136-41.
70 Id. at 1136-42.
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Washington 7 1-courts have primarily relied on two policy rationales:
the nature and importance of the defendant's duty and the idea that
intentional and negligent fault are different in kind.
b. The Defendant's Duty
The state court most widely noted for its rejection of intentional/
negligent fault comparisons is the Kansas Supreme Court-one of the
first courts to adopt comparative negligence 72 and one of the first
courts to expressly consider and reject this aspect of comparative ap-
portionment. 73 The Kansas Supreme Court has repeatedly refused to
compare the fault of intentional and negligent tortfeasor defend-
ants-primarily relying on the concern that comparisons would un-
dermine the very duty of the negligent defendant. Specifically, the
Kansas court maintains that when the very duty of the negligent de-
fendant is to use reasonable care to prevent an intentional tort, it
would be contrary to that obligation to allow the defendant to rest its
defense on the fact that the intentional tort that it facilitated had
occurred.
Under this "very duty" reasoning, a truck stop accused of negli-
gence in failing to safeguard a bailed tractor-trailer rig was not permit-
ted to compare its negligence with the intentional fault of the thief
who had stolen and demolished the bailed vehicle because "[t] heft is
clearly one of the harms against which a bailee must protect. '"74 Simi-
larly, a fast-food restaurant accused of negligence for its manager's
failure to contact police or intervene while a customer was attacked on
its premises could not compare its fault with the intentional attacker's
because the restaurant's very duty was to use reasonable care to pro-
tect the customer from the intentional assault. 75 And a school bus
transportation service and school district accused of negligence in ig-
71 See M. Bruenger & Co. v. Dodge City Truck Stop, Inc., 675 P.2d 864, 869 (Kan.
1984); Flood v. Southland Corp., 616 N.E.2d 1068 (Mass. 1993); Brandon v. County of
Richardson, 624 N.W.2d 604 (Neb. 2000) (Brandon II); Turner v.Jordan, 957 S.W.2d
815 (Tenn. 1997); Welch v. Southland Corp., 952 P.2d 162, 165 (Wash. 1998).
72 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 28, § 67, at 469-70.
73 See M. Bruenger & Co., 675 P.2d at 869-70 (discussing Kansas's comparative
negligence statute and refusing to compare negligent and intentional fault).
74 Id. at 869. The court reversed the judgment of the trial court, which permitted
the jury to compare the truck stop's negligence with the intentional fault of the
thief-the jury had allocated 50% of the responsibility to the thief, 10% to the truck
stop that had left the truck unlocked with the keys in the ignition while repairing a
tire, and 40% to the owners of the truck who had left the truck unlocked with the keys
in the ignition before the truck was repaired. Id. at 867.
75 Gould v. Taco Bell, 722 P.2d 511, 514, 516-17 (Kan. 1986) (holding that Taco
Bell, whose manager knew of prior attack by restaurant patron and saw patron's attack
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noring a mother's concerns that her six-year-old mentally retarded
daughter was being sexually abused could not compare their negli-
gence with that of the abuser.76 Courts are concerned that "[a] weak-
ening of the incentives [of negligent defendants] would occur if a
large part of the responsibility remained on the criminal who directly
caused the harm.
'77
c. Difference in Kind
In decisions rejecting comparison of defendants' intentional and
negligent torts, courts also note concerns that intentional and negli-
gent torts are inappropriate for comparison because the two types of
conduct are "different in kind. '78 As one court wrote when prevent-
ing such comparisons, "intentional torts are part of a wholly different
legal realm and are inapposite to the determination of fault pursuant
to [the statutory scheme].
79
on plaintiff but failed to phone police, could not add attacker as a formal party in
plaintiff's negligent security suit against the restaurant).
76 Kan. State Bank & Trust Co. v. Specialized Transp. Servs., Inc., 819 P.2d 587,
591-93, 605 (Kan. 1991) (holding that in suit brought on behalf of a six-year-old
mentally retarded girl assaulted by her school bus driver, which alleged negligence by
the school bus transportation service and school district on the ground that they ig-
nored her mother's concerns about signs of abuse, the trial court had not erred "in
failing to instruct the jury to compare their fault (negligence) with [the bus driver's]
fault (intentional)" because "it would be unfair to allow the intentional act of one
defendant to be compared with the negligent act of a defendant whose duty it is to
protect the plaintiff from the act committed by the intentional tortfeasor").
77 Dawson v. Townsend & Sons, Inc., 735 So. 2d 1131, 1140 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999);
see also Limbaugh v. Coffee Med. Ctr., 59 S.W.3d 73, 87 (Tenn. 2001) (rejecting nurs-
ing home's attempt to compare its fault with that of nurse who assaulted patient and
relying in part on court's previously stated concern that "allowing comparison would
reduce the negligent person's incentive to comply with the applicable duty of care
and thus prevent further wrongdoing").
78 See, e.g., Lee v. Coss, 39 F. Supp. 2d 170, 174 (D. Conn. 1999); Turner v. Jor-
dan, 957 S.W.2d 815, 823 (Tenn. 1997).
79 Welch v. Southland Corp., 952 P.2d 162, 166 (Wash. 1998) (citing Price v. Kit-
sap Transit, 886 P.2d 556, 560 (Wash. 1994)); cf Dawson, 735 So. 2d at 1141 ("Both
negligence and wilful torts are considered in the statute, but there is no bridge be-
tween them. The statute almost seems to say, to paraphrase Kipling, 'fault is fault and
wilful is wilful and nevei the twain shall meet.'").
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2. The Emerging Minority: Jurisdictions That Compare
Defendants' Intentional and Negligent Fault By
Percentages
In the last decade, a number of states have permitted comparison
of defendants' intentional and negligent fault.80 This minority view is
significant because it is recent, appears likely to increase,,' and has
garnered support from one significant authority.8 2
Before discussing cases that compare defendants' intentional and
negligent fault, it is important to note that this law is both recent and
in flux. In some jurisdictions, courts have not yet reviewed state stat-
utes that were amended to include intentional conduct.83 In other
jurisdictions, state appellate courts, but not state supreme courts, have
decided that defendants' intentional and negligent fault should be
compared. 84 In still other jurisdictions, state court holdings have
been subsequently modified or overruled by state legislatures.8 5 Con-
sequently, the state laws themselves are still evolving.
Courts in fourteen states have recently permitted comparison of
some defendants' intentional and negligent fault.8 6 Courts in these
fourteen states support their decisions with a number of similar ratio-
nales-deference to state legislatures, renewed concern for "fair
shares" particularly in light of other rules about allocating fault, con-
viction that intentional and negligent torts are different only in de-
gree, deference to juries and their ability to make comparative
80 See supra note 55.
81 See, e.g., Swedlund, supra note 21, at 45 (noting that a case that would have
raised the issue of intentional-negligent comparisons in South Dakota was settled
before trial and suggesting that South Dakota reconsider that issue in future cases).
82 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 1 cmt. c
(2000) (recommending comparison of some types of intentional and negligent fault,
but also adopting significant ameliorative doctrines).
83 See supra note 21.
84 See, e.g., Scott v. County of Los Angeles, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 643 (Ct. App. 1994);
Weidenfeller v. Star & Garter, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 14 (Ct. App. 1991).
85 See Bhinder v. Sun Co., Inc., 717 A.2d 202 (Conn. 1998), superceded by statute as
stated in Eskin v. Castiglia, 753 A.2d 927, 935 (Conn. 2000); Veazey v. Elmwood Planta-
tion Assocs., 650 So. 2d 712, 717-18 (La. 1994) (interpreting that state's comparative
fault statute before it was revised in 1996); Morrison v. Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity,
738 So. 2d 1105, 1112-13 (La. Ct. App. 1999) (noting Louisiana's 1996 comparative
fault statutory revisions).
86 State courts that have recently chosen to compare some defendants' inten-
tional fault with other defendants' negligence include: Arizona, California, Colorado,
Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York,
North Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming. See supra note 55.
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apportionment determinations, and interest in following the lead of
other state courts and authorities.
a. Reliance on State Statutes
While many courts rely on statutory interpretation, courts that
permit comparison of intentional and negligent torts have been much
less likely to rely exclusively on actual or perceived legislative man-
dates. In a few states, comparative fault statutes expressly include "in-
tentional" conduct within their ambit. 87 In most of these states,
reported opinions have not yet interpreted whether that statutory lan-
guage includes not only intentional conduct but also conduct that in-
tended harm."" However, in one state with such a statute, a state court
included without discussion even conduct that intended harm. 9
In states with statutes that do not explicitly address intentional
torts, courts also rely on legislative intent.90 Some courts have con-
cluded that the "plain meaning" of the statutory term "fault" in com-
parative fault statutes includes intentional torts. Courts have
determined that state comparative fault or responsibility statutes in-
clude intentional harms even when the statute enumerated specific
categories of included "fault" that did not list intentional torts,91
struck references to "intentional torts" found in earlier versions of the
legislation, 92 contained specific language exempting "actions requir-
ing proof of intent,"93 or included legislative history suggesting that
87 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.900 (Michie 2000) ("'[F]ault' includes acts or
omissions that are in any measure negligent, reckless, or intentional toward the per-
son or property of the actor or others ...."); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-6-2-45(b) (Michie
1998) (fault includes "any act or omission that is negligent, willful, wanton, reckless,
or intentional toward the person or property of others"); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 600.6304 (West 2000) (stating that "'fault' includes an act, omission, [or] conduct,
including intentional conduct").
88 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.900; see also RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF TORTS:
LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM (BAsIC PRINCIPLES) § 1 (Tentative Draft, March 28,
2001) (distinguishing between intentional acts and intentional harms and recom-
mending that only the latter be included as intentional torts).
89 IND. CODE ANN. § 34-6-2-45(b); Paragon Family Rest. v. Bartolini, 769 N.E.2d
609 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).
90 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2506 (West Supp. 2001), as interpreted by
Hutcherson v. City of Phoenix, 961 P.2d 449 (Ariz. 1998).
91 Hutcherson, 961 P.2d at 462.
92 See Bd. of County Comm'rs of Teton County ex rel. Teton County Sheriff's
Dep't v. Bassett, 8 P.3d 1079, 1083 (Wyo. 2000).
93 Chianese v. Meier, 774 N.E.2d 722, 724 (N.Y. 2002).
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the legislature had never considered the possibility of comparing de-
fendants' intentional torts.
94
b. A Concern for "Fair Shares"
Courts that have elected to compare defendants' intentional and
negligent fault have been much more likely than their counterparts to
discuss policy considerations along with their statutory interpretation.
The most frequently cited policy rationale in favor of intentional/neg-
ligent fault comparisons between defendants has been a concern for
fairness. A number of courts apparently viewed comparison of inten-
tional and negligent fault as more fair to plaintiffs and defendants,
because they believed that such comparisons would ensure that no
party would pay more than its "fair share" of the fault,95 or for more
than what it caused.96 Within this overarching concern for fairness,
courts have raised a number of distinct issues. Courts are concerned
that absent intentional/negligent fault comparisons, negligent
tortfeasors will be held liable for an intentional tortfeasor's fault.97
They are also concerned that negligent defendants will pay a larger
share of the judgment when their codefendants are intentional rather
than negligent tortfeasors. 98 In addition, courts are concerned that
94 Slack v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 5 P.3d 280, 290 (Colo. 2000) (Rice, J., dissenting)
("[A]t no time did the committee engage in any discussion indicating that these
changes [from comparative "negligence" to "fault"] might alter the scope of liability
apportionment in any fashion .... It is difficult to believe that the conference com-
mittee intended so sweeping a change in the scope of liability apportionment without
any discussion or comment to that effect.").
95 See, e.g., Hutcherson, 961 P.2d at 452.
96 See, e.g., Reichert v. Atler, 875 P.2d 379, 381 (N.M. 1994) ("[T]he basis for
comparative fault is that each individual tortfeasor should be held responsible only
for his or her percentage of the harm. We will not stray from that reasoning in this
case." (citation omitted)); Rodenburg v. Fargo-Moorhead Young Men's Christian
Ass'n, 632 N.W.2d 407, 416 (N.D. 2001) (stating that in comparisons, each party is
"liable only for the amount of damages attributable to that party").
97 See Reichert, 875 P.2d at 381 (stating that the "injured party is attempting to
hold a negligent tortfeasor responsible for the conduct of an intentional tortfeasor");
Bd. of County Comm'rs of Teton County, 8 P.3d at 1084 ("To leave an actor such as [the
intentional tortfeasor] out of the apportionment calculation exposes the remaining
appellants to the possibility that they will be held to answer for his misconduct.").
98 For example, the New York Court of Appeals has stated that:
under plaintiff's reading of the statute, the right of a low-fault defendant to
apportion would depend entirely on the nature of the culpability of the
third-party tortfeasor. A negligent defendant could apportion liability with a
negligent or reckless third-party tortfeasor, but not an intentional tortfeasor.
Such a result is not only illogical but also inconsistent with the chief reme-
dial purpose of article 16.
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negligent tortfeasors will pay more than intentional tortfeasors. 99 Fi-
nally, courts are concerned that payments by negligent tortfeasors will
primarily benefit intentional tortfeasors. 10 0
Some courts also believe that fault shares must be apportioned
"as a whole" and "at one time" in order to achieve a fair assignment of
liability. Courts cite the desirability of making comparisons in a single
case,")I even when intentional and negligent fault comparisons do not
preclude (or even create evidence in) suits against a second defen-
dant stemming from the same injury.
10 2
c. Rejection of the Defendant's Duty Argument
Courts that compare defendants' intentional and negligent fault
often reject the argument that the comparison undercuts the negli-
Chianese, 774 N.E.2d at 726 (citation omitted); see also Slack, 5 P.3d at 286 (suggesting
that the legislature did not intend "to expose a negligent tortfeasor to greater liability
when his conduct was coupled with that of an intentional tortfeasor, than when his
conduct combined with that of another negligent tortfeasor").
99 See, e.g., Weidenfeller v. Star & Garter, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 14, 16 (Ct. App. 1991)
("[T]he common sense notion [is] that a more culpable party should bear the finan-
cial burden caused by its intentional act."); Slack, 5 P.3d at 286 ("[F]ailure to appor-
tion 'would have the incongruous effect of rendering a negligent party solely
responsible for the conduct of an intentional actor, whose deviation from the stan-
dard of care is clearly greater."' (quoting Bhinder v. Sun Co., 717 A.2d 202, 210 (Conn.
1998) (overruled by statute))). Thatjuries in some states can award most or all of the
fault to the negligent rather than the intentional tortfeasor appears to undermine this
argument somewhat. See, e.g., Evangelatos v. Super. Ct., 753 P.2d 585, 590 (Cal. 1988)
(noting that "defendants who bore only a small share of fault for an accident could be
left with the obligation to pay all or a large share of the plaintiff's damages if other
more culpable tortfeasors were insolvent").
100 See, e.g., Evangelatos, 753 P.2d at 590.
101 See Weidenfeller, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 16 (noting that the purpose of the compara-
tive fault statute is "to prevent the unfairness of requiring a tortfeasor who is only
minimally culpable as compared to the other parties to bear all the damages"); John Scott
Hickman, Note, Efficiency, Fairness, and Common Sense: The Case for One Action as to Per-
centage of Fault in Comparative Negligence Jurisdictions That Have Abolished or Modified Joint
and Several Liability, 48 VAND. L. REV. 739, 754-58, 762 (1995) (noting that "[a] rule
requiring plaintiffs to join all possible defendants in a single action would serve the
goals of efficiency, fairness, and consistency of judgments in comparative fault
jurisdictions").
102 See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2506(B) (West Supp. 2001) ("Assessments of
percentages of fault for nonparties are used only as a vehicle for accurately determin-
ing the fault of the named parties. Assessment of fault against nonparties does not
subject any nonparty to liability in this or any other action, and it may not be intro-
duced as evidence of liability in any action.").
2003] THE END GAME OF TORT REFORM 381
gent party's duty, as the legal duty itself is formally retained. 10 3 Those
courts also state that comparisons will not reduce negligent
tortfeasors' incentives to take care. 10 4 However, one court that chose
to compare defendants' intentional and negligent fault did so despite
its belief that barring comparisons "does act as an incentive to those
with a duty to protect against intentional harm. ' 105
d. Difference in Degree
Not only do courts that compare intentional and negligent defen-
dant fault reject the idea that the question of comparison is a question
of the defendant's duty, but they also reject the more traditional dif-
ference-in-kind distinction.10 6 Courts that. compare intentional and
negligent torts suggest that these types of torts are not different in
kind, but rather different only in degree. 0 7 In support of this argu-
ment, courts are particularly apt to rely on legal scholars who have
"demonstrated" that differences are not in kind but in degree.108
e. Deference to Juries
In order to make degree comparisons, courts that embrace de-
fendants' intentional/negligent fault comparisons often express com-
plete confidence in and deference to jury allocations. As one court
said, "We have no doubt that jurors are capable of evaluating degrees
of fault .... 109
103 See, e.g., Bhinderv. Sun Co., Inc., 717 A.2d 202, 210 (Conn. 1998), superseded as
stated in Eskin v. Castiglia, 753 A.2d 927, 935 (Conn. 2000). The court stated,
We are also unpersuaded by the plaintiff's claim that apportionment would
permit a defendant to avoid liability or diminish a defendant's incentive to
exercise a standard of reasonable care in providing security for his premises.
Apportionment does not affect the determination of whether the defendant
is liable under a theory of negligence ....
Id.
104 See id.; Blazovic v. Andrich, 590 A.2d 222, 231 (N.J. 1991) ("Apportionment of
fault between intentional and negligent parties will not eliminate the deterrent or
punitive aspects of tort recovery.").
105 See Bd. of County Comm'rs of Teton County ex rel. Teton County Sheriff's
Dep't v. Bassett, 8 P.3d 1079, 1084 (Wyo. 2000).
106 See, e.g., Hutcherson v. City of Phoenix, 961 P.2d 449, 452 (Ariz. 1998).
107 See id.
108 See id. (citing, for example, Dear & Zipperstein, supra note 49, at 5).
109 Id. at 453.
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f. The Lead of Other Jurisdictions and Scholars
Finally, courts considering intentional/negligent fault compari-
sons look to their own cases concerning recklessness," 10 to other state
court decisions regarding reckless and intentional torts,11 and to a
few early articles in the area. 112
D. Ancillary Questions: Blurring the Dichotomy
While states that compare defendants' intentional and negligent
fault by percentages take a seemingly opposite view from states that do
not permit such comparisons, state answers to a number of ancillary
questions regarding the scope and effect of intentional/negligent
fault comparisons create the possibility for significant distinctions
within this category of states. Consequently, even jurisdictions that
share a similar position with respect to the initial issue of whether or
not to compare defendants' intentional and negligent fault may pro-
duce markedly different damage assessments.
In jurisdictions that elect to permit intentional/negligent fault
comparisons between defendants, courts quickly face a number of
foundational questions. Do comparisons apply to all intentional and
negligent defendants or just some? Are alleged tortfeasors included
when they are not parties to the litigation? What about when the
tortfeasor is unknown or immune from suit? Are intentional
tortfeasors and/or negligent tortfeasors jointly and severally liable for
a single, indivisible injury? If not, are uncollectible shares of fault re-
allocated between the parties or rather left to the plaintiff to bear?
Can the negligent tortfeasor be assigned a greater share of liability
than the intentional tortfeasor? What is the standard for jury compar-
isons and judicial review? If there isjoint and several liability, what are
the rules of contribution or indemnity between the two tortfeasors?
These questions are not simply items of secondary importance,
but relate to the very purpose and effect of comparisons. Few courts
that compare intentional and negligent fault have yet addressed the
panoply of subsidiary questions that they will ultimately be called
upon to resolve; many courts have perhaps not yet envisioned the full
range of these questions.' 13
110 See id.
111 See, e.g., Whitehead v. Food Max of Miss., Inc., 163 F.3d 265, 281 (5th Cir.
1998) (noting the decisions of fifteen other states).
112 See Blazovic v. Andrich, 590 A.2d 222, 228 (N.J. 1991) (citing Dear & Zipper-
stein, supra note 49, at 5).
113 See Jonathan Cardi, Note, Apportioning Responsibility to Immune Nonparties: An
Argment Based on Comparative Responsibility and the Proposed Restatement (Third) of
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Courts that have addressed these ancillary issues have not
achieved a consensus. Few courts that permit comparisons have
discussed or suggested limits on the types of intentional tort-
feasors that can use them. Defendant-defendant compari-
sons have included intentional tortfeasor murderers, 114 burg-
lars, 1 15 and rapists. 116 In addition, comparisions have applied to negli-
gent tortfeasors who have created or enhanced the risk of an inten-
tional tort, not just those whose negligence was separate from the
intentional tort. 
17
Nevertheless, courts have accepted or suggested some limits.
One potential limit is the "very duty" rule.1 18 Under that rule, a negli-
gent tortfeasor defendant cannot compare the fault of an intentional
tortfeasor if the duty the negligent tortfeasor breached was to combat
the risk of the intentional tort.11 9 Other restrictions have been sug-
Torts, 82 IowA L. REv. 1293, 1294 (1997) (noting that "the strength and simplicity of
the central concept of 'comparative responsibility' has often compelled law-makers to
adopt sweeping change without tending to many important corollary issues," such as
"how several-liability jurisdictions should handle an immune nonparty's share of re-
sponsibility for a tort").
114 See, e.g., Hutcherson, 961 P.2d at 449; Ozaki v. Ass'n of Apartment Owners, 954
P.2d 644 (Haw. 1998).
115 See Thomas v. First Interstate Bank of Ariz., N.A., 930 P.2d 1002 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1996).
116 See Morris v. Yogi Bear'sJellystone Park Camp Resort, 539 So. 2d 70, 72 (La. Ct.
App. 1989); Martin v. Prime Hospitality Corp., 785 A.2d 16, 24 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2001) ("The sole fact that [the rapist] pled guilty to a crime would also not bar
apportionment.").
117 See, e.g., Rausch v. Pocatello Lumber Co., 14 P.3d 1074, 1082-83 (Idaho Ct.
App. 2000) (rejecting argument that negligent employer "should not get the benefit
of apportionment of part of the damages to [the intentional tortfeasor employee]
because the foreseeability of harm caused by [the employee's] misbehavior is the very
fact that makes [the employer's] conduct negligent"); Martin, 785 A.2d at 24 (holding
that hotel's duty of care to guest "did not as a matter of law encompass an obligation
to prevent the sexual assault").
118 See Hutcherson, 961 P.2d at 452 n.1 (noting that the "very duty" argument had
not been raised before it); see also Brown & Morgan, supra note 45, at 526 (stating that
if states interpret comparative fault statutes to include intentional fault, "legislatures
should amend their statutory language to exclude the allocation of fault to inten-
tional tortfeasors in duty-to-protect cases or statutorily provide that the negligent de-
fendant be held jointly and severally liable").
119 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILIIY § 14 (2000).
The Restatement provides,
A person who is liable to another based on a failure to protect the other
from the specific risk of an intentional tort is jointly and severally liable for
the share of comparative responsibility assigned to the intentional tortfeasor
in addition to the share of comparative responsibility assigned to the person.
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gested by individual states. Louisiana originally took the view that
comparison of negligent and intentional fault could be limited based
on public policy when (1) the negligent tortfeasor had a duty to pre-
vent the intentional act of another, (2) the expense of comparison
would otherwise fall on a plaintiff who was not at fault, and (3) the
negligent and intentional acts were so different in kind that compari-
son was not possible. 120 Based on that doctrine, the Louisiana Su-
preme Court refused to allow a landlord alleged to have lied about its
security system to diminish its liability for negligence on the basis of a
rapist's intentional fault. 12' However, after a subsequent statutory
amendment, the status of the Louisiana public policy exception is now
unclear. 1
2 2
Courts that compare intentional and negligent fault also make
different decisions with respect to a range of other comparison-re-
lated issues. For example, although many courts that engage in com-
parison include nonparty defendants in apportionment calculations,
courts have not reached a consistent view about the treatment of in-
tentional tortfeasors who are unknown or insolvent. 23 For example,
Louisiana law requires comparison with nonparty and even unknown
tortfeasors. 24 Utah courts reject comparison with an unknown
tortfeasor, but have made no statement about a known, nonparty de-
fendant. 2 5 Meanwhile, Kentucky courts reject comparisons of fault
with even known nonparties.1
26
Similarly, states have different rules with respect to joint and sev-
eral liability. Some comparison states have statutes retaining joint and
several liability for intentional tortfeasors.127 Others abolish the joint
and several liability of intentional tortfeasors except in special limited
circumstances. 128 For negligent tortfeasors, while jurisdictions that
120 See Veazey v. Elmwood Plantation Assocs., 650 So. 2d 712, 719-20 (La. 1994).
121 Id. at 720.
122 See Frazier v. St. Tammany Parish Sch. Bd., 774 So. 2d 1227, 1231-32 (La. Ct.
App. 2000).
123 See Cardi, supra note 113, at 1295-97.
124 LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2323 (West 1997).
125 See, e.g., Field v. Boyer Co., 952 P.2d 1078, 1081-82 (Utah 1998).
126 Baker v. Webb, 883 S.W.2d 898, 899-900 (Ky. Ct. App. 1994) (dismissing non-
party defendants under Kentucky statute, which limits allocation of fault to parties in
the litigation). But see Adam v. J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc., 130 F.3d 219, 227-28 (6th
Cir. 1997) (suggesting that in Baker, the court's discussion of nonparty defendants was
dicta).
127 See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 663-10.9 (]Michie 2002).
128 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2506(A) (v) (West Supp. 2001) (abolishing
joint and several liability unless the defendant is acting in concert or as agent of the
party, which would seem to prevent joint and several liability even for many inten-
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compare intentional and negligent fault generally do not retain joint
and several liability, 29 some retain joint and several liability for cer-
tain classes of the harm, such as economic damages.
1 30
Court holdings are also split on the question of whether juries
may apportion a greater share of the responsibility to the negligent
tortfeasor than to the intentional tortfeasor. One might expect that
in most cases, intentional tortfeasors would be assigned greater-per-
haps far greater-shares of fault. To date, however, jury verdicts in
reported cases appear more randomly dispersed. Several juries have
assigned negligent tortfeasors the lion's share of liability. 31 In some
cases, these jury determinations have been upheld, 132 and in others
they have been overruled.
13 3
tional tortfeasors); TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 33.002(b) (Vernon Supp.
2002). The Texas Code provides,
[A] defendant who, with the specific intent to do harm to others, acts in
concert with another person to engage in the conduct described in the fol-
lowing sections of the Penal Code shall be jointly and severally liable with
such other person for the damages legally recoverable by the claimant that
were proximately caused by such conduct.
Id.; see alsoJames v. Bessemer Processing Co., 714 A.2d 898, 915 (N.J. 1998) (noting
that New Jersey retains joint and several liability with regard to environmental tort
actions and in cases in which the defendant is found responsible for 60% or more of
the total damages); infra note 158.
129 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 17, at 154
(2000) (listing several liability jurisdictions).
130 See CAL Civ. CODE §§ 1431-1431.2 (West Supp. 2002) (retainingjoint and sev-
eral liability for "economic damages," but only several liability for "non-economic
damages").
131 See, e.g., Ortiz v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., 22 F. Supp. 2d 15, 19 (E.D.N.Y. 1998)
(examining jury decision that found reckless housing authority 60% at fault and rap-
ist 40% at fault); Hutcherson v. City of Phoenix, 961 P.2d 449, 451-52 (Ariz. 1998)
(upholding jury decision that found negligent 911 operator 75% at fault and mur-
derer 25% at fault); Ortega v. Pajaro Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 64 Cal. App. 4th 1023,
1030 (1998) (apportioning 100% of responsibility to school district and none to the
teacher who molested the student); Paragon Family Rest. v. Bartolini, 769 N.E.2d 609,
613-14 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (apportioning 80% of responsibility to bar and 10% to
each of two intentional tortfeasors); Roman Catholic Diocese of Covington v. Secter,
966 S.W.2d 286, 288 (Ky. Ct. App. 1998) (apportioning 75% of responsibility to
church for negligent supervision and 25% to employee for molesting a child); Weiss
v. Hodge, 567 N.W.2d 468, 474 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997) ("[J]ury found the dram shop
defendant eighty percent at fault and [the intentional tortfeasor defendant] only
twenty percent at fault.").
132 See, e.g., Ortiz, 22 F. Supp. 2d at 19; Hutcherson, 961 P.2d at 455; Weiss, 567
N.W.2d at 477-78.
133 See, e.g., Scott v. County of Los Angeles, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 643, 660 (Ct. App.
1994) (reversing jury apportionment of one percent of fault to grandmother who
severely abused four-year-old and 75% and 24% fault, respectively, to the county and
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All of these different doctrinal determinations render a single
description of the law in jurisdictions that compare intentional and
negligent fault untenable-the differences within these jurisdictions
may be as profound as the differences between jurisdictions that com-
pare and those that do not. Similarly, differences between jurisdic-
tions that do not compare defendants' intentional and negligent fault
may be equally profound. 1
34
II. COMPARISON: A FUNCTIONAL ACCOUNT
The numerous opinions that discuss comparison of intentional
and negligent fault rarely address what is actually at stake in the com-
parison decision. Accordingly, this Part shifts the focus away from
what courts are saying about comparisons to what courts are doing-
the actual effects of comparing intentional and negligent fault.
From a functional perspective,13 5 the effects of comparing inten-
tional and negligent torts are highly dependent on other variables-
particularly a state's joint and several liability rules and its rules gov-
erning the joinder of nonparties. 136 It is only when comparative ap-
portionment is considered within a context of vanishing joint and
several liability137 and the increasing inclusion of nonparty, and some-
its social worker who negligently failed to protect the child); Paragon Family Rest., 769
N.E.2d at 613-14 (allocation of 80% of fault to pub that frequently served alcohol to
minors and 20% to underage drinkers who attacked the plaintiff was "contrary to and
not supported by the evidence"); cf Lee v. Coss, 39 F. Supp. 2d 170, 174 (D. Conn.
1999) ("Whether a reckless defendant should be able to escape liability because a
negligent plaintiff is found more than 50% responsible is not a question the Connect-
icut Supreme Court has squarely addressed.").
134 For example, these states may take different views of defendants' original duty,
or enact limits through other doctrines such as proximate cause. See Pula v. State, 40
P.3d 364, 366-67 (Mont. 2002) (holding that state charged with negligence in female
prisoner's rape by male inmate properly presented jury instruction that rapist's inter-
vening acts negated the state's causal role, even though court had previously ruled
that fault could not be apportioned to non-party defendants).
135 See Guido Calabresi, Two Functions of Formalism, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 479, 481
(2000) (describing a functional approach to law as one that looks "not at the lan-
guage of the law, but only to what the law was supposed to do"; viewing the "law as a
'doer' of things").
136 See Roger Henderson, Draft of Uniform Apportionment of Tort Liability Act
(July 3, 2000) (on file with author) (providing background on changes since the Uni-
form Comparative Fault Act was promulgated); Frank J. Vandall, A Critique of the Re-
statement (Third), Apportionment as It Affects Joint and Several Liability, 49 EMORY L.J. 565
passim (2000).
137 See RESTATEMENr (TIRD) OF ToRTs: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 17, at
151-59 (2000) (including a state-by-state listing of joint and several liability rules);
Cardi, supra note 113, at 1302-04 & nn.52-56 (stating that sixteen states have abol-
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times even unknown and immune parties, 138 that apportionment is-
sues become practically, not just theoretically, significant.
In the context of intentional and negligent tortfeasor defend-
ants-the main locus of state comparison controversies-comparisons
have the potential to decrease the negligent tortfeasor's liability to the
plaintiff, decrease the intentional tortfeasor's liability to the plaintiff,
increase the plaintiffs burden to bear the costs of the injury, and de-
crease the intentional tortfeasor's liability to the negligent defendant
for contribution or indemnity. In the Brandon case, 13 9 for example,
not only might the County of Richardson reduce its liability for dam-
ages to Brandon's estate, but the murderers might also reduce their
liability to the estate, as well as their obligation to the county for pur-
poses of contribution or indemnity. In addition, these effects would
be achieved through an apportionment process that places more reli-
ance on jury discretion and less reliance on defined legal standards
than do current noncomparison rules. Of course, there may be addi-
tional indirect effects as well.
A. Diminishing Negligent Tortfeasors' Liability to Plaintiffs
Without question, the single most significant effect of current
state court intentional/negligent fault comparisons is to decrease neg-
ligent defendants' liability to plaintiffs. In jurisdictions that do not
retain joint and several liability for negligent tortfeasors, either
through joint and several liability statutes or through a "very duty"
rule, comparison of defendants' intentional and negligent fault
reduces, at times dramatically, negligent defendants' liability to plain-
tiffs. For example, despite accusations of sexual assault made to an
insurance company about a chiropractor, the insurance company did
not take steps to remove the doctor from its list of independent medi-
cal examiners, but rather required another accident victim to have
her independent medical evaluation with that doctor. When she too
was sexually assaulted, the jury found the insurance company negli-
gent. However, the insurer was permitted to compare its negligence
with the chiropractor's fault for intentional sexual assault. In the
ished or nearly abolished joint and several liability and that twenty others have elimi-
nated at least part of that liability; these partial joint and several liability systems
include jurisdictions that retain joint and several liability for economic but not non-
economic damages, for specific causes of action, and for cases in which the defen-
dant's fault is greater than a certain threshold percentage).
138 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 17, at
151-59.
139 See Brandon v. County of Richardson, 624 N.W.2d 604 (Neb. 2000) (Brandon
II); see also supra notes 8-17 and accompanying text.
2003]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
comparison, the insurer's fault was assessed at 40% of the total,
thereby reducing the victim's compensatory damage award against the
insurer from $40,000 to $16,000.140
In another case, despite a jury finding of negligence, an apart-
ment complex that let a woman's agitated ex-boyfriend past security
without telling her it had done so avoided its entire responsibility to
pay compensatory damages to the woman's estate after the ex-boy-
friend confronted her in the hallway and murdered her.
I 4
1
At times, the negligent tortfeasor's liability has been cut by more
modest percentages. A housing authority landlord that failed to main-
tain a working front door lock paid 40% less in damages to a grand-
mother who was raped at gunpoint in the stairwell. 142 A security
company that collected $1 million a year in security premiums but
had no response to repeated warnings that a fired employee, had re-
turned to the premises was assigned 75% of the total fault in an action
brought by the estate of the murdered coworker. 43 A city whose 911
operator listed a domestic violence victim's call as low-priority paid
25% less to the victims' families.
144
In most cases, the effects of comparison are not easily calculable
from appellate records, because court opinions reject an award ob-
tained without comparison but do not report the dollar value of the
new award or settlement.
145
By reducing the share of damages that negligent tortfeasors are
required to pay injured plaintiffs in particular cases, comparison of
intentional and negligent fault generally increases the share of injury
140 Slack v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 5 P.3d 280, 283 (Colo. 2000) (explaining the ap-
portionment of liability by the jury and noting that the plaintiff, Slack, was also
awarded $16,000 in exemplary damages).
141 Ozaki v. Ass'n of Apartment Owners, 954 P.2d 652, 663 (Haw. 1998) (explain-
ing that when the lower court compared the apartment complex's conduct with the
ex-boyfriend's deliberate act of murder, the complex was only left with 3% of the
liability, which then-by comparison to the victim's 5% fault-eliminated its responsi-
bility to pay any sum of money to the murder victim's family).
142 Ortiz v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., 22 F. Supp. 2d 15, 38 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (reducing
award from $3 million to $1.8 million).
143 Rosh v. Cave Imaging Sys., Inc., 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 136, 139 (Ct. App. 1994)
(reducing $5.5 million judgment by approximately $300,000).
144 Hutcherson v. City of Phoenix, 961 P.2d 449, 455 (Ariz. 1998) (upholding
jury's award of $1.7 million in damages based on an allocation of fault to murderer of
25% and 75% of fault to the city).
145 See, e.g., Thomas v. First Interstate Bank of Ariz., 930 P.2d 1002 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1996); Bd. of County Comm'rs of Teton County ex rel. Teton County Sheriff's Dep't v.
Bassett, 8 P.3d 1079 (Wyo. 2000).
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costs that plaintiffs are required to bear. 146 For example, in a case in
which a jury assigned 70% of the responsibility to pay damages for an
injury to the intentional tortfeasor and 30% to the negligent
tortfeasor, if the intentional tortfeasor were unknown or insolvent and
the negligent tortfeasor paid only its initial 30% share of the damages,
the plaintiff would be left to bear the remaining 70% of the injury
costs, even if she was not at fault and the negligent defendant was at
fault. 147 Consequently, courts' willingness to compare defendants' in-
tentional and negligent harms reduces plaintiffs' ability to recover
damages in cases involving a combination of negligent and inten-
tional harm. 1
4
The impact on plaintiff recoveries is likely to be particularly acute
when comparisons involve intentional torts because, to the extent that
fault plays a role in assigning responsibility, intentional tortfeasors will
likely be assigned higher responsibility shares than other types of de-
fendants. In addition, intentional tortfeasors may be less able to pay
judgments than negligent tortfeasors-particularly because insurance
does not cover most intentional torts.1 49 Permitting comparison of
negligent and intentional torts will likely influence not only recoveries
but settlement values as well. 150
There is one significant uncertainty in this calculation. Although
comparisons minimize negligent tortfeasor liability in particular cases,
comparisons could lead to an overall expansion of negligent
tortfeasor liability. This could happen if: (1) courts expand negligent
defendants' duties or permit a greater number of cases to reach juries
in light of comparisons; (2) juries are more likely to hold defendants
liable for negligence when that negligence can be assigned in percent-
146 See Leonard Charles Schwartz, Apportionment of Loss Under Modern Comparative
Fault: The Significance of Causation and Blameworthiness, 23 U. TOL. L. REv. 141, 142
(1991) ("With an apportionment method, each of the tortfeasors is liable for only a
share of the [total loss,] and the plaintiff bears the share that is not apportioned to
any of the tortfeasors.").
147 See Cardi, supra note 113, at 1295 ("[I]n a several-liability system, each defen-
dant may be held liable only for its comparative share of the fault, leaving the plaintiff
to shoulder the burden of an immune or insolvent nonparty's share.").
148 See, e.g., Ortiz v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., 22 F. Supp. 2d 15, 34 (E.D.N.Y. 1998)
(apportioning fault between intentional and negligent tortfeasors).
149 See Ellen S. Pryor, The Stories We Tell: Intentional Harm and the Quest for Insurance
Funding, 75 TEX. L. REv. 1721, 1722-23 (1997) ("[M]ost standard liability policies do
not cover liability for harm that the insured intentionally causes.").
150 See Marc S. Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't
Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA
L. REv. 4, 28 (1983) ("Of the cases in ten courts studied by the Civil Litigation Re-
search Project, about 88% were settled .... ").
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age shares; 51 or (3) juries and judges in comparative apportionment
jurisdictions are more likely to award and uphold punitive damages to
avoid compensatory damage caps.' 52 In addition, comparing defend-
ants' intentional and negligent fault may produce changes in other
rules-more plaintiff "no duty" rules or negligent defendant "very
duty" rules, for example, which change the relationship between neg-
ligent plaintiffs and defendants.
5.1
Not only will comparison of defendants' intentional and negli-
gent fault affect plaintiff awards, but such comparisons will also
change the very standards by which juries determine fault and judges
review those determinations.
B. Diminishing Intentional Tortfeasors' Liability to Plaintiffs
While courts usually consider the effect of comparison on negli-
gent tortfeasors' liability, they seem to give less thought to another
potential consequence of comparing negligent and intentional
fault-the potential diminution of intentional tortfeasors' liability for
damages to the injured plaintiff in light of another defendant's negli-
gence. However, the potential for this consequence is equally real.
Reducing the intentional tortfeasor's liability to the plaintiff
based on another defendant's negligence is a distinct possibility. In
Arizona's Hutcherson v. City of Phoenix case, 154 for example, a man who
deliberately murdered his ex-girlfriend and her new boyfriend was as-
signed a 25% share of the total responsibility for damages. 155 Because
151 Flood v. Southland Corp., 616 N.E.2d 1068, 1071 (Mass. 1993) (noting that "if
the stabbing was intentional" the intentional tortfeasor's conduct "would not be in-
volved in the jury's comparative fault assessment" and that this proof "would tend to
increase the prospect that ajury would conclude that the stabbing was not a reasona-
bly foreseeable intervening act for which [the allegedly negligent convenient store]
would be responsible").
152 Compare Roman Catholic Diocese of Covington v. Secter, 966 S.W.2d 286, 287,
291 (Ky. Ct. App. 1998) (apportioning fault for sexual abuse of church-school student
between church and abuser for purposes of compensatory damage award, but uphold-
ing punitive damage claim against the church), with Hutchinson ex rel. Hutchinson v.
Luddy, 763 A.2d 826, 837-38, 847 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000) (refusing to apportion fault
for sexual abuse of minor parishoner for purposes of compensatory damages, but
rejecting punitive damage claim against the church). See also Slack v. Farmers Ins.
Exch., 5 P.3d 280, 287 (Colo. 2000) (upholding jury award of exemplary damages
against insurance company although compensatory damages had been apportioned).
153 See David W. Robertson, Love and Fury: Recent Radical Revisions to the Law of
Comparative Fault, 59 LA. L. REV. 175, 188-95 (1998) (discussing "ameliorative doc-
trines or techniques" used to mitigate effects of contributory negligence regimes).
154 961 P.2d 449 (Ariz. 1998).
155 Id. at 451.
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Arizona law explicitly does not retain joint and several liability for in-
tentional tortfeasors, 156 the murderer, even if extremely wealthy,
might have owed the victims' estates only a quarter of their compensa-
tory damage award, leaving the victim to bear the costs if the negligent
defendant were insolvent. 157 Since a number of jurisdictions that
compare defendants' intentional and negligent fault do not retain
joint and several liability rules for all intentional tortfeasors, 158 the
same result would appear likely to occur in other jurisdictions as well.
At least one court rejected an intentional tortfeasor's attempt to
diminish her responsibility based on the liability of an additional neg-
ligent tortfeasor. 15 9 However, other reported decisions on this point
are scarce.1 60 While the possibility of intentional tortfeasor reductions
has been raised by parties in other cases, courts have rarely addressed
the issue. 161 If apportionment were to reduce intentional tortfeasor
liability, as it would seem to, courts and legislatures might then craft
additional rules barring such reductions.' 62
156 See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2506(D) (West Supp. 2001).
157 However, because the murderer himself was not joined as a defendant in the
case and thus could not be bound by the jury's apportionment, see ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 12-2506(B) (West Supp. 2001) ("Assessment of fault against nonparties does
not subject any nonparty to liability in this or any other action, and it may not be
introduced as evidence of liability in any action."), Hutcherson raised the possibility but
not the reality of such diminution.
158 See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 34-51-2-10 (West 1999) ("In the case of an inten-
tional tort, the plaintiff may recover one hundred percent (100%) of the compensa-
tory damages in a civil action for intentional tort from a defendant who was convicted
after a prosecution based on the same evidence."); TEX. Cir. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 33.002(b) (Vernon 1997) (retaining joint and several liability for intentional
tortfeasors committing specified conduct); see also supra note 128.
159 See Lafer v. Becker, No. B141962, 2002 WL 598973, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 19,
2002) (holding that defendant who was liable for malicious prosecution and inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress could not "shift responsibility ... to others
who . . .may have negligently contributed to [the plaintiff's] injury") (opinion not
certified for publication or ordered published).
160 See id. (noting that "[t]he parties do not cite, and our research does not reveal,
any cases which directly address the question of whether an intentional tortfeasor is
entitled to establish the liability of additional negligent tortfeasors in order to invoke
the benefits of Proposition 51," which holds parties severally liable for portions of
non-economic damages).
161 See, e.g., Martin v. Prime Hospitality Corp., 785 A.2d 16 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2001) (raising the possibility that the rapist's recovery could be reduced based on
the rape victim's negligence and the third party's negligence, but not directly address-
ing whether it would be).
162 See, e.g., LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2323(c) (West 1997) ("[I]f a person suffers
injury, death, or loss as a result partly of his own negligence and partly as a result of
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C. Diminishing Intentional Tortfeasors' Share of
Contribution or Indemnity
Comparison of intentional and negligent torts might also reduce
intentional tortfeasor defendants' share of contribution or indemnity
to negligent defendants. Some new rules would permit intentional
tortfeasors to obtain contribution from negligent defendants.
163
Overall, comparisons would tend to reduce negligent and inten-
tional tortfeasor liability to plaintiffs (and thereby reduce plaintiff re-
coveries), reduce intentional tortfeasor responsibility relative to
negligent defendants, and change the terms of jury decisions and
court review.
III. EVALUATING THE EFFECTS OF COMPARISON
Once courts and legislatures recognize the effects of comparison,
the question for decisionmakers is whether these effects are desirable.
It is not clear whether courts and legislatures that compare inten-
tional and negligent fault actually desire the effects of comparison, or
whether decisionmakers believe that fairness to the parties requires
comparison, so that questions about the desirability of effects do not
deserve direct scrutiny. 1
64
the fault of an intentional tortfeasor, his claim for recovery of damages shall not be
reduced.").
163 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 22 cmt. e
(2000) ("The policy of allocating a loss according to each person's share of responsi-
bility supports having the negligent tortfeasor and the intentional tortfeasor, as be-
tween themselves, each bear their own comparative shares."); id. § 23 cmt. 1 ("A
person who can otherwise recover contribution is not precluded from receiving con-
tribution by the fact that he is liable for an intentional tort.").
164 See, e.g., Hutcherson v. City of Phoenix, 961 P.2d 449, 452-53 (Ariz. 1998) (al-
lowing the comparison of intentional and negligent fault because these comparisons
would be more fair to both plaintiffs and defendants, but then mitigating the effects
of those comparisons by allowing the negligent tortfeasor to be assigned a greater
share of the responsibility than the intentional tortfeasor); Lamp v. Reynolds, 645
N.W.2d 311, 319 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002) (stating that Michigan's comparative fault
statute permits a willful and wanton or intentional tortfeasor defendant to assert
plaintiff's comparative negligence, but then avoiding that comparison by holding that
the plaintiff's conduct was not the proximate cause of his harm); Pamela J. Sewell,
Comment, Tort Law-New Mexico Examines the Doctrine of Comparative Fault in the Context
of Premises Liability: Reichert v. Atler, 25 N.M. L. REV. 353, 359-60, 362 (1995) (noting
that New Mexico compares a premises' owner-defendant's negligence with another
defendant's intentional fault and thus "diminishes the duty" owed by the negligent
tortfeasor, but also adopts a jury instruction which "compensates for the potential
unfairness to the plaintiff by increasing the amount of care that the premises owner
must exercise in the face of an increasing risk of danger").
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Many courts and commentators view comparison of intentional
and negligent torts as essential to fairness because of the need to en-
sure that negligent tortfeasor defendants are liable only for the por-
tion of the harm that they caused. However, this fairness concern
misconceives the meaning of the percentages assigned through the
comparative apportionment process. While those comparative per-
centages may provide information about one defendant's fault relative
to another's, they do not divide liability based on true shares of causa-
tion. Furthermore, issues of justice and policy, rather than causation,
must guide determinations about the appropriate scope of negligent
defendant liability.
One relevant aspect of justice and policy questions is the internal
consistency of intentional-negligent fault comparison rules with rules
requiring comparison of negligent tortfeasors' conduct. Including in-
tentional fault in comparative fault systems solves one coherence
problem-not requiring a negligent tortfeasor to pay a larger share of
the judgment when his codefendant is an intentional tortfeasor than
that negligent tortfeasor would have to pay if his codefendant were
another negligent tortfeasor. Nonetheless, comparison creates an-
other equally incoherent result and problem-permitting a negligent
tortfeasor who has committed the same negligence and produced the
same harm to pay less when he is fortunate enough to have an inten-
tional tortfeasor codefendant rather than a negligent tortfeasor code-
fendant, or no codefendant at all. Coherence problems in
comparative fault systems do not result from decisions to exclude in-
tentional torts or to include them. Instead, these coherence problems
stem from structuring comparative fault systems around the fallacy
that fault is a zero-sum proposition.
Rather than focusing on considerations of causation and coher-
ence, courts and legislatures should direct more attention to norma-
tive considerations. 165 Whether decisionmakers ultimately determine
that they want to limit or expand negligent defendants' liability, or
adopt any of the other effects of apportionment, conscious substantive
decisions about the goals and scope of liability would be the prefera-
ble route to achieving these effects rather than unguided, unpredict-
able, and unreviewable jury discretion.
165 See David W. Robertson, Eschewing Ersatz Percentages: A Simplified Vocabulay of
Comparative Fault, 45 ST. Louis U. L.J. 831, 837 (2001) (citing then-Judge Stephen
Breyer who wrote, "assessing 'comparative fault' is not so much an exercise in pure
mathematics as it is an exercise in [normative] judgment").
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A. Examining Judicial Rationales
1. The Mask of Causation
There is a certain appeal to treating an injury as an organizing
event. Contemporary courts routinely permit all parties and causes of
action related to a single transaction or occurrence to be joined in a
single legal action.166 The comparative apportionment's single set of
percentages for all parties involved in a tort would appear to reflect a
similar organizing principle. Instead of the "balkanized" tort-by-tort
approach of the traditional law, which suggests that policy concerns
change as injuries and states of mind change, a comparative appor-
tionment approach is "undergirded by an assumption that, when sev-
eral actors cause a single injury, we can treat the injury as a unit and
compare the contributions of the various actors."' 6 7 But treat that in-
jury as a unit and compare those actors' contributions for what pur-
poses? To discover an essential truth about the harm that each
defendant caused?
The view that apportionment of responsibility performs this latter
function-ensuring that each defendant pays for only what that de-
fendant "caused"-is a widely held misunderstanding of the function
of comparative apportionment. 68 Courts and commentators repeat-
edly suggest that the negligent defendant was the cause of only a part
(usually a small fraction) of the harm, and that comparative appor-
tionment creates essential, ascertainable, and fair shares of liability
based on that causation. 16 ,91 But the pervasive claim of courts and com-
mentators that comparative apportionment identifies true causes is
166 See FED. R. Civ. P. 13.
167 William Powers, Jr., What a Comparative Bad Faith Defense Tells Us About Bad Faith
Insurance Litigation, 72 TEX. L. REX. 1571, 1579 (1994).
168 See, e.g., Slack v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 5 P.3d 280, 287 (Colo. 2000) (stating that
state apportionment act "demonstrates the General Assembly's intent that a tortfeasor
should pay only for the portion of the injury he caused"); Reichert v. Atler, 875 P.2d
379, 381 (N.M. 1994) ("[T]he basis for comparative fault is that each individual
tortfeasor should be held responsible only for his or her percentage of the harm. We
will not stray from that reasoning in this case." (citation omitted)); Swedlund, supra
note 21, at 45 (stating that the state needs apportionment between negligent and
intentional tortfeasor defendants to "prevent a merely negligent party from being
made to incur full liability for an injury caused by the intentional act of another").
169 See, e.g., R. David De Arinas & Edward L. White, III,Judge Ervin's Step in the Right
Direction: Apportioning Fault Between the Negligent and Intentional Tortfeasor, Ft,,. B.J. Oct.
1995, at 92, 94 (arguing that a jury must apportion fault among all parties to the harm
"to ensure that the negligent defendant pays just his or her share of the noneconomic
damages").
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flawed. 170 Despite the rhetoric, the question of negligent tortfeasor
liability usually has little or nothing to do with the question of actual
causation-that is, the question of whether the plaintiff would have
been injured but for the defendant's negligence. 17 1 Instead, cases of
intentional and negligent fault often involve harm caused by two nec-
essary but not sufficient causes of an injury. In these cases, the ab-
sence of either cause would have been enough to avert the plaintiffs
entire injury. 172 For example, in Arizona's Hutcherson v. City of Phoenix
case, 173 a domestic violence victim called a 911 operator to request
help because her abusive ex-boyfriend had tried to assault her at a
nightclub the previous evening, had threatened to kill her, and was on
his way over to her house. The 911 operator classified the call as pri-
ority three, for which the police had an average response time of
thirty-two minutes. After twenty-two minutes, the ex-boyfriend mur-
dered the victim and her new boyfriend. Had the call been classified
as a priority one or two call, the police would have been at the scene
in four to thirteen minutes. As such, if either the operator had appro-
priately classified the assistance call such that the police would have
arrived in time, or the ex-boyfriend had given up his murderous plan,
170 See Robertson, supra note 165, at 837 (stating that "the percentage-based ap-
proach treats the 'commodity' of fault as though it had an ontological limit of 100
units for each case. But it takes only a moment's reflection to realize that percentage-
fault assignments do not and cannot represent some real part of some real whole.").
171 See Richard W. Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REv. 1735, 1738 (1985)
(explaining actual causation by reference to the test of whether an actor's conduct
was a necessary element of a sufficient set). There may, however, be actual cause ques-
tions in some apportionment cases. For example, if a defendant were accused of
negligence for failing to repair a door lock but it was unclear whether the attacker
entered the home through the door or through an open window. See, e.g.,John Elliot
Leighton, Fighting New Defenses in Inadequate Security Cases, TRIAL, Apr. 2000, at 20, 22
(noting that a recent defense tactic in negligent security cases is to use criminal profil-
ing to show that "no matter what security was provided the criminal would still have
attacked the plaintiff"); see also Aaron Twerski & Anthony J. Sebok, Liability Without
Cause? Further Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact as Applied to Handgun Liability, 32 CONN. L.
REv. 1379, 1408 (2000) (primarily addressing global causation questions but also cit-
ing case that address specific actual cause issues in enabling torts).
172 See Wright, supra note 171, at 1762 (noting that the plaintiff has a corrective
justice claim against both tortfeasors for the full amount of the harm); see also William
K. Jones, Tort Triad: Slumbering Sentinels, Vicious Assailants, and Victims Variously Vigilant,
30 HOFSTRA L. REv. 253, 290-91 (2001) (noting that limitations on liability are based
on a "faulty premise" and observing that "if that harm is indivisible, and if it could
have been avoided had care been taken by any one of the multiple defendants, then
the fair share of each is 100%").
173 961 P.2d 449 (Ariz. 1998).
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the victims would not have been murdered. 174 In cases like this, both
the negligent defendant and the intentional tortfeasor are an actual
cause of all of the plaintiffs harm.
75
The situation in which two or more defendants may be the actual
cause of a plaintiffs entire harm is not a new possibility. Many basic
tort problems involve multiple causes. 176 How courts assign liability to
these various actors are policy decisions that are not based on issues of
causation.
Individual courts can and have resolved these identical issues in a
variety of ways. Kentucky law provides a useful example. At one time,
Kentucky held that negligent defendants were not liable for harms
produced jointly by negligence and intervening intentional miscon-
duct.177 Later, Kentucky reversed its position and held that negligent
defendants should be jointly and severally liable for indivisible harms
involving intervening intentional torts as long as the harm was foresee-
able.' 78 In Kentucky now, courts hold negligent tortfeasors liable for
failing to use reasonable care to prevent foreseeable intentional torts,
but limit that liability through comparison with the intentional
tortfeasor's fault.179 Even within a single jurisdiction then, at least
three liability approaches have been considered fair. There is no
174 See id. at 450-51; see also Morrison v. Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity, 738 So. 2d
1105, 1120-21 (La. App. 1999) ("Without the fault of Magee, an intentional actor,
there would have been no incident; however, the same would have been true had the
University and Kappa National intervened to enforce their anti-hazing policies.").
175 See Richard W. Wright, The Logic and Fairness of Joint and Several Liability, 23
MEMPHIS ST. U. L. REV. 45, 59 (1992) ("[A] defendant's individual full responsibility
for an injury that was an actual and proximate result of her tortious behavior does not
become 'partial' or 'minimal' simply because other defendants' tortious behavior was
much worse, individually or in the aggregate.").
176 For example, the facts in the traditional Polemis case-one negligent defendant
created the spark, the other leaked the fuel-involved two necessary but not sufficient
causes. In re Polemis and Furness, Withy & Co., 3 K.B. 560, 564 (Eng. C.A. 1921). But
for the actions of either negligent actor, the ship would not have burned. Id. at 560.
177 See, e.g., Watson v. Ky. & Ind. Bridge & R.R., 126 S.W. 146 (Ky. 1910).
178 See, e.g., Britton v. Wooten, 817 S.W.2d 443, 449 (Ky. 1991) (endorsing the view
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts that "the negligence of a defendant is actionable as
a contributory cause, wherein the immediate cause is a subsequent criminal act"); see
also Delta Tau Delta v. Johnson, 712 N.E.2d 968, 973 (Ind. 1999) (concluding that
fraternity may be held liable for its negligence in connection with a rape committed
by an alumnus member of the fraternity on fraternity property, where the tortious
conduct was foreseeable to the fraternity); Gerald W. Boston, Apportionment of Harm in
Tort Law: A Proposed Restatement, 21 U. DAYTON L. REV. 267, 277 (1996) (noting that
joint and several liability is often used when two necessary causes create a single indi-
visible injury).
179 See, e.g., Roman Catholic Diocese of Covington v. Secter, 966 S.W.2d 286 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1998).
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"true" way to divide responsibility18 0 There are only policy factors
that commend or reject each of these three approaches, or the many
other approaches that might be enacted in their stead.18'
A central problem with comparative apportionment is that some
courts and commentators believe that apportionment resolves issues
of causation in a nondiscretionary way-holding defendants liable
only for what they "actually caused"-rather than recognizing the cen-
trality of policy considerations to those holdings.18 2 In fact, in many
cases, comparative apportionment holds defendants liable for a
smaller amount of harm than they actually caused. While this result
may or may not be justified on othe'r policy grounds, courts' failure to
see that they are dealing with policy questions prevents deliberation of
the very questions that are being answered.
Perhaps it is easier for courts to see the centrality of policy issues
when they look on the intentional tortfeasor side of the negligent-
intentional tortfeasor comparison ledger. In that context, even with
apportionment of responsibility byjuries, courts do not say that a mur-
derer caused 25% or even 92% of the responsibility for a murder, nor
that it would be unfair to hold the murderer accountable for a greater
share of the harm than he actually caused.'83 Instead, in that context,
decisionmakers are more apt to recognize that the portion of the
judgment the intentional tortfeasor must pay depends on issues of
policy-usually policies that support full payment by intentional
tortfeasors through joint and several liability.
180 SeeJoseph W. Little, Eliminating the Fallacies of Comparative Negligence and Propor-
tional Liability, 41 ALA. L. REV. 13, 44 (1989) ("This entire structure of more perfect
and simpler justice is false because the underlying premise that negligence comes in
discrete and precisely measurable packages is wrong.").
181 See Michael D. Green, The Unanticipated Ripples of Comparative Negligence: Super-
ceding Cause in Products Liability and Beyond, 53 S.C. L. REv. 1103, 1112 (2002) (noting
that the realists debunked "the concept that a single cause of an outcome could be
identified in a normative and objective fashion"); Morton J. Horwitz, The Rise and
Early Progressive Critique of Objective Causation, in THE POLITICS OF LAw: A PROGRESSIVE
CRITIQUE 471, 479 (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998) (critiquing the formalist doctrine of
objective causation, under which "it was necessary to find a single scientific cause and
thus a single responsible defendant, for any acknowledgment of multiple causation
would open the floodgates of judicial discretion").
182 Comparison of intentional and negligent fault within a single unitary system
appears to be a return to formalist notions of "scientific causation"-that courts can
and should determine the "true cause" of an injury, and that tort liability should be so
limited. See Horwitz, supra note 181, at 479.
183 See Hutcherson v. City of Phoenix, 961 P.2d 449, 452-53 (Ariz. 1998) (uphold-
ing jury apportionment of 25% of fault to murderer); Ozaki v. Ass'n of Apartment
Owners, 954 P.2d 644, 644 (Haw. 1998) (discussing jury apportionment of 92% of
fault to murderer).
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2. Coherence Considerations
When apportionment of intentional and negligent fault is under-
stood not as a question of causation, but as a question of justice and
policy, substantive issues can be directly addressed.18 4 The main pol-
icy factor that animates court comparison of intentional and negligent
fault is the desire to achieve internal coherence within comparative
negligence systems. 18 5 On its face, comparing intentional and negli-
gent fault would seem to achieve more consistent results within state
systems that already compare the negligent fault of multiple actors.
On closer reflection, however, inconsistencies arise both in jurisdic-
tions that compare intentional and negligent fault and those that do
not. These inconsistencies stem not from any decision about includ-
ing or excluding intentional torts, but from the treatment of fault as a
zero-sum commodity.
Courts understandably would like to create coherence within
their comparative negligence or apportionment systems. Because
many states already permit the division of negligent defendants' fault
into mutually exclusive fault shares, cases that do not compare inten-
tional and negligent fault create some disjunction at the border with
comparison systems. 1
86
Professors William Westerbeke and Reginald Robinson provide a
useful illustration of the difficulties created by a system in which the
misconduct of negligent defendants is compared but the misconduct
of an intentional tortfeasor is not. In their example:
a restaurant owes a duty of reasonable care to protect its guests from
unreasonable risks of harm while they are on the premises. Assume
that a visibly intoxicated third person in the restaurant negligently
stumbles into and knocks down one guest, then intentionally
pushes down another guest. In each case the restaurant breached
its duty in the same manner-by failing to remove the intoxicated
person from the premises before he harmed a guest. The results,
however, vary. The restaurant is liable for only a proportionate fault
share of the damages suffered by the first guest, but is jointly and
severally liable for all damages suffered by the second guest.
187
184 See Larry S. Stewart, Phase Two of the ALi Torts Project: Apportionment of Liability,
TRIAL, Aug. 1998, at 26, 27 ("[L]egal rules for causation, joint and several liability,
treatment of intentional tortfeasors, division of multiple damages, and allocation of
damages were developed, often based on public policy considerations.").
185 See supra Part I.
186 See William E. Westerbeke & Reginald L. Robinson, Survey of Kansas Tort Law,
37 U. KAN. L. REV. 1005, 1049 (1989).
187 Id.
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As illustrated by Westerbeke and Robinson noncomparison of in-
tentional and negligent fault creates the possibility that the negligent
restaurant will have a greater share of liability for its conduct when the
harm created by its codefendant patron was intentional rather than
negligent. This result not only means that a negligent tortfeasor who
has performed the same negligent act may have varying amounts of
liability depending on the nature of the intervening actor's conduct,
but also that, unlike the result under the traditional rule, negligent
tortfeasors may have more, rather than less, liability for harms created
in part by intervening intentional acts.
188
To resolve this coherence problem, Westerbeke and Robinson
suggest that "[t] he better approach would be a hybrid system in which
the intentional tortfeasor is jointly and severally liable for all damage,
but the negligent tortfeasor is limited to a proportionate fault share of
the total damages."189 In such a case, the restaurant, if negligent,
would owe the plaintiffs the amount of their damages minus the
188 This result would be opposite to traditional cases like Watson v. Kentucky &
Indiana Bridge & R., 126 S.W. 146 (Ky. 1910), in which an intentional intervening
act was considered superseding and subjected the negligent tortfeasor to no liability
whatsoever. Although Westerbeke and Robinson made their critique in response to
the Kansas Supreme Court's decision in M. Bruenger & Co. v. Dodge City Truck Stop,
Inc., 675 P.2d 864 (Kan. 1984), their critique may be even better illustrated by the
Kansas Supreme Court's recent decision in Wood v. Groh, 7 P.3d 1163 (Kan. 2000). In
Wood, a fifteen-year-old boy on probation for joyriding took his parents' gun to a party
and accidentally shot a fifteen-year-old girl. Id. at 1166. The jury apportioned 10% of
the fault to the parents' negligent failure to safeguard their gun and supervise their
son, 20% to the girl who was shot, and 70% to the nonparty son who negligently shot
the girl. Id. at 1167. Because the son negligently shot the girl, his fault was compared
to his parents' negligence, and the parents were held responsible for only $10,000 of
the girl's $100,000 in damages. If instead, the boy intentionally shot the girl, the
parents' fault could not have been compared under Kansas law, and the parents
might have been liable for $80,000 (although the jury also might have concluded
then that they were not liable at all). If one did not understand that both parties'
misconduct in this case was the actual cause of the plaintiff's entire harm, this illustra-
tion might seem particularly unfair because a party assigned a small percentage share
of the overall responsibility, would bear liability for payment of a large portion of the
plaintiff's actual recovery. Cf Walt Disney World Co. v. Wood, 515 So. 2d 198, 199
(Fla. 1987) (approving a jury's finding that although Walt Disney World was I % re-
sponsible for plaintiff's injury, the plaintiff may collect 86% of her damages from
Disney under Florida's joint and several liability law).
189 Westerbeke & Robinson, supra note 186, at 1049. For further discussion, see
William Edward Westerbeke, Survey of Kansas Law: Torts, 33 U. KAN. L. REV. 1 (1984).
A similar solution is proposed in Lee A. Wright, Utah's Comparative Apportionment: What
Happened to the Comparison?, 1998 UTAi- L. REV. 543, 578 ("[T] he modified compara-
tive fault approach requires negligent actors to pay proportionally while intentional
actors pay fully.").
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amount of damages the jury assigned to the intoxicated third party,
whether or not the plaintiff could actually collect that share from the
third party.
But, while Professors Westerbeke and Robinson aptly identify the
problem, their solution-folding intentional torts into comparative
fault systems to resolve coherence problems-does not in fact resolve
that problem. In the restaurant illustration, for example, if the restau-
rant were permitted to compare its fault with the fault of the intoxi-
cated third party who negligently stumbled over one guest and
intentionally pushed another, the negligent tortfeasor's liability would
still depend on "the anomalous rule" that negligent tortfeasors are
afforded different treatment "depending not on the nature or culpa-
bility of their own acts, but on the nature or culpability of some third
party's unrelated act"-the very problem that Westerbeke and Robin-
son hope to avoid.190
This is true because although the restaurant and the third party's
fault would be compared in both cases (a certain formal coherence),
the results of those comparisons should differ. As long as intent to
harm another matters to the standard for assigning shares of responsi-
bility to various parties-an intentional tort is, all other things being
equal, more blameworthy than a negligent tort-the intoxicated third
party's responsibility should be greater when he intended harm than
when he negligently caused it. By zero-sum comparison then, the res-
taurant will have less responsibility to the guest who was intentionally
harmed than it will have to the guest who was negligently harmed,
even though the restaurant committed precisely the same negligent
act in both circumstances, and the same harm to the patron resulted
in both cases.
Thus, comparison of intentional and negligent torts creates a dif-
ferent result-making the negligent tortfeasor substantially better off
when he exposes his guests to a foreseeable risk of intentional harm
rather than to a foreseeable risk of negligent harm-but does not re-
solve the coherence issue.19 1
But why should a negligent tortfeasor pay less when he is fortu-
nate enough to have a codefendant who is an intentional rather than
a negligent tortfeasor?' 9 2 Or when the negligent tortfeasor has no
codefendant at all? For example, if a termite inspector negligently
190 See Westerbeke & Robinson, supra note 186, at 1049.
191 As in Wood v. Groh, the parents might be better off had they negligently stored
a gun that their child used to intentionally shoot another child than if their son negli-
gently shot his friend. See supra note 188.
192 See Wright, supra note 175, at 59; cf RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPOR-
TIONMENT OF LIABILrY § 14 cmt. a, illus. 3, 5 (2000).
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investigates a home for termites, she may be liable to the home buyer
for subsequent termite damage. However, if the inspector conducts
the same negligent inspection and the home seller fraudulently con-
ceals a prior termite report, under intentional/negligent fault com-
parisons the negligent termite inspector would now owe a smaller
share of damages to the home buyer, even though the termite inspec-
tor had committed precisely the same negligence with respect to the
plaintiff in both scenarios, and even if the fraudfeasor were judgment-
proof, so that the home buyer had no other source of recovery for
that portion of the harm.
193
Moreover, comparing defendants' intentional and negligent torts
can be paradoxical in some cases. The greater the risk to which the
negligent tortfeasor exposes the plaintiff, the greater the benefit the
negligent defendant derives by comparison. 194 So, for example, an
insurer may be better off sending its patients to doctors known to
commit intentional torts, rather than to doctors known to commit
negligent torts, because the insurer's fault will be less by compari-
son-a result that seems as anomolous as the one produced by the
noncomparison rule.
The reason that a negligent tortfeasor, like the restaurant, does
not have a consistent amount of liability that depends on the nature
or culpability of its own acts, stems not from a state's choice to ex-
clude intentional torts from comparative fault systems, but rather
from a several liability system that views defendants' collective "fault"
or "responsibility" as a zero-sum proposition. Once courts decide that
fault (and liability) must be exclusive, rather than overlapping (as
with joint and several liability), courts must evaluate the negligent de-
fendant's liability, based not only on the wrongfulness of that party's
individual acts but also by direct and inverse relation to another de-
fendant's fault-a relationship that may not be justified.
One person's fault does not necessarily detract from another's
fault. Not only may the wrongfulness of one person's act not decrease
the wrongfulness of another's, but it actually may increase it. This is
the basic reason that conspiracies, for example, are often considered
worse than individual misconduct. 195 The fact that one perhaps negli-
193 See Lynn v. Taylor, 642 P.2d 131, 135 (Kan. Ct. App. 1982) (refusing to permit
intentional-negligent comparison).
194 This is particularly true with "a negligent defendant who creates a risk of an
intentional tort by another," as opposed to "defendants acting independently but
causing a single indivisible injury." DOBBS, supra note 19, at 520.
195 See Cass R. Sunstein, Why They Hate Us: The Role of Social Dynamics, 25 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 429, 430 (2002) (identifying "the distinctive logic behind the special
2003)
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gently markets guns as resistant to fingerprints 196 is an act made worse
(not better) by the fact that others may intentionally misuse those
guns for murder.1 97 As such, measuring a party's liability not only by
that party's own conduct, but also by a direct and inverse relationship
with others' conduct, may lead to results in which defendants who
have committed identical acts that produce identical harm may never-
theless be responsible for varying amounts of liability to innocent
plaintiffs.' 98 Thus, whether courts include intentional fault in com-
parative fault systems or exclude it, as long as states divide all parties'
fault into mutually exclusive shares of liability for damage (as in sev-
eral liability), coherence problems will remain.
3. Additional Rationales
Court disagreements about whether intentional and negligent
torts are different in kind or different in degree are equally unhelpful
to resolving comparison issues. Whether intentional and negligent
fault are different in kind or degree does not tell courts whether those
types of fault should or should not be compared in particular cases. 199
For example, even courts that say intentional and negligent fault are
different only in degree still permit comparisons in some contexts-
such as the context of intentional and negligent tortfeasor defend-
ants-but not in others-as in the context of an intentional tortfeasor
plaintiff and a negligent defendant.2 10 This differential treatment
may make sense, but it highlights the fact that decisions about
whether to compare these types of fault stem from policy rationales,
such as whether courts want to diminish negligent tortfeasor liability
or intentional tortfeasor liability in particular contexts, and not from
punishment of conspiracy: those who conspire are likely to move one another in
more extreme and hence more dangerous directions").
196 See, e.g., Merrill v. Navegar, 28 P.3d 116, 132 (Cal. 2001).
197 Jonathan E. Lowy, Litigating Against Gun Manufacturers, TRIAL, Nov. 2000, at 42,
48 ("[T]he fact that manufacturers know that these lethal weapons are often used by
irresponsible and criminal people should heighten their duty to do all they reasona-
bly can to prevent injuries.").
198 To some extent, this problem is about seeking coherence with legislative
schemes that were not substantively well-founded. See Calabresi & Cooper, supra note
6, at 879-80.
199 See Hollister, supra note 49, at 141-43 (arguing that even if intentional and
negligent torts were different in kind, "that difference wotld not justify denying in-
tentional tort defendants the benefits of comparative fault").
200 See supra note 43.
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an essential description of the essential nature of intentional and neg-
ligent torts.
201
While courts cite particular law review articles to demonstrate
that intentional and negligent fault should be compared, these law
review articles do not advocate the broad range of comparisons that
the courts invoke them to support. For example, the New Jersey Su-
preme Court's decision in Blazovic v. Andrich202 repeatedly cites Jake
Dear and Steven E. Zipperstein's article, Comparative Fault and Inten-
tional Torts: Doctrinal Barriers and Policy Considerations,203 for the pro-
position that intentional and negligent conduct should be compared
in a comparative fault system.20 4 But while the New Jersey Supreme
Court cites the article to bolster its ultimate holding that a batterer
should be permitted to assert the plaintiff's comparative negligence as
a defense,20 5 the court fails to mention Dear and Zipperstein's direct
conclusion that "comparative fault should not be extended to self-
help intentional torts, such as battery. '20 6
Many other arguments courts make are unfounded as well.
While statutes in some states may require comparison of intentional
and negligent fault, in many states this issue is a more open question
than the courts acknowledge. Furthermore, it is not a claim of dis-
trust in the jury system to suggest that juries cannot effectively and
consistently answer questions for which they have been given no con-
crete standard for comparison.
Rather than continue to focus on rationales such as these, courts
must consider the actual effects of their decisions-reducing negli-
201 See Dear & Zipperstein, supra note 49, at 20 ("When courts decline to apply
comparative fault in intentional torts, they should do so expressly for reasons of social
policy and not because of formalistic adherence to an ill-conceived notion that negli-
gent, reckless and intentional torts are different in kind.").
202 590 A.2d 222 (NJ. 1991).
203 Dear & Zipperstein, supra note 49.
204 Blazovic, 590 A.2d at 229-30 (citing Dear & Zipperstein, supra note 49, as sup-
port for the proposition that "[r] efusal to compare the negligence of a plaintiff whose
percentage of fault is no more than fifty percent with the fault of intentional
tortfeasors is difficult to justify under a comparative fault system in which the plain-
tiff's recovery can be only diminished, not barred").
205 See id. at 231.
206 Dear & Zipperstein, supra note 49, at 2. The authors further state,
Some types of intentional torts are by their nature so offensive to our cus-
toms and values that we should as a matter of social policy decline to apply
comparative fault principles, lest the courts appear to sanction or facilitate
the proscribed conduct. "Self-help" measures resulting in damage to per-
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gent tortfeasor liability to plaintiffs, reducing intentional tortfeasors'
liability to plaintiffs, decreasing plaintiff recoveries, and reducing in-
tentional tortfeasors' responsibility to pay contribution or indemnity
to other negligent tortfeasors.
B. Beyond Causation and Coherence: Examining Effects
1. Negligent Tortfeasors' Liability to Plaintiffs
To decide whether comparison of intentional and negligent torts
is desirable, states must take normative considerations beyond ques-
tions of formally consistent treatment into account. Courts that com-
pare intentional and negligent fault often insist that defendants
should not pay more than their "fair share." But determining what is
a fair share is precisely the task at hand for state decisionmakers.
Whether states should reduce negligent tortfeasors' liability to plain-
tiffs through comparisons with intentional tortfeasors depends on
both the appropriate level of negligent tortfeasor liability as an initial
matter, and the desirability of using intentional/negligent fault com-
parisons as a means of achieving reductions.
The appropriate level of negligent tortfeasor liability in cases in-
volving intentional torts is an important issue, and plausible argu-
ments can be made for expanding or contracting that liability. 20 7 The
liability of negligent actors in cases involving intentional torts may be
desirable because of that liability's ability to provide a broad concep-
tion of accountability for harm, as well as incentives for structural
safety.2°8 Because tort judgments are uncoupled from the oppressive
consequences of imprisonment, tort law is free to provide a broader
understanding of accountability for intentional harms than can the
criminal law.209 This broader understanding can recognize the role
207 See Uri Kaufman, When Crime Pays: Business Landlords' Duty To Protect Customers
from Criminal Acts Committed on the Premises, 31 S. TEX. L. REV. 89, 101 (1990) (arguing
forjudges to take a greater role in determining negligence); Schwartz, supra note 4, at
620 (comparing various scholars' positions on whether negligent liability amounts to
strict liability); Michael J. Yelnosky, Comment, Business lnviters'Duty 7o Protect Invitees
from Criminal Acts, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 883, 911 (1986) (arguing for juries to take a
greater role in determining negligence).
208 See Calabresi & Cooper, supra note 6, at 870 (stating that when comparing re-
sponsibility, "[wie essentially consider how good a safety pressure point one party is
compared with the other. That is, we take into account the relative effectiveness of
safety incentives placed on either party").
209 See Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1617 (1986) (not-
ing that "[l]egal interpretation ... can never be the function of an understanding of
the text or word alone [because it] must be capable of transforming itself into
action").
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that actors, beyond the individual wrongdoer, can play in the creation
and perpetuation of risks of intentional violence. So, for example,
police officers must use reasonable care to protect all potential vic-
tims, including domestic violence victims. 210 And fraternities that sup-
ply a free flow of alcohol to underage guests must take reasonable
care to account for foreseeable possibilities like rape.
211
This accountability of institutional defendants to use reasonable
care for the physical safety of others can have positive consequences.
Many institutional actors have real power. Private security companies
take in billions of dollars each year.212 Schools take physical custody
of children by the authoritative power of the state.213 Store safety pre-
cautions can reduce the number of crimes committed on the prem-
ises.214 Negligent tortfeasor liability within the context of intentional
torts can lead to structural solutions to safety problems, by requiring a
wide range of actors-schools, businesses, employers, gun manufac-
turers, security services, parole officers and others-to be accountable
for choices that create real risks to the physical well-being of others.
2 1 5
Many types of actors create real risks of physical harm to others, even
though their careful action might have been able to prevent those
harms. To the extent that tort law can influence these groups to take
proactive precautions, it may be able to reduce harm.
216
Although comparative apportionment stories often depict negli-
gent tortfeasors as innocent victims whose only fault is a deep
pocket,217 there is a strong moral accountability basis for negligent
210 See Hutcherson v. City of Phoenix, 961 P.2d 449, 455 (Ariz. 1998).
211 See Delta Tau Delta v. Johnson, 712 N.E.2d 968, 974 (Ind. 1999).
212 See Tomas J. Philipson & Richard A. Posner, The Economic Epidemiology of Crime,
39J.L. & ECON. 405, 407 (1996).
213 See, e.g., People v. Bennett, 501 N.W.2d 106, 119 (Mich. 1993) (holding that if
home school does not comply with rigorous state requirements, "the attendance of-
ficer may initiate criminal proceedings against parents for failing to send their chil-
dren to schools in violation of compulsory education laws").
214 See, e.g., McClung v. Delta Square Ltd. P'ship, 937 S.W.2d 891, 902 (Tenn.
1996).
215 Cf Neal Kumar Katyal, Architecture as Crime Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1039, 1041
(2002) ("[A]ttention to cities, neighborhoods, and individual buildings can reduce
criminal activity."). This structural safety approach is similar to the Occupational
Health and Safety Act and its guidelines, which require implementation of engineer-
ing controls before looking to more individualized safety measures. See, e.g., Brock v.
City Oil Well Serv. Co., 795 F.2d 507, 509-10 (5th Cir. 1986).
216 Cf Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Deterrence: The Legitimate Function of the Public To7rt,
58 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1019 (2001) (arguing that holding an entity liable to the
government for costs the government incurred from citizens' injuries will promote
efficient deterrence).
217 See Swedlund, supra note 21, at 51.
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tortfeasor fault. In some cases, defendants take numerous precau-
tions for the safety of their property that they do not take for their
customers. For example, in Wassell v. Adams, 218 a small motel with a
history of previous crimes invested money in an alarm system to pro-
tect its television sets, but did not provide alarms or even phones to
protect its guests.2 19 In other cases, defendants do not take the care
for their customers that they would likely have taken for themselves.
For example, in Slack, a patient told her insurance company that the
doctor it sent her to had sexually assaulted her.220 The insurer ap-
pears not to have conducted an investigation or imposed other re-
quirements like the presence of a female nurse in the room during
the examination; in fact, the insurance company subsequently sent an-
other patient to the same doctor.22' The doctor then sexually as-
saulted the second patient, who sued. 222 Would an executive of that
insurance company have sent a family member to that doctor without
any safeguard? A jury might have thought that a reasonable person
would not. A number of other accountability bases appear through-
out the negligent security cases.
22 3
On the other hand, negligent tortfeasor liability, if not focused
on meaningful safety precautions, can foster proliferation of costly but
wasteful security measures. If the case law responds to crime myths
and not crime realities, focusing on potentially ineffective precau-
tions, negligent tortfeasor liability may purchase little additional safety
in exchange for its high pricetag. 224
Moreover, negligent tortfeasor liability, by putting a premium on
safety, may not give enough weight to other social values. 225 For ex-
ample, constant video surveillance may add to security but eliminate
privacy. Similarly, from a liability-limiting perspective, and sometimes
218 865 F.2d 849 (7th Cir. 1989).
219 Id. at 851.
220 Slack v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 5 P.3d 280, 282 (Colo. 2000).
221 Id. at 282-83.
222 Id.
223 See, e.g., Rosh v. Cave Imaging Sys., Inc., 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 136, 139-41 (1994)
(imposing liability where defendant took money to provide protection but did not
provide security services in return).
224 See Katyal, supra note 215, at 1132-33 (discussing the possibility that use of
architecture as crime prevention in affluent communities but not others may displace
some amont of crime to poorer communities).
225 See Marshall S. Shapo, On First Looking into General Principles of Torts: Rumina-
tions on Restating for an Ex-Dean, 78 NEB. L. REV. 891, 893 (1999) (noting with approval
the "supple pluralism" of the tort law goals mentioned in the draft Restatement of
General Principles, which included "fairness," "providing appropriate safety incen-
tives," and "broadly humanitarian goals").
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from a safety perspective, employers facing liability may shy away from
hiring prior felons. But such liability may make other goals like social
reintegration of criminals more difficult to achieve. 226 Furthermore,
requiring racial or religious groups to pay for special security may
combat the threat of group-based violence, but at other costs. 227
In addition, court concerns about negligent tortfeasors paying
more than intentional tortfeasors are real, though these concerns are
inherent in the creation of third party duties as an original matter, not
a particular concern of apportionment.
It is not necessary to resolve these arguments for and against lia-
bility in the negligent security context to resolve whether comparison
of intentional and negligent fault should be the method of achieving
such liability reductions. Regardless of whether negligent tortfeasor
liability should be extended or limited in certain types of cases, com-
parison of intentional and negligent torts is a poor means for realizing
these extensions or limitations.
Specifically, comparative apportionment is a poor means of re-
ducing liability because it looks at defendants' relative-rather than
absolute-fault when resolving issues of plaintiff compensation, exam-
ines ideal rather than real-world situations, leaves innocent plaintiffs
bearing greater shares of fault than negligent defendants, has ill-de-
fined standards, leaves juries unguided, and unreviewable discretion,
and is likely to yield legal outcomes that are unpredictable and incon-
sistent. Although comparison can make powerful postmodern state-
ments about collective responsibility, the value of those statements is
diminished by the reality that comparison in practice serves to reduce
plaintiffs' recovery from those collective actors.
a. Defendants' Individual Versus Relative Fault
One main problem with comparative apportioninent is that it
views fault (or responsibility) as a zero-sum attribute-if one defen-
dant has more of it, another defendant necessarily has less. But con-
sider this example: a person suffering from a gunshot wound enters a
hospital for treatment. The doctor commits medical malpractice.
From the combination of the gunshot wound and the malpractice, the
patient dies. The patient would have lived if either one of these two
226 Cf John Q. La Fond, Can TherapeuticJurisprudence Be Normatively Neutral? Sexual
Predator Laws: Their Impact on Participants and Policy, 41 ARxz. L. REv. 375, 413 (1999)
(arguing that therapeutic jurisprudence should be taken into account when evaluat-
ing how sexual predators are treated after their release).
227 CAL. INS. CODE § 676.10 (Deering 2001) (restricting insurer's right to cancel or
refuse to renew policy due to hate crime losses).
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events-the gunshot or the malpractice-had not occurred. The pa-
tient's compensatory damages, which are indivisible, are $100,000.
In the first scenario, imagine that the patient was wounded acci-
dentally. The gunshot wound was not the product of any party's negli-
gence. In a jurisdiction with apportionment and several liability, the
doctor, as the sole tortfeasor, potentially could be liable for all
$100,000 in damages.
In the second scenario, suppose that the patient was instead in-
jured by another person's negligence, perhaps in a hunting accident.
In this same jurisdiction, if the injury is indivisible, 228 the doctor could
now compare her own negligence with the hunter's negligence. Per-
haps the jury would find each defendant responsible for 50% of the
damages. So, the doctor would now be liable for $50,000 in damages.
In the third scenario, suppose that the patient was shot at point-
blank range by a family member who planned the murder. Now the
doctor's negligence would be compared with the murderer's inten-
tional fault. If the level of fault matters for apportioning responsibil-
ity, as it generally should, the jury might assign the lion's share of the
responsibility to the intentional tortfeasor-perhaps 90% of the liabil-
ity for damages. Consequently, the doctor would be liable for only
$10,000, a small fraction of the damages stemming from the injury.
Consequently, even though the doctor committed the same negli-
gence in each of the three cases and caused the same amount of harm
to the plaintiff in each of the three scenarios, the doctor would be
liable for a different amount of damages in each case. Under a com-
parative apportionment system that includes intentional torts, the
doctor's liability in these scenarios will not be assessed based on a con-
sistent examination of the doctor's own conduct and culpability (as
comparative apportionment rhetoric often supposes), but will be
based on a direct and inverse relationship to the culpability of the
person who shot the patient. Thus, in order to limit its liability, the
negligent defendant simply must hope that someone else has done
(or will do) something worse to the patient. As such, comparative ap-
portionment no longer accounts for absolute levels of fault. Instead,
it looks at only the fault of one wrongdoer relative to another.
While a legislature might want to reduce medical malpractice lia-
bility as an initial matter, ideally the extent of that liability should be
228 Causal apportionment may make fault apportionment unnecessary if the inju-
ries are divisible-for example, where the treating doctor aggravated the injury in an
identifiable way. See Schwartz, supra note 6, at 512.
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commensurate with the defendant's own fault and the harm that it
caused, not reduced based on another defendant's culpability.2 29
b. Relative Defendant Fault and Plaintiff Compensation
Although the fault being weighed is the defendant's relative fault,
the comparison is being used to determine not only the defendant's
relative contribution, but also the plaintiff's recovery. In apportion-
ing percentages, courts are looking at the ideal way to divide the costs
of a given injury among all relevant actors. The problem with this
focus on the ideal situation is thatjudges and juries never ask the real-
world question: which of the parties should bear the costs when only a
second best solution is possible? Just because a defendant would ide-
ally pay a particular percentage of the damages when all other defend-
ants are known and solvent does not mean that any other allocation
would be unfair when other defendants are unknown or insolvent. In
this situation, the harsh reality is that either the plaintiff or the negli-
gent defendant will bear the remaining cost of the injury.230 In courts
that apportion intentional and negligent fault and adopt several liabil-
ity, the plaintiff, even if completely innocent, is always forced to bear
the burden of any uncollectible portion of the judgment (though
some states have begun to reapportion these uncollectible judg-
ments) .231 Courts do not articulate why having an innocent plaintiff
pay more than her fair share (as defined by her ideal percentage) is
more fair than having the negligent tortfeasor pay more than her fair
share. 232 Ironically, in jurisdictions with several liability and compari-
229 See Wright, supra note 175, at 59; cf Lewis A. Kornhauser & Richard L. Revesz,
Sharing Damages Among Multiple Tortfeasors, 98 YALE LJ. 831, 833 (1989) (demonstrat-
ing "that the efficiency of apportionment rules under negligence depends almost ex-
clusively on whether the negligent actors must pay for damage caused by non-
negligent actors, as they must under joint and several liability" and arguing that
"[e]xcept where one actor's damage does not affect the extent of damage caused by
another, only joint and several liability rules produce the efficient result").
230 This is true absent some kind of public fund or private insurance that covers
intentional torts. SeeJennifer Wriggins, Domestic Violence Torts, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 121,
146-69 (2001) (proposing insurance reform to deal with this reality).
231 See Green & Powers, supra note 22, at 36 ("The adoption of several liability
imposes the risk of insolvency of other tortfeasors on the plaintiff. It is now the plain-
tiff that bears the risk that some responsible tortfeasor will not be able to pay any-
thing, or at least the full amount of his share."); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: COMPARATIVE APPORTIONMENT § 17, at 156 (1999) (listing reallocation
jurisdictions).
232 See Wright, supra note 175, at 78 ("There is absolutely no justification, however,
for treating the contributorily negligent plaintiff worse than the defendants who tor-
tiously injured him.").
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son of defendants' intentional and negligent fault, plaintiffs who are
not contributorily negligent "would actually be better off under the
doctrine of contributory negligence than they are under comparative
fault."233
While concerns about shifting burdens to plaintiffs are appropri-
ately raised in comparative negligence systems, the concerns are
heightened when intentional/negligent fault comparisons are added
to the mix. Intentional/negligent fault comparisons, by putting an
even heavier thumb on the scale for the liability of the intentional
tortfeasor, are likely to have the corresponding effect of assigning neg-
ligent parties an even slighter share of liability.23 4 As such, in some
number of cases, comparisons will minimize or eliminate negligent
tortfeasor liability. 235 In addition, intentional tortfeasors are more
likely to be insolvent and unable to pay judgments because of the lack
of insurance funds to cover most intentional torts.236 Consequently,
with defendant intentional/negligent fault comparisons, plaintiffs are
more likely to be left uncompensated for part of the judgment.
This diminished ability to recover is weighed against the real
needs for compensation of plaintiffs injured by a combination of in-
tentional and negligent torts. 237 Although comparative fault may not
233 Brown & Morgan, supra note 45, at 512.
234 See, e.g., Clouse v. State, 16 P.3d 757, 759 n.3 (2001) (in case involving family
tortured and set on fire by criminals who sheriffs had improperly released on the side
of the road,jury apportioned 85% of fault to criminals and 15% to county); Nasteway
v. City of Tempe, 909 P.2d 441, 443 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (in case in which officer
negligently failed to block road for police chase which killed plaintiff bystander, jury
apportioned 80% of fault to person fleeing police and 20% to negligent cities and
officers); Weidenfeller v. Star & Garter, I Cal. App. 4th 1, 4 (1991) (in case in which
victim was assaulted in bar parking lot, jury apportioned 75% of fault to attacker, 20%
to the bar for inadequate security precautions, and 5% to the victim for unspecified
conduct).
235 See, e.g., Ozaki v. Ass'n of Apartment Owners, 954 P.2d 644 (Haw. 1998) (elimi-
nating negligent defendant's liability).
236 See Wriggins, supra note 230, at 122 (discussing creation of "a massive epidemic
of uncompensated intentional torts" by domestic violence).
237 See TED R. MILLER ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, VICTIM COSTS AND CONSE
QUENCES: A NEW LOOK 1, 19 (1996) ("Victims pay about $44 billion of the $57 billion
in tangible non-service expenses for traditional crimes of violence-murder, rape,
robbery, assault, and abuse and neglect."). Although it has been suggested that plain-
tiffs in contrast to defendants "can always bear their comparative share of liability" as
they "merely bear a greater portion of portion of the harm without compensation," see
Green, supra note 181, at 1131, this preference for settled distributions, see Eric A.
Posner, Law and Regret, 98 MICH. L. REv. 1468, 1475 (2000) (discussing the preference
courts give to settled distributions in contract law), overlooks the sometimes life-
crushing costs of serious injuries to victims. See GuIDO CALABRES], THE COSTS OF AccI-
DENTS: A LECAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 44-45 (1970) (stating that "accidents are a
[voI- 78:2
THE END GAME OF TORT REFORM
have changed plaintiffs' total recoveries, comparative responsibility
will reduce them.238 To the extent that making an injured victim
whole is a central part of tort law's fairness agenda, comparisons of
defendants' fault are even less likely to meet that objective than when
comparison includes intentional tortfeasors.
Courts that limit the negligent tortfeasor's liability rarely acknowl-
edge that plaintiffs, whether innocent or negligent, will bear a larger
portion of the injury tab under comparative apportionment. 239 How-
ever, given this real effect, it is not surprising that groups that have
testified against intentional/negligent fault comparisons before state
legislatures include victims' rights organizations, low-income advocacy
groups, and plaintiffs' lawyers. 240 But even with some representation,
here as elsewhere, what is missing from reform proposals in legisla-
tures "is the significant presence of people who are looking specifi-
cally to the interests of those who are injured and to the
administrative costs of granting such people recovery."
241
c. Metaphysical Questions
Not only is the use of relative fault comparison problematic as a
tool for reducing plaintiff recoveries, the procedures for making those
intentional/negligent fault comparisons are also troubling. Some
comparative apportionment advocates concede that comparative ap-
portionment is "impossible in theory," and yet contend that such com-
parisons are nevertheless feasible in practice. 242 But when courts say
thatjuries can apportion responsibility between intentional and negli-
gent parties, do they mean anything more than that the jury can cre-
source of some of the most dramatic concentrations of costs in our society," that
"some of the direst examples of poverty stem from accident situations," and that
"some unspread accidents costs reduce people from a good to a minimum standard of
living").
238 See Calabresi & Cooper, supra note 6, at 870.
239 See, e.g., Hutcherson v. City of Phoenix, 961 P.2d 449 (Ariz. 1998).
240 In Connecticut, for example, groups testifying before the Connecticut legisla-
ture included the Connecticut Sexual Assault Crisis Services, Inc., the Legal Assistance
Resource Center of Connecticut, Inc. (a low-income advocacy organization), the Con-
necticut Bar Association, and the Connecticut Trial Lawyers Association. See Scheffey,
supra note 21, at 2. In the Pennsylvania legislature, Mothers Against Drunk Driving
testified against proposed comparative responsibility legislation. Hearings on Joint and
Several Liability Before the House Judiciary Comm., 2002 Leg., 185th Sess. 229-45 (Pa.
2002) [hereinafterJoint and Several Liability Hearings] (testimony of Nancy P. Oppedal,
State Chair of Mothers Against Drunk Driving).
241 Calabresi & Cooper, supra note 6, at 864.
242 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Foreword to RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPOR-
TIONMENT OF LIABILITY xii-xiii (Proposed Final Draft (Revised) 1999).
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ate a set of percentages that totals 100%?243 When a jury assigns 50%
to a defendant, it is 50% of what? Fault? Causation? Responsibility?
Liability for damages? Courts vary in how they speak about this
task.
244
If these numbers are intended to reflect assessments of fault, as
many courts say they are, courts frequently do not provide guidance
about how to compare negligent and intentional fault.245 One court
that refused to make comparisons noted the difficulty of devising a
standard. As that court wrote, "unless fraud has a fault basis with
which negligence can compare, it is difficult to envision how the court
should have divined a particular portion of fault as traceable to [the
negligent defendant] .,"46
One solution to the inability of courts to articulate an answer to
the metaphysical questions of how to compare intentional and negli-
243 Cf William L. Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 41 CAL. L. REV. 1, 37 (1953) (pro-
posing a separation of verdicts into discrete parts, including one that does not con-
sider comparative negligence); Kenneth W. Simons, Dimensions of Negligence in
Criminal and Tort Law, 3 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 283, 329 (2002) ("Comparing neg-
ligence to supposedly 'more serious' forms of fault, such as recklessness, knowledge,
and purpose, is treacherous. Depending on the type of negligence, as well as the type
of recklessness or other fault, this might amount to comparing apples and oranges.").
244 See Hutcherson, 961 P.2d at 453 (stating a jury has the authority and ability to
evaluate "degrees of fault" but then framing fault not in terms of "culpability" but in
terms of "responsibility for foresight and avoidance"); Paragon Family Rest. v.
Bartolini, 769 N.E.2d 609, 621 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (discussing the jury's allocation of
"fault" but then weighing "spontaneous, unforeseeable, and independent criminal
acts" by minors as more culpable than acts of negligent party which could have
avoided the situation, and reviewing the matter as an issue of damage assessment);
Morrison v. Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity, 738 So. 2d 1105, 1105, 1119 (La. Ct. App.
1999) (discussingjury allocation of "fault" but suggesting that in allocation considera-
tion should be given to fault and "extent of the causal relationship between the con-
duct and the damages claimed").
245 But see Morrison, 738 So. 2d at 1119. The Morrison court stated,
In allocating comparative fault, consideration must be directed toward the
nature of each party's conduct and the extent of the causal relationship be-
tween the conduct and the damages claimed. Factors which may influence
the degree of fault include: (1) whether the conduct resulted from inadver-
tence or involved an awareness of the danger; (2) how great a risk the con-
duct created; (3) the significance of what the actor sought by the conduct;
(4) the capacities of the actor, whether superior or inferior; and (5) any
extenuating circumstances which might require the actor to proceed in
haste, without proper thought.
Id.
246 Lynn v. Taylor, 642 P.2d 131, 135 (Kan. Ct. App. 1982).
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gent fault is to foist that task onto juries.247 This is where courts must
express exuberant confidence in juror abilities. 248 The result is at
once less assailable-it is difficult to know how or why a jury has
reached a given set of percentages, thus making the result less perme-
able to questioning-and more worrisome.
Standardless jury determinations present a particular problem for
appellate review. Without a legal standard governing jury decisions,
the possibilities for that review are quite limited.249 The limited judi-
cial review of American negligence cases250 seems even more limited
when the cases involve negligence and intentional torts combined.
25'
This soft review is particularly troublesome given the prospect that
apportionment will expand evidence related to subjective intent,252
and that juries will focus their inquiries on the parties' moral worth,
rather than their conduct.
25-
247 In other contexts, courts shy away from doctrines that would require answers to
metaphysical questions. See, e.g., Greco v. United States, 893 P.2d 345, 347 (Nev.
1995) (refusing to recognize the claim of wrongful birth since that kind of claim
would require the courts "to weigh the harms suffered by virtue of the child's having
been born with severe handicaps against 'the utter void of nonexistence"' (quoting
Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 692 (N.J. 1967))).
248 Cf Kenneth S. Abraham, The Trouble with Negligence, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1187,
1198 (2001) ("I doubt that the process of norm creation, which I submit is at the core
of unbounded negligence cases, could have survived if we did not have juries.").
249 Thus, there is no countermajoritarian possibility through appellate review. See
id. at 1194, 1197 (noting both the importance ofjudicial review ofjurors' norm crea-
tion decisions, and the current lack of such review).
250 See Stephen G. Gilles, The Emergence of Cost-Benefit Balancing in English Negligence
Law, 77 CiI--KENT L. REv. 489, 490 (2002) (noting that appellate review of negligence
issues in England is freer and better informed than is such review in the United States
because an English "appellate tribunal is confronted with a judge's explanatory opin-
ion, rather than a jury's delphic verdict").
251 See Yount v. Johnson, 121 N.M. 585, 587 (Ct. App. 1996) (noting that juries
now "perform complicated tasks such as comparing the simple negligence of one
party with the intentional or reckless conduct of another" and that "[t]oday, courts
are less often compelled to direct the jury's work"); Morrison v. Kappa Alpha Psi Fra-
ternity, 738 So. 2d 1105, 1119 (La. Ct. App. 1999) ("Allocation of fault is a factual
determination subject to the manifest error rule."); see also Vandall, supra note 136, at
606 (questioning how "a jury [can] effectively compare apples and oranges by as-
signing shares to plaintiffs and defendants"); DOBBS, supra note 19, at 521 (noting
that tort rules "must apply the fault comparison in ways that can be rationally evalu-
ated by reviewing judges").
252 Stewart, supra note 184, at 27 ("[E]vidence that could not make it in the front
door could, under an allocation justification, come in the back door."); see also
Vandall, supra note 136, at 608-09 (claiming "heresy" that evidence irrelevant to de-
fendant's liability could be admitted to reduce proportion of liability).
253 See DOBBS, supra note 19, at 521 ("Such difficulties [in comparing fault] open
the door to highly subjective judgments about an individual's moral worth rather than
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d. Consistency and Transparency
Each jury can have a different interpretation of what responsibil-
ity means.2 5 4 Thus, juries, which are not required to articulate the
standards they apply, 255 may not be applying a consistent standard.
This lack of consistency leaves tort law in a situation in which there is
no law, just a process for resolving disputes. 256 Rather than resolve
litigation as a lottery, where the winner takes all or nothing,25 7 com-
parative responsibility brings the jury in closer line with the roulette
wheel, where the plaintiff can win a large amount, nothing, or any
number of combinations in between. Inconsistent verdicts that stem
from the jury's discretionary lawmaking undermine the legitimacy of
the tort-law system.
258
Apportionment also hurts the transparency of tort-law rules. A
court may say that gun manufacturers have a duty to victims of gun
violence, or a duty only in limited circumstances, or no duty at all-
and in any of these cases, litigants can know the rules of decision.
However, if the rule is that gun manufacturers have liability that can
only be realized to the extent that ajury believes the fault of that actor
is worse than the fault of an individual who used the weapon-the
actual substance of that rule is opaque.259
In addition, lack of objective standards for juries to follow may
magnify the effects of undesirable factors such as bias.260 A standar-
dless approach may be particularly problematic in cases in which race
about an individual's conduct. Biased judgments would be difficult or impossible to
detect and review on appeal in the absence of a firm standard for comparison.").
254 See Abraham, supra note 248, at 1189 (arguing that "negligence is a far less
satisfactory standard" in cases where the finder of fact must create a norm than in
cases governed by a pre-existing independent norm).
255 See id. at 1199.
256 See id. at 1197 ("Given this norm creation in unbounded cases, instead of hav-
ing a law of negligence that applies in such cases, we merely have (as Leon Green put
it long ago) a process for deciding negligence cases.").
257 See Hollister, supra note 49, at 122-23 (arguing that when both parties are at
fault, the court's results are either a complete victory or a complete loss for the
plaintiff).
258 See Abraham, supra note 248, at 1204-05.
259 Cf Simons, supra note 243, at 307 ("The negligence concept, even if articu-
lated somewhat by such criteria as 'reasonable person in the community' or risk-utility
balancing, remains fundamentally vague. To employ such a standard more exten-
sively in the criminal law would present problems of fair notice and unreviewable
discretion.").
260 See Martha Chamallas, Deepening the Legal Understanding of Bias: On Devaluation
and Biased Prototypes, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 747, 775 (2001) (noting the value of objective
standards in comparable worth cases).
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An interesting facet of apportionment is the expressive content it
creates. Comparative apportionment requires plaintiffs, in order to
recover, to tell stories about why intentional tortfeasors are not to
blame for the harm. 262 Jury findings convey these stories-a 911 oper-
ator who negligently misclassifies a domestic violence call as low prior-
ity bears 75% of the responsibility for the murder victim's death, while
the murderer himself bears only 25% of the responsibility.263 If any
judgment could send shock waves through a culture committed to in-
dividual accountability, this apportionment judgment (and others like
it) would be a likely candidate. 264
Comparative apportionment not only can assess broader social
fault on its own (as negligent tortfeasor liability did before compara-
tive apportionment), but it can also do so in relation to individual
fault. Here then is the ultimate vehicle of the postmodern message-
police inattention is more responsible for domestic violence injuries
than is deliberate violence by batterers; schools are more responsible
for child abuse than are abusers.
265
But the value of that message's recognition of broader social re-
sponsibility is diluted because apportionment acknowledges that re-
sponsibility only as part of a broader equation to reduce the financial
accountability of those social actors.
261 See Bublick, supra note 16, at 1457-62 (arguing that tort law compels female
victims to treat minority males as dangerous); cf Audio tape: Walter Dellinger, Associ-
ation of American Law Schools Annual Meeting (Jan. 7, 2000) (on file with author)
(criticizing the Supreme Court's confidence in segregation-era juries to treat African-
Americans fairly).
262 Such a system creates concerns like those addressed in the context of under-
pleading. Pryor, supra note 149, at 1722-23.
263 See Hutcherson v. City of Phoenix, 961 P.2d 449, 451 (Ariz. 1998).
264 Id. at 455.
265 See Hutcherson, 961 P.2d at 451, 455 (upholding a jury verdict that allocated
75% of liability to the city for negligently responding to a 911 distress call in a case
where a tortfeasor intentionally shot and killed the plaintiff's decedent); Ortega v.
Pajaro Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 64 Cal. App. 4th 1023, 1056-59 (1998) (remanding
the case for a new allocation of fault between a school district that suppressed evi-
dence of a teacher's history of molestation and the teacher, where the jury found the
district 100% responsible for the plaintiff's injuries); see also Douglas Litowitz, In De-
fense ofPostmodernism, 4 GREEN BAG 2D 39, 46 (2000) (noting that postmodernism is, in
part, a critique of Enlightenment notions about the autonomous self).
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2. Intentional Tortfeasors' Liability to Plaintiffs
Comparing defendants' intentional and negligent fault can also
reduce intentional tortfeasors' liability to plaintiffs. If a state has not
retained joint and several liability for intentional tortfeasors and a
court permits a murderer's fault to be compared with a negligent
party's fault, the murderer himself may owe less than full compensa-
tory damages to the murder victim's estate.
A number of courts have addressed whether an intentional
tortfeasor should be able to reduce liability for damages to the plain-
tiff based on the plaintiffs fault. In that context courts are nearly
unanimous in rejecting comparisons except in cases that challenge
the definitional boundaries between intentional and negligent torts.
However, courts generally have not addressed whether an intentional
tortfeasor should be able to reduce its liability to plaintiff because of
another defendant's fault-a question that raises both the issue of
whether an intentional tortfeasor should be able to diminish responsi-
bility for damages to a plaintiff, and whether comparison of defend-
ants' relative fault is a means for achieving those reductions in
plaintiff's recovery.
Although the issue of whether intentional tortfeasors should be
able to reduce damage payments to plaintiffs may seem unimportant
because many intentional tortfeasors will be absent or insolvent, there
are large categories of cases in which this debate could have a signifi-
cant financial impact-for example, in cases of intentional environ-
mental harm. 266 Moreover, even when the practical import is slight,
this subject is an area laden with particularly strong expressive
dimensions.
The initial responsibility of an intentional tortfeasor to pay plain-
tiff full compensatory damages seems straightforward. In general,
holding intentional tortfeasors liable for full damages to the persons
they have intentionally harmed leads to and reflects a notion of plain-
tiff entitlement-specifically, a person's entitlement not to be inten-
tionally harmed.267 Implicit in noncomparison of intentional and
negligent torts is an assumption that intentional torts are more blame-
worthy than negligent torts.26s This view that an actor's intentional
266 Vandall, supra note 136, at 618-19 (suggesting that the reason for the Restate-
ment's comparisons is to allow toxic tortfeasors to reduce payments).
267 McNichols, supra note 31, at 641-42.
268 See Simons, supra note 243, at 326 (stating that tort law differentiates "three
kinds of torts-intentional, negligence, and strict liability," which "creates the appear-
ance of a single, very general hierarchy of fault" and describing situations in which
that hierarchy is unpersuasive).
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misconduct is more culpable than that actor's negligent misconduct is
shared by criminal as well as tort authorities. 269 Moreover, the view
that states of mind and culpability are central to the tort system is
firmly rooted in American jurisprudence 270 and the American concep-
tion of justice.
271
These principles are not beyond challenge. One may reconsider
whether moral culpability and intent to harm are useful principles for
making policy decisions about payment for injuries.2 72 An argument
has been made, for example, that shifting legal responsibility from
intentional tortfeasors to their careless victims will promote
efficiency.
2 73
Such arguments for reductions in intentional tortfeasor liability
seem less worrisome at the border of intentional and negligent
torts.2 74 Intentional torts that lack indicia of culpability are more sym-
pathetic candidates for reduction, and not surprisingly, it is in those
contexts that most advocates of comparison have made their case.
275
But allowing comparisons in cases such as trespass, nuisance, excessive
force in self-defense that was subjectively but unreasonably believed to
have been necessary (sometimes classified as a negligent tort for insur-
ance purposes), and intentional torts committed by young children
does not seem to threaten the fabric of the central rule that inten-
tional tortfeasors cannot diminish their liability by comparison with
another party's negligence. Instead, these cases simply flag problems
269 The Model Penal Code establishes levels of blameworthiness-purposefully,
knowingly, recklessly, and negligently. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (1962).
270 See Richard A. Posner, Professionalisms, 40 ARiz. L. REV. 1, 13 (1998) ("[T]he
morality from which those [legal] terms is drawn is Judeo-Christian and so gives pri-
macy to intentions and other mental states bearing on culpability, rather than focus-
ing, as the ancient Greeks did, primarily on results.").
271 See Lawrence M. Solan & John M. Darley, Causation, Contribution, and Legal Lia-
bility: An Empirical Study, 64 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 265, 297 (2001) (studying the way
in which people understand enabling torts and concluding that "the determination of
the legal consequences of an action depended upon whether the enabler's state of
mind was willful, reckless, negligent, or nonnegligent").
272 Id.
273 See Alon Harel, Efficiency and Fairness in the Criminal Law: The Case for a Criminal
Law Principle of Comparative Fault, 82 CAL. L. REv. 1181 passim (1994) (arguing that
comparing victims' conduct in determining sanctions imposed on a criminal will pro-
mote efficiency).
274 SeeJones, supra note 172, at 263 (suggesting that the category of intentional
torts is overinclusive and that the relevant distinction should not be "between inten-
tional and negligent behavior but between predatory and nonpredatory behavior").
275 See supra note 49.
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in the definition of intentional-versus-negligent torts. 276 The labels
given to individual torts may or may not track important policy rea-
sons to treat torts differently.277 Moreover, policy distinctions that
make sense for a broad group of cases may be problematic in individ-
ual cases. 278 And the conduct of parties in particular cases may resist
classification along the traditional intentional and negligence lines.
2 79
While these inroads suggest that tort scholars may have to think
more carefully about the culpability-related questions examined by
our criminal law colleagues, such as questions concerning the liability
of reduced-capacity actors and the defense of provocation, and similar
questions that examine issues relating to actors' state of mind,280 they
do not suggest that there are no intentional torts that warrant differ-
ential treatment.
Moreover, any pleas for relief from over-burdensome debt in the
intentional tort context are unlikely to commend comparative appor-
tionment as their solution. When a defendant intended harm and
may be liable for punitive as well as compensatory damages, there is
little logic in relieving the defendant from responsibility for payment
276 See Theresa L. Fiset, Comparative Fault as a Tool To Nullify the Duty To Protect:
Apportioning Liability to a Non-Party Intentional Tortfeasor in Stellas v. Alamo Rent-a-Car,
Inc., 27 STETSON L. REV. 699, 732 (1997) (arguing that exceptions to the general rule
that intentional tortfeasors cannot claim the plaintiff's comparative fault for cases
involving strictly liable defendants, such as batteries involving provocation and nui-
sances, "make sense because the defendant's 'intentional conduct' either involves a
level of risk that mimics the plaintiff's negligence, or the plaintiff's conduct involves a
level of risk that mimics the defendant's intentional acts").
277 See Sandifer Motors, Inc. v. City of Roeland Park, 628 P.2d 239, 245 (Kan. Ct.
App. 1981) (noting that not only do "the two concepts [of nuisance and negligence]
overlap and ... often coexist," but also that "'[w] here the acts or omissions constitut-
ing negligence are the identical acts which it is asserted gave rise to a cause of action
for nuisance, the rules applicable to negligence will be applied'" (quoting 58 AM. JUR.
2o Nuisances § 35 (2000))); AnthonyJ. Sebok, Purpose, Belief and Recklessness: Pruning
the Restatement (Third) 's Definition of Intent, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1165, 1183-85 (2001)
(arguing that substantive policy decisions and not formal definitions of acts as "reck-
less" or "intentional" should drive practical decisions with respect to insurance's cov-
erage of those acts).
278 See McNichols, supra note 31, at 652.
279 See Cummings v. Sea Lion Corp., 924 P.2d 1011, 1023 (Alaska 1996) (noting
that comparisons are permissible because the jury is comparing the plaintiff's negli-
gence with the defendant's negligence, not the defendant's intentional tort, but the
same underlying conduct by the defendant was the basis for both the intentional tort
of fraud and the professional negligence claim).
280 See Simons, supra note 243, at 322-28 (examining the "hierarchy of fault" in
tort and criminal law and separating and discussing distinct features embedded within
the concept of "intentional torts" and "negligence"); Kenneth Simons, Rethinking
Mental States, 72 B.U. L. REV. 463 (1992).
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of full compensatory damages. Moreover, arguments about protect-
ing intentional wrongdoers from over-burdensome debt have not
been persuasive in the bankruptcy context, 28 1 which seems a more ap-
propriate forum for the question.
Procedurally, as with reductions in negligent tortfeasor liability to
plaintiffs through comparison of relative defendant fault, reduction in
intentional tortfeasor liability on that basis is equally flawed. When a
defendant intentionally harms a plaintiff-and the defendant's only
claim to lesser payment is that another defendant wronged the plain-
tiff as well-one can hear the faint suggestion of the old adage "two
wrongs don't make a right" in denial of the claim for diminution of
liability.
2 82
3. Intentional Tortfeasors' Situation Relative to Negligent
Defendants
Comparing defendants' intentional and negligent fault can also
improve an intentional tortfeasor's position relative to a negligent
tortfeasor for purposes of contribution and indemnity. When an in-
tentional tortfeasor and a negligent tortfeasorjointly caused an injury,
the traditional rule was to treat the intentional tortfeasor as an indem-
nitor. The more recent trend toward comparison of intentional and
negligent torts, which appears to affect contribution, places less em-
phasis on the intentional tortfeasor's primary responsibility for the
harm. Accordingly, even if the intentional tortfeasor could pay the
281 See Sebok, supra note 277, at 1181 (noting that in bankruptcy, "intentionally
caused tort liability is not [dischargeable]").
282 See Joint and Several Liability Hearings, supra note 240, at 129 (testimony of Jay N.
Silverblatt, Immediate Past Chair, Civil Litigation Section, Pennsylvania Bar Associa-
tion). Silverblatt stated,
[T] his moral judgment that is being made is something that our mothers all
taught us as youngsters. Imagine a group of friends, 5 boys throwing rocks.
And they finish their frivolity and go home. And my mother finds out that I
was throwing rocks along with 4 other boys and our neighbor's window is
broken and there's a rock in her living room, a single rock. But 5 boys all
throwing rocks. What do you think my mother is going to say to me? Well, I
bet my mother is going to say the exact same thing that all of your mothers
will say. You were there. You were throwing rocks. You pay for that window.
And if I say to her, But Mom, all the other boys were throwing rocks, too,
she'll say to me, Then you talk to those 4 other boys; but you get your rear
end down to that hardware store and you buy another window. That's my
mother's moral judgment. And I'm sure it's your mother's moral judgment
as well. That's joint and several liability.
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entire judgment, if intentional tortfeasors can take advantage of con-
tribution they would not be required to do so.
It is difficult to understand why courts would be willing to allow
intentional tortfeasors to take advantage of doctrines of contribution,
when these same courts are uniformly hostile to the idea of direct
intentional tortfeasor plaintiff recoveries outside extremely limited
contexts. 28 3 Perhaps courts see contribution benefits as very small
given the possibility that many intentional tortfeasors will be judg-
ment-proof or subject to punitive damages or criminal sanctions. 284.
Perhaps, too, this difference reflects the reluctance of courts to make
the negligent tortfeasor pay the intentional tortfeasor despite being
willing to offer the intentional tortfeasor a credit-reflecting the stick-
iness of settled distributions.285  Still, permitting intentional
tortfeasors to take advantage of contribution seems difficult to jus-
tify28 6 outside certain intentional torts in which harm was not in-




The aggregate effects of comparing defendants' intentional and
negligent torts are a likely decrease in negligent tortfeasor liability to
plaintiffs, a decrease in intentional tortfeasor liability to plaintiffs, a
decrease in plaintiff recovery from defendants adjudged to be at fault,
and a decrease in intentional tortfeasor liability to other negligent de-
fendants. Because courts do not address these multiple effects of
comparison, their rationales are not as helpful as they might be. Invo-
cations of "fair share" rhetoric do not help determine what shares of
liability are fair. While statutes may require comparisons in some
283 SeeJoseph H. King, Jr., Outlaws and Outlier Doctrines: The Serious Misconduct Bar
in Tort Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1011, 1020, 1060 (2002) (stating that the rules
barring claims arising from plaintiffs' serious misconduct command increasing sup-
port in the courts but are undergirded by questionable rationales); cf Williams v.
Thude, 934 P.2d 1349 (Ariz. 1997) (upholding differential treatment of willful and
wanton plaintiffs and defendants).
284 See Pryor, supra note 149, at 1722-23 ("[M]ost standard liability policies do not
cover liability for harm that the insured intentionally causes.").
285 See Posner, supra note 237, at 1475 (noting that courts give more protection to
those in possession of a good than those who have merely been promised that good).
286 See Robertson, supra note 153, at 204 ("[I] ntentional tortfeasors ought not to
be able to get contribution from 'merely' negligent ones .... ).
287 See DOBBS, supra note 19, at 520 (noting that comparison is "an approach that
might be justified in some claims between defendants for contribution"); see also supra
notes 52-53.
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states, in many more states the issue is more open than courts ac-
knowledge. It is precisely policy issues that affect judicial decisions.
IV. TOWARD THE FUTURE: SUGGESTIONS FOR THE STATES
States have resolved issues surrounding comparative apportion-
ment and intentional fault in a variety of ways. Two legal authori-
ties-the American Law Institute and the National Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws-also have recently addressed these issues. The
Institute's Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability includes
some types of intentional torts within its comparative apportionment
system, but then minimizes many of the most problematic effects of
that inclusion. In contrast, the National Commissioners' Uniform Ap-
portionment of Tort Responsibility Act excludes intentional fault
from its default provisions288 but allows states to add such conduct to
the Act's apportionment-with-reallocation plan at their own
election. 2
8 9
This Part reviews each apportionment proposal with respect to
comparisons of intentional and negligent fault. The Article finds that
the Restatement provisions are superior to existing state solutions be-
cause the Restatement systematically accounts for subsidiary issues and
prevents particularly problematic aspects of comparing intentional
and negligent fault. However, the Article further concludes that the
Uniform Apportionment Act is preferable both to state comparisons
of intentional and negligent fault and to several possibilities under the
Restatement because the Uniform Apportionment Act's default rules
and reapportionment mechanism more fully and consistently elimi-
nate problems associated with including intentional fault in compara-
tive apportionment systems.
Still, the Part concludes with a caution for states that have not
ventured into the apportionment process. Because legal deci-
sionmakers want only a few of the many potential effects of comparing
intentional and negligent fault, states may be better served by continu-
ing to exclude intentional fault from comparative fault and compara-
tive apportionment systems, and instead directly addressing the
functional issues that animate their perceived need for comparisons,
rather than embarking on the apportionment process.
288 UNIF. APPORTIONMENT OF TORT RESPONSIBILITY ACT § 2 Definitions (2002).
289 Id. § 2 cmt. (noting that "an adopting jurisdiction is still free to determine ...
which types of conduct should be compared").
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A. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability
1. The Restatement Provisions
The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability provides
for apportionment of all personal injury claims "regardless of the basis
for liability. '" 29° Despite this inclusive language, the intentional/negli-
gent fault comparisons authorized by the Restatement are less encom-
passing than they originally appear. First, comparisons of intentional
and negligent fault recommended by the Restatement are confined to
the single context of comparison between two tortfeasor defendants.
The Restatement takes "no position" on whether to permit intentional
tortfeasor defendants to invoke the plaintiff's negligence, or to permit
suits to be brought against negligent defendants by plaintiffs who in-
tended harm.
29 1
Moreover, even within that context of intentional and negligent
tortfeasor defendants, the Restatement does not require comparison of
all intentional torts. By its terms, the Restatement retains a large carve-
out for suits for purely non-tangible economic loss caused by breach
of contract or warranty, fraud, misrepresentation, non-medical profes-
sional malpractice, or, where recognized, negligence; for suits by in-
sureds or others against insurers for inappropriate claims-settlement
practices; and for suits for breach of fiduciary relationship, interfer-
ence with contractual relations, defamation, and invasion of privacy as
well as suits based on "a statutory cause of action."292 In these cases,
the Restatement suggests that "special policy considerations" may
render apportionment inappropriate. 29
3
In addition to the Restatement's specified carve-out, the Restatement
provides courts "with flexibility to fashion appropriate special rules for
victims of intentional torts."294 In commentary, the drafters note that
courts have discretion to decline to use intentional-negligent compari-
sons when those comparisons would yield an unfair result. 295 If courts
make use of this commentary, the Restatement could exclude a range of
intentional torts from within its ambit.
29 6
290 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 1 (2000).
291 Id. § 1 cmt. c.
292 d. § I cmt. e.
293 Id.
294 id. § 1 cmt. c.
295 Id.
296 Cf Veazey v. Elmwood Plantation Assocs., 650 So. 2d 712, 717-19 (La. 1994)
(deciding to use a case-by-case analysis in determining "whether to apply comparative
fault principles in cases where it is alleged that comparative fault exists among inten-
tional tortfeasors and negligent tortfeasors").
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Perhaps as important as the Restatement's exceptions from inten-
tional/negligent fault comparisons is its creation and retention of
doctrines that eliminate some of the adverse effects of intentional/
negligent fault comparisons when such comparisons apply. Of partic-
ular import, although the Restatement does not retain full joint and
several liability for all negligent defendants whose actions produce a
single indivisible injury, the Restatement does preserve negligent de-
fendants' whole liability to plaintiffs in a significant category of
cases. 297 In particular, the Restatement preserves negligent tortfeasor
liability through a "very duty" rule-a rule eliminating the negligent
defendant's ability to take advantage of intentional fault comparisons
when the negligent defendant's very duty of care related to preven-
tion of the intentional tort.298 Specifically, under the Restatement rule,
a negligent tortfeasor cannot reduce its liability to the plaintiff if it is
liable for "a failure to protect the [plaintiff] from the specific risk of
the intentional tort."29
9
Moreover, the Restatement retains the full joint and several liability
of intentional tortfeasors to plaintiffs for indivisible injuries.300 Conse-
quently, an intentional tortfeasor cannot reduce its share of liability to
the plaintiff because another defendant was negligent.
In addition, the Restatement through plaintiff "no duty" rules may
prevent negligent defendants from diminishing their obligations to
plaintiffs in cases also involving intentional torts. Plaintiff no-duty
rules limit plaintiffs' obligations to take precautions to prevent their
own victimization. Such rules may shield plaintiffs from being as-
signed a fault share with respect to either intentional or negligent
tortfeasors.3
01
Accordingly, although the Restatement compares defendants' in-
tentional and negligent fault in a number of cases, plaintiffs, particu-
larly if exposed to the risks of intentional torts by negligent
defendants, have a more robust possibility of recovery under the Re-
statement than may be afforded in a number of states.
297 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 14.
298 Id.
299 Id.
300 See id. § 12.
301 See, e.g., id. § 3 cmt. d (proposing plaintiff no-duty rules); Hutchinson ex. rel.
Hutchinson v. Luddy, 763 A.2d 826, 848-49 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000) (holding that mi-
nor parishoner who had been sexually abused had no duty to avoid being harmed
and that even negligent defendant could not raise the plaintiff's comparative negli-
gence as a defense); Bublick, supra note 16, passim (discussing the problems in apply-
ing a comparative fault system to rape cases filed against rapists or third parties).
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As between the intentional and negligent tortfeasor defendants,
the Restatement improves the position of intentional tortfeasors relative
to negligent tortfeasors. The Restatement changes the rules of contri-
bution and indemnity between intentional and negligent tortfeasors
so that an intentional tortfeasor would not be an indemnitor of the
negligent tortfeasor 30 2 but would instead be entitled to obtain
contribution.
03
As forjury standards and appellate review, the Restatement enunci-
ates two factors by which to apportion responsibility: fault and causa-
tion. 3°14 Factors in this comparison not only include traditional
negligence criteria such as the reasonableness of the parties' conduct,
but also additional criteria like the parties' subjective intent and their
individual abilities and disabilities. 30 5 Although the Restatement admits
that "it is not possible to precisely compare conduct that falls into dif-
ferent categories, such as intentional conduct, negligent conduct, and
conduct governed by strict liability, because the various theories of
recovery are incommensurate,3 0 6 it nevertheless asserts, primarily
based on administrative ease, that juries routinely compare incom-
mensurate values and should make such assignments of
responsibility.11
7
2. Benefits of the Restatement Approach
The new Restatement is an improvement over the practices of
states that compare defendants' intentional and negligent fault. The
Restatement has systematically worked through many of the most im-
portant apportionment questions and eliminates some of the harshest
consequences of comparing intentional and negligent torts.
The Restatement is one of the first and only authorities explicitly to
recognize that the context in which an intentional-negligent fault
302 RESTATEMENT (ThIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 22 cmt. e
("The policy of allocating a loss according to each person's share of responsibility
supports having the negligent tortfeasor and the intentional tortfeasor, as between
themselves, each bear their own comparative shares. That is accomplished by contri-
bution, not indemnity.").
303 Id. § 23 cmt. I ("A person who can otherwise recover contribution is not pre-
cluded from receiving contribution by the fact that he is liable for an intentional
tort.").
304 See id. § 8.
305 Id. § 8 cmt. c.
306 Id. § 8 cmt. a.
307 Id. § 1 cmt. b ("[L]eaving intentional torts out of a comparative-responsibility
system can create problems. In a multi-party lawsuit involving negligent tortfeasors
and intentional tortfeasors, it would be cumbersome to have different apportionment
systems apply to different parts of the same case.").
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comparison is proposed makes a difference. In particular, the Restate-
ment acknowledges that comparisons between the intentional and neg-
ligent fault of defendants does not require comparisons between
plaintiffs and defendants.
Moreover, although the Restatement generally attempts to main-
tain a separation between primary issues of liability and secondary is-
sues of apportionment, the Restatement rightly abandoned that
fictional separation when apportionment threatens to obliterate negli-
gent tortfeasors' obligation to use reasonable care to prevent inten-
tional torts.
Furthermore, the Restatement's retention of other ameliorative
doctrines will likely result in fairer outcomes for plaintiffs. For exam-
ple, the Restatement's decision to retain joint and several liability for
intentional tortfeasor defendants, regardless of the state's choice of
liability track and joint and several liability rule for negligent
tortfeasors, ensures that an intentional tortfeasor will not be able to
use another defendant's fault as a reason to pay the plaintiff less than
full compensation for a single indivisible injury caused by the defen-
dant's intentional act.
Finally, the Restatement's plaintiff no-duty rules provide a way for
courts to recognize plaintiff entitlements in cases involving both negli-
gent and intentional tortfeasors.
3. Continued Problems Under the Restatement
But problems remain under the Restatement approach. The Re-
statement's decision to compare defendants' intentional and negligent
torts creates a number of ill effects that ameliorative doctrines cure
only in part. The Restatement's attempt to resolve apportionment rules
independently of substantive rules leads to a system that not only per-
petuates but also extends the unfairness inherent in some state sys-
tems. Moreover, the Restatement's ameliorative doctrines lack
analytical consistency with its basic rules. Consequently, as compared
with an approach that excludes intentional fault from comparative ap-
portionment altogether, the Restatement approach may create more
problems than it solves.
One of the main problems with the Restatement's choice to com-
pare intentional and negligent torts is that it includes this comparison
in a framework that does not retain joint and several liability for all
negligent tortfeasors. 308 Rather than retain joint and several liability
308 See Mark M. Hager, What's (Not) in a Restatement? ALI Issue-Dodging on Liability
Apportionment, 33 CONN. L. REV. 77, 94-106 (2000) (arguing that the Restatement
should have retained the doctrine of joint and several liability); Brown & Morgan,
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as the governing rule, the Restatement's blackletter provisions provide
that "the law of the applicable jurisdiction" determines whether inde-
pendent tortfeasors who produce a single indivisible injury "are jointly
and severally liable, severally liable, or liable under some hybrid of
joint and several liability. '" 31 9 The Restatement then provides five differ-
ent "tracks" of liability for multiple tortfeasors who produce indivisible
harm. 310 One of the five tracks provides for joint and several
liability. 311
However, the presence or absence of a joint and several liability
rule affects the functional effects of apportionment and, therefore,
the substantive fairness and desirability of particular apportionment
rules like comparison of intentional and negligent fault. In jurisdic-
tions that retain full joint and several liability, adding intentional torts
into comparative systems is relatively unproblematic. However, ad-
ding intentional torts into comparative systems that eliminate joint
and several liability exacerbates the justice and policy problems al-
ready present in those systems.
3 12
Consequently, in a number of the Restatement's five "tracks" that
do not adopt joint and several liability, the inclusion of intentional
torts in comparative apportionment systems will come at a real cost to
injured plaintiffs. Even though injured plaintiffs in these tracks are
also covered by the "very duty" rule, which will effectively retain the
joint and several liability of some negligent tortfeasors, plaintiffs who
are injured by a combination of intentional and negligent torts but
cannot seek aid under the "very duty" rule will bear additional cost
burdens because of the Restatement.
Specifically, the Restatement's inclusion of intentional torts in com-
parative apportionment leads to problematic results for plaintiffs in
cases that involve harms caused by intentional and negligent fault but
fall outside the "very duty" exception. For example, under the Restate-
supra note 45, at 509 (arguing that legislatures and courts "should adopt a compara-
tive fault system that holds the negligent defendant responsible for the entire amount
of damages that he and the intentional tortfeasor have caused when the intentional
tortfeasor is unknown or insolvent"); see also Kornhauser & Revesz, supra note 229, at
846-55 (demonstrating that if "the standards of care are set at the socially optimal
level," joint and several liability rules "are always efficient" but that rules that abandon
joint and several liability "generally are not"). But see Wright, supra note 189, at 563
(arguing that "[w] hile holding a negligent defendant fully liable is a deterrent, it is an
over-deterrent").
309 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAmLITv § 17.
310 Id. at § 18(A-E).
311 Id. at § A18.
312 See Wright, supra note 171, at 1816-21 (exploring the problems with several
liability for negligent defendants in comparative fault systems).
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ment approach, innocent plaintiffs will receive less compensation
when they are injured by both a negligent and an intentional tort than
they would recover if they were injured by only the negligent tort it-
self. A Restatement example illustrates this point. A driver intention-
ally rams his car into the plaintiff's car. Due to a defect, the plaintiff's
airbag does not inflate, causing her serious injury that would not have
occurred if the airbag had operated properly. Under the Restatement,
the automobile manufacturer can compare its fault with that of the
intentional tortfeasor, and is not liable for the intentional tortfeasor's
share of responsibility "because the risk that made [the automobile
manufacturer] negligent was the general risk of an accident in which
[the plaintiff] might be injured without an airbag, not the specific risk
of an intentional tort."3
13
However, if the plaintiff's car had instead slipped on ice and
slammed into a tree and the same defect in the airbag caused it not to
inflate, causing the plaintiff to suffer the identical injury, there would
be no intentional tortfeasor for the car maker to divide damages with,
and the plaintiff could then recover the full amount of her damages
from the negligent automaker. Thus, under the Restatement's ap-
proach, the negligent automobile manufacturer gets a windfall (and
the plaintiff is left with a shortfall) because the negligent tortfeasor,
despite committing the identical act of negligence and causing the
identical harm to the plaintiff, fortuitously had a codefendant that in-
tentionally harmed the victim as well.
In addition, the Restatement would seem to protect plaintiffs who
are harmed by negligence that occurs before but not after an inten-
tional tort. For example, under the Restatement, if an employer fails to
take care to protect its gas station attendant from attack, it cannot split
its fault with that of the assailant who attacks the attendant 314 because
the employer's liability is based on a failure to protect the employee
from the very risk of the intentional tort. But if the employer negli-
gently fails to transport its injured employee to the hospital for treat-
ment, the Restatement would seem to allow that negligent employer to
divide fault with the assailant because the employer did not create the
risk of the intentional tort, just the risk that the employee would not
recover from it. As such, the negligent employer's liability (and the
plaintiff's prospects for recovery), may depend not only on whether
313 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 14 cmt. a, il-
Ins. 3.
314 See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Tidwell, 867 S.W.2d 19 (Tex. 1993) (involving the ac-
tion of service station employee against employer for negligence leading to armed
robbery shooting).
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its negligence caused harm to the plaintiff, but also on when its negli-
gence occurred.
The problem with the Restatement's "very duty" rule, which is help-
ful in so far as it applies, is that it overlooks the fact that every compari-
son of a negligent defendant's fault with an intentional defendant's
fault in a several liability system diminishes the negligent defendant's
duty to victims of intentional torts.3 '1 5 If the reason for the car manu-
facturer's duty to use reasonable care in manufacturing cars is to
make those cars safer for occupants in crashes, whatever the origin of
those crashes, comparisons undermine that duty too.
3 16
Moreover, because the Restatement includes intentional torts but
eliminates many undesirable effects of that inclusion, its exceptions
lack analytic consistency. For example, the Restatement drafters wisely
noted that individual policy considerations might shape the advisabil-
ity of comparisons in the case of economic harms or statutory causes
of action. It is unclear, however, why purely economic harms pre-
sumptively raise more special policy considerations than do physical
harms. Fraud resulting in physical injury is presumptively the subject
of comparison under the Restatement, while fraud resulting in eco-
nomic loss raises a question for courts to review.
Similarly, while the Restatement's "very duty" rule eliminates some
problematic results, it does not follow the full import of its own ratio-
nale. The Restatement adopts a "very duty" rule to bar some negligent
defendants from taking advantage of comparisons with other inten-
tional tortfeasors if that comparison would undermine its very duty,
but does not bar comparisons between two negligent tortfeasors when
those comparisons would undermine the defendant's duty as well.
For example, if the very duty of some car safety features is to prevent
car crashes or to protect plaintiffs during them, why not bar negligent
315 See DoBBS, supra note 19, at 520 (noting two types of categories involving a
combination of negligent and intentional harms: cases in which the defendants act
independently but cause a single indivisible injury, and cases in which a negligent
defendant creates a risk of an intentional tort by another). In this latter category at
least, comparison of the negligent defendant's fault with the intentional tort would
generally eviscerate the defendant's duty. Though the former might not eviscerate
the defendant's general duty, it would eviscerate the defendant's duty to the class of
persons harmed by intentional torts. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTION-
MENT OF LIABILITY § 14, illus. 3.
316 Cf Green, supra note 181, at 1131-32 (arguing that for the purpose of super-
ceding cause "it should not be necessary" for the plaintiff to show that an intervening
act was foreseeable since the nature of the act that produced the foreseeable harm is
"entirely fortuitous," so that the ignition source of a fire whether lightning, a dis-
carded match, or arson should be irrelevant to plaintiff's ability to prove proximate
cause).
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car manufacturers from comparing their fault with the negligence of a
driver who caused the crash as well?
The Restatement's inclusion of intentional torts in comparative ap-
portionment also leaves judges and juries without a clear standard to
apply and will confuse issues of causation and culpability. The Restate-
ment section that apportions responsibility asks jurors to compare fault
and cause in a way that not only compares incommensurable quanti-
ties, but gives so little guidance to judges and juries about how those
comparisons should be made that jury resolution in tort cases be-
comes simply a process without standards.
3 17
Overall then, the Restatement ameliorates some of the harshest ef-
fects of comparing intentional and negligent fault, but it does so in a
way that is incomplete and inconsistent.
4. The Restatement Plus
States that include intentional torts in comparative apportion-
ment systems and adopt an approach like the Restatement's might fur-
ther minimize ill-effects. To begin, states can choose the Restatement's
track adopting joint and several liability.
318
Within any track, states can better retain the scope of negligent
defendants' substantive obligations to plaintiffs by refusing to
compare particular types of intentional and negligent fault be-
yond the Restatement exclusions, 31 9 and they can adopt a more ex-
pansive conception of the "very duty" rule than that embraced by
the Restatement. In addition, to abate the problem of leaving fault
shares to persons who will likely be unable to repay them, states can
exclude nonparties and unknown or immune defendants from
the apportionment process,3 20 and they can reapportion shares
317 See Abraham, supra note 248, at 1191 ("The negligence decision in an un-
bounded tort case is neither a finding of empirical fact nor an application of law, and
it is not really a mixture of the two either.").
318 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § A18.
319 See Veazey v. Elmwood Plantation Assocs., 650 So. 2d 712, 718-19 (La. 1994)
(noting public policy exceptions that work against inclusion of intentional torts in
comparisons in physical injury context).
320 See Cardi, supra note 113, at 1297 ("[T]he soundest and most efficient ap-
proach is to exclude all immune nonparties from the apportionment process. Al-
though such exclusion may seem contrary to the goal of comparative responsibility, in
fact it serves the principle-by automatically redistributing the immune nonparty's
fault pro rata among the remaining parties-while avoiding the difficulty and ex-
pense of protracted litigation."); id. at 1296 (arguing also that the fault of parties who
have nominal immunity should be reallocated); id. at 1298 (arguing that workers'
compensation claims should not be included); see also Hager, supra note 308, at
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that cannot likely be collected, or retain joint and several lia-
bility.
32 1
In making the apportionment decision, courts can set clearer
guidelines for apportionment between actors with different types of
mental states and can ask juries to make specific findings with respect
to fault and causation. These findings would both facilitate judicial
review of apportionment decisions and assist courts in uncovering bi-
ases concealed by a "do justice" approach. They would also permit
better empirical study of judgments throughout the system.
Moreover, to avoid the misconception that percentages assigned
in comparisons reveal an essential truth about parties' fault, states can
ask juries to apportion "damages," not "fault," and can call the per-
centages "apportionment of damages" rather than "apportionment of
responsibility.'3 22 In addition, at the time of trial, courts can ask juries
not only to establish what the plaintiff's damages are and how they
would ideally apportion damages between the parties, but also how
those damages should be reapportioned if that ideal apportionment
were unachievable. For example, if the intentional tortfeasor's por-
tion of the damages would have to be borne by the plaintiff or the
negligent defendant, which party or what combination of the parties
should pay that portion of the damages? 323 In addition, with respect
to defendants' liability as between themselves, states can continue to
use active-passive tortfeasor indemnity rules to curb benefits to at least
some solvent intentional tortfeasors whose very duty was not to protect
an intentional tortfeasor.
B. Uniform Apportionment of Tort Responsibility Act
1. The Uniform Apportionment Act Provisions
The Uniform Apportionment of Tort Responsibility Act does not
include intentional fault in its default provisions.324 However, the Act
119-26 (arguing that "phantom share allocation" should be "disallowed for both no-
party and tortfeasor immunities").
321 This approach avoids the re-litigation and collection problems that have been
experienced by the states that reapportion shares when the share cannot be collected
after one year. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY
§ C18.
322 Cf Prosser, supra note 243, at I & n.2 (stating that the new doctrine is "com-
monly miscalled 'comparative negligence"' and that it should instead be called "dam-
age apportionment" or "comparative damages").
323 See Calabresi & Cooper, supra note 6, at 880-81 (urging that courts consider
jury intent in determining how to divide defendant's percentage of responsibility be-
tween the plaintiff and remaining defendants). The jury, however, would obviously
have to be informed of standards for that determination.
324 UNIF. APPORTIONMENT OF TORT RESPONSIBILITY ACT § 2 Definitions (2002).
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permits an adopting state "to resolve these issues in any manner that it
wishes. '325 States that exclude intentional fault can directly evaluate
negligent and intentional tortfeasors defendants' liability with respect
to the plaintiff. States that include intentional fault under the Act will
initially apportion the parties' liability into mutually exclusive respon-
sibility shares.3 26 In order to determine these shares, the trier of fact
will be instructed to consider both the "nature of the conduct" and its
"causal relation" to the damages. 327 As long as the plaintiff's fault is
less than or equal to 50% of the total fault, the plaintiff can then re-
cover each party's several share.
In a number of circumstances, the Uniform Apportionment Act
permits the plaintiff to recover more than the defendant's several
share. Notably, the Uniform Act includes a provision akin to the Re-
statement's "very duty" provision. The Act's provision provides: "[i]f a
party is adjudged liable for failing to prevent another party from in-
tentionally causing personal injury to, or harm to the property of, the
claimant, the court shall enter judgment jointly and severally against
the parties for their combined shares of responsibility."
328
Moreover, in situations in which the defendants are not jointly
and severally liable, the plaintiff can move the court to reallocate a
defendant's share if it is shown by a preponderance of the evidence
not to be "reasonably collectible."
329
The net result of these rules is that in some states intentional and
negligent fault will not be compared, but rather examined individu-
ally. When intentional and negligent fault are compared, the negli-
gent defendant's liability will be preserved by a very-duty rule (which
in effect creates joint and several liability in those situations) and by
reapportionment of uncollectible shares in others.
2. Benefits of the Uniform Apportionment Act
It is difficult to compare the Uniform Apportionment Act and the
Restatement because both plans leave a variety of issues to individual
state decision. If a court were to choose the Restatement's reallocation
track, the Restatement and the Uniform Act provisions would be nearly
identical. However, the Uniform Act's decision to enact reallocation,
not merely leave that choice as an option for the states, ensures that
the Act will never create the harshest effects that the Restatement plan
325 Id. § 2 cmt.
326 Id. § 4(2).
327 Id. § 4(4)(b).
328 Id. § 6(2).
329 Id. § 5(b).
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might generate in its several liability track. For example, an uncollect-
ible share of the damages can only be reassigned to plaintiffs who are
at fault to some degree. But while the Act does not risk some of the
harshest effects possible under the Restatement, neither does it pre-
serve the possibility that states can retain joint and several liability for
all indivisible harms, despite the fact that many states still embrace
that approach. The Act is a reasonable compromise between compet-
ing state positions, which may well make it more likely to be adopted
by a number of states-the ultimate goal of a Uniform Act.
The Act's choice of reallocation of uncollectible shares makes it
more consistent across definitional lines than the Restatement would be
on a number of its tracks. Under the Act, reallocation of uncollectible
shares occurs both in cases involving only negligent defendants as well
as cases involving a negligent and an intentional tortfeasor defendant.
As such, the Act prevents particularly unjust results in the negligence
context as well as the intentional tort context. Furthermore, ameliora-
tive doctrines like the provision retaining joint and several liability of
parties that fail to prevent intentional torts are more consistent with
other Act provisions.
3. Continued Problems Under the Uniform Apportionment Act
One of the Uniform Act's main disadvantages in the intentional-
negligent tort context is that its provisions, which permit but do not
require the inclusion of intentional torts, have not fully anticipated
the inclusion of intentional torts. For example, the Act does not re-
tain joint and several liability for intentional tortfeasors, and the Act
fails to address whether, after fault shares have been allocated to each
party, an intentional tortfeasor can take advantage of the plaintiffs
assigned contributory negligence. Moreover, while the Act appears to
prevent a plaintiff guilty of intentional fault from bringing a cause of
action-the definition of comparative fault makes no mention of in-
tentional fault-this result is far from clear.
Presumably, provisions that specifically relate to intentional torts
have been omitted because the Act does not explicitly sanction the
inclusion of intentional fault. Accordingly, provisions relevant to that
inclusion may not be necessary. Even so, if a state does include inten-
tional fault within the auspices of the Act, it will need to provide sup-
plementary provisions related to the effects of that inclusion. In
particular, if states include intentional fault under the Act, they must
distinguish between the different contexts in which the intentional
negligent fault comparisons may arise-between two or more
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tortfeasor defendants, or between a plaintiff and a defendant-and
plan for the possibilities in each. 33
0
There are other concerns raised by the Uniform Act. The mathe-
matical determinacy of the mutually exclusive allocations in the Uni-
form Act are likely to feed both misunderstandings about the essential
nature of parties' responsibility shares, and a desire to abandon the
reallocation system it creates, which then seems as though it requires
one party to pay another party's share. 331 In addition, relatively trivial
differences in plaintiff and defendant fault in the initial allocation can
take on exaggerated significance during the reallocation process,332
and some difficult calculations can be expected to arise. 333 Further,
the Act's decision to adopt modified comparative fault on the basis of
a tally and no justifications suggests the political process has already
begun to take its toll on the Act even before a single state's adoption.
Still, the Act is a vast improvement over the law in many states
that compare because it would exclude intentional torts, and either
retain joint and several liability or reallocate uncollectible shares, and
would thus avoid many of the most troubling consequences of includ-
ing intentional torts in apportionment.
4. The Uniform Apportionment Act Plus
To improve upon the Uniform Act, courts may want to account
for intentional torts more. explicitly by retaining joint and several lia-
330 UNIF. APPORTIONMENT OF TORT RESPONSILITY Ac, at 6 (Final Draft 2002) (on
file with author) (discussing the inclusion of intentional torts as though including
intentional fault would necessarily allow intentional tortfeasors to assert contributory
negligence defenses, not merely to allow negligent tortfeasor defendants to diminish
their liability based on comparisons). See Part I.B with regard to the importance of
context.
331 SeeJoseph W. Little, Eliminating the Fallacies of Comparative Negligence and Propor-
tional Responsibility, 41 ALA. L. REv. 13, 44 (1989) (stating that "[o] nce the idea that
negligence can be measured and divided in precise and accurate packages takes hold
of a mind, then that mind is susceptible to being sent off, in the name of perfect
fairness, on a quest to reform other aspects of the law," such as abolishing joint and
several liability).
332 For'example, a fault apportionment of 5% to the plaintiff and 3% to a negli-
gent tortfeasor may take on more significance in the reallocation process than the
jury meant. Ozaki v. Ass'n of Apartment Owners, 954 P.2d 644, 650 n.5 (Haw. 1998)
(stating that "[h]ad the jury, for example, apportioned ninety-two percent of the total
fault to the intentional conduct of [the murderer], five percent to the negligent con-
duct of [the apartment complex], and three percent to the negligent conduct of [the
murder victim], the result would be quite different," because the actual allocation of
92-3-5 barred the plaintiff's recovery entirely).
333 For example, what happens when the plaintiff's fault is less than 50% before
the reallocation, but would be more than 50% after it?
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bility for intentional tortfeasors and preventing intentional tortfeasors
from diminishing their fault shares based on plaintiff negligence.
Moreover, if small percentage allocation differences are likely to yield
vastly different results, as with modified comparative negligence,
courts may want to inform juries of the consequences of their
decisions.
334
C. Direct Substantive Consideration
If, at the end of the day, comparison of intentional and negligent
torts is not an essential attribute of a fair tort system but simply one
means of generating a certain number of effects, the question be-
comes not only whether states want these effects, but whether the ap-
portionment method is the most desirable method of achieving them.
Because a comparative apportionment system that includes inten-
tional fault bases a defendant's liability (and a negligently injured
plaintiffs compensation) on a relative comparison of the defendant's
fault with the fault of others, it is not an accurate barometer of either
the harm that defendant's conduct has caused or the defendant's in-
dividual fault toward the plaintiff. Moreover, because comparative ap-
portionment depends on a process that creates wide latitude for
unreviewable jury discretion, it is not likely to produce consistent stan-
dards or holdings.
Consistent then with the majority approach, states would be bet-
ter advised not to compare intentional and negligent torts, but rather
to directly address a number of questions raised by the apportionment
process. In particular, policymakers should examine the appropriate
scope of negligent tortfeasor liability and the distinctions between in-
tentional and negligent torts that warrant special policy
considerations.
In terms of negligent tortfeasor liability, one question is whether
negligent tortfeasors, like the county in the Brandon case,33 5 should be
held jointly and severally liable for harm to the plaintiff that was pro-
duced by a combination of two or more defendants' intentional and
negligent acts. The bulk of scholarly authority weighs strongly in
favor of joint and several liability in such cases.
3 6
334 Brown & Morgan, supra note 45, at 524 (urging that states that compare in-
form juries of the consequences of their decisions and allow special jury instructions
explaining the duty to protect).
335 See Brandon v. County of Richardson, 624 N.W.2d 604 (Neb: 2000) (Brandon
11); see also supra notes 8-17 and accompanying text.
336 See supra note 308.
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At times, joint and several liability may seem unfair because slight
negligence can produce great harm and, therefore, great liability. But
tort law is designed to provide compensation for wrongful injuries,
and until some rule of nature prevents plaintiffs from being injured
out of proportion to defendant's fault, compensation to injured plain-
tiffs must continue to be based on the actual harm caused by that
fault.
To the extent that courts and legislatures have deliberately cho-
sen to establish negligent tortfeasor liability in the situations they have
set-dram shop liability, parental liability, premises liability and so
forth-to ensure reasonable care for physical safety, decisionmakers
should ensure that the liability remains at the levels they have set.
33 7
If states fear that negligent tortfeasor liability levels are too high,
there are a wide variety of ways to directly address that problem. First,
courts and legislatures might undertake an empirical study of judg-
ments and settlements in the state. State legislative processes are fil-
led with anecdotes, but short on actual data.338 With empirical study
of state cases, states can design solutions to reflect real problems-
whether those solutions entail liability limitation or expansion, more
aggressive or less aggressive use of judicial prerogatives like summary
judgment, or clearer definitions of defendants' obligations in particu-
lar types of cases.
337 See, e.g., Limbaugh v. Coffee Med. Ctr., 59 S.W.3d 73, 87 (Tenn. 2001) ("We
believe that in the context of a negligent defendant failing to prevent foreseeable
intentional conduct, the joint liability rule 'is a very reasonable and just rule of law
which compels each to assume and bear the responsibility of the misconduct of all.'"
(quoting Resolution Trust Corp. v. Block, 924 S.W.2d 354 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996)));
Frank A. Sloan et al., Liability, Risk Perceptions, and Precautions at Bars, 43 J.L. & ECON.
473, 497 (2000) (conducting an empirical study of bar owners/managers and con-
cluding that management's increased perception of the probability of a tort suit "in-
creased the bar's level of precaution in serving obviously intoxicated adults" and its
level of monitoring "to avoid serving alcoholic beverages to minors," and noting pre-
vious empirical studies finding that "implementation of dramshop liability lowers mo-
tor vehicle fatality rates as well as fatality rates for other alcohol related causes").
338 In recent hearings Pennsylvania legislators asked witnesses who offered anec-
dotal evidence about the unfairness ofjoint and several liability in particular cases to
provide the legislature with docket numbers of those cases. See, e.g., Joint and Several
Liability Hearings, supra note 240, at 76 (testimony of Del. Thomas Gannon, Majority
Chairperson, House Judiciary Comm.) (objecting to a witness' simultaneous use of a
case example while invoking confidentiality to avoid answering specific questions
about it); id. at 106 (testimony of Del. Kevin Blaum, Minority Chairperson, House
Judiciary Comm.) (requesting the docket number of a case that the witness character-
ized as unfair in testimony). Such a verification mechanism is one that other legisla-
tures would do well to emulate.
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Second, states that want to calculate negligent tortfeasors' share
of the plaintiff's damage bill at something less than the full amount of
damages caused by the defendant's negligence in negligent security
cases need to combine fair procedures for making those comparisons
with other forms of compensation for plaintiffs, and measures of de-
terring unreasonable conduct. 3 3 9 A wide range of programs might be
considered.
While it is not the purpose of this Article to enumerate possible
alternative programs, it might be useful to briefly illustrate one addi-
tional type of approach. Legislatures could adopt an apportionment
approach but eliminate the central fallacy of comparative apportion-
ment with several liability-that all parties' fault must be divided into
mutually exclusive shares. Ajury could instead assign liability for dam-
ages in overlapping shares; for example, an intentional tortfeasor
could be liable for 100% of the plaintiffs damages, while a negligent
tortfeasor could be liable for up to only 80% of the plaintiff's damages
(subject to the one-satisfaction rule).
In such a system the negligent defendant might be liable for par-
tial rather than full damages, but reductions would not be based on
the intentional tortfeasor's fault, but rather on a series of factors re-
lated to the negligent tortfeasor's own fault relative to the plaintiff.
To provide for consistency and review, states might, for example, de-
vise a points system akin to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
3 40
Under an apportionment guidelines system, juries could answer a se-
ries of questions involving the defendant's state of mind, the scope
and type of harm that the defendant intended, the defendant's de-
gree of deviation from an objective standard of reasonableness, any
aggravating factors related to the defendant's conduct, such as
whether the defendant committed the tort against a vulnerable victim,
and any mitigating factors with respect to that conduct, such as age or
incapacity.
341
339 Cf Solan & Darley, supra note 271, at 297 (suggesting from an empirical study
of citizen beliefs with respect to enabling torts that it seems that "citizens would be
uncomfortable with a system that assigned full liability to an enabler, although they
are sometimes willing to assign considerable liability to the enabler, and often express
a desire that the enabler who hopes for the completion of the action be dealt with by
criminal punishments").
340 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (2001).
341 Cf. Robertson, supra note 165, at 850-51 (proposing a fault line in whole num-
bers from zero to ten to communicate the trier of fact's "normatively-based estimation
of the extent to which each relevant actor's relevant conduct departed from what was
required of that actor under the circumstances").
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In addition to criteria related to defendants' fault, such a system
could incorporate more detailed criteria with respect to other aspects
of the negligence case. For instance, states could allowjuries to evalu-
ate cause in fact based on the probability that the defendant's negli-
gence caused the plaintiff's harm. 342 Juries could evaluate cause in
fact in a variety of increments of certainty, such as the following-
certain of causation, causation very likely, causation more likely than
not, causation very unlikely, certain of the absence of causation. Such
measures could allow recoveries to be discounted based on uncer-
tainty about a given defendant's role,343 not by the certainty of an-
other defendant's role.
Harms could be measured in more particularized categories as
well. A guidelines method would result in less discretion and also al-
low for judicial review. How specific findings would translate into per-
centages of the plaintiff's compensatory damage judgment to be paid
would depend on state legislative formulas reflecting policy
choices. 34
4
But if plaintiff recovery from the defendant were permitted in
proportion to the negligent defendant's own fault and not the full
amount of damages caused to the plaintiff, some type of supplemental
compensation for plaintiffs would have to be planned. A meaningful
expansion of victim compensation programs would take the pressure
off the tort system to be the only forum for victim compensation. -3 45
Legislatures could examine direct compensation programs for inten-
tional tort victims, and revision of existing insurance laws. For exam-
ple, states might reconsider laws barring insurance coverage for
intentional torts.346 Legislatures could also examine the possibility of
creating broadly accessible, first-party insurance to cover potential vic-
tims. 347 Such compensation programs are important even when tort
342 Cf Alvin I. Goldman, Quasi-Objective Bayesianism and Legal Evidence, 42
JURIMETRICS J. 237 (2002) (looking at knowledge in terms of outlining degrees of
belief or truth-possession).
343 Twerski & Sebok, supra note 171, at 1388-96 (arguing for proportional liability
in enabling torts).
344 Cf David W. Leebron, Final Moments: Damages for Pain and Suffering Prior to
Death, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 256, 323 (1989) (finding wide and unjustified variations in
pain and suffering awards but eschewing guidelines in part because they would have
to be devised by legislatures rather than courts).
345 See Matsuda, supra note 5, at 2211-18.
346 See Wriggins, supra note 230, at 152-69.
347 See Jordan H. Leibman, Comparative Contribution and Intentional Torts, 30 AM.
Bus. L.J. 677, 705 (1993) ("[P]erhaps efficient first party insurance coverage analo-
gous to that of the inexpensive 'uninsured' or 'underinsured motorist' found in mod-
ern automobile policies could be appended to homeowners' and renters' policies that
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recoveries are fully recognized. For victims without a valid claim that
a negligent defendant should have engaged in different conduct ex
ante, insurance or compensation funds represent the only benefits
available .
41
Moreover, states might rehaul safety regulations related to inten-
tional torts in light of the importance of the subject-murder is now
the second leading cause of death in the workplace 349-and because
of the need to ensure adequate safety incentives.
Not only can courts directly examine and resolve appropriate
levels of negligent tortfeasor liability, but they can also reexamine the
distinctions between negligent and intentional fault. The Restatement
(Third) of Torts has already redefined intentional torts as those torts in
which the defendant had an intent to harm, not merely an intent to
act, 35°1 a decision that should ensure more consistency in intentional
tort categories for policy purposes. However, even further divisions
may be desirable. Courts might want to consider special liability rules
for persons who did intend to harm, but whose physical or mental
capacity makes that intent to harm less culpable. So, for example, the
liability of a young child who deliberately intends to hit a babysitter
might be subject to less severe tort sanctions.'3 5 1
Finally, examining the problems posed by intentional/negligent
fault comparisons should not only help states avoid unintended ef-
fects with respect to defendants' intentional/negligent fault compari-
sons, but it should also create an opportunity for states to reexamine
other kinds of comparisons permitted under tort reform programs.
Although comparison of defendants' torts poses special compensation
and valuation problems in the intentional-negligent fault comparison
context, the problems of zero-sum apportionment in several liability
jurisdictions extend beyond this area. 352
would reimburse victims for the unpaid portions ofjudgments assessed against inten-
tional tortfeasors under several only apportionment rules.").
348 See Wright, supra note 175, at 68 ("Why should the defendant, rather than soci-
ety at large, provide this social insurance?"); George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in
Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537, 540 (1972) (arguing that "the two central issues of
tort law-whether the victim is entitled to recover and whether the defendant ought
to pay-are distinct issues").
349 See Accidents and Murders Cause Most Job Deaths, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1998, at
A16.
350 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORrs: GENERAL PRINCIPLES § 1 (Discussion Draft
Apr. 5, 1999).
351 See supra notes 49-50.
352 See McNichols, supra note 29, at 234-36 (addressing problems with compari-
sons of negligence and strict liability); Wright, supra note 175, at 51-62 (addressing
problems with comparing negligent torts in several liability systems).
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CONCLUSION
For many years it was a given that state comparative fault systems
exclusively compared parties' negligence. That is no longer the case.
An increasing minority of states are comparing some intentional and
negligent fault, primarily the fault of intentional and negligent
tortfeasor defendants. This fact will likely come as a surprise to many.
In fact, when a Connecticut legal newspaper reviewed the Connecticut
Supreme Court's 1998 decision to compare defendants' intentional
and negligent torts, the article's first line read, "Think you know Con-
necticut tort law? Think again."3 53 The issues raised by comparisons
are as significant as they are new.
Courts that now compare defendants' intentional and negligent
fault have repeatedly relied on rationales that do not adequately jus-
tify their choices. For example, while courts that compare defend-
ants' intentional and negligent fault often say that these types of fault
are "different in degree," not "in kind," this rationale does not explain
why courts consistently compare intentional and negligent fault in
some contexts-as with intentional and negligent tortfeasor defend-
ants-but not in others-as with intentional tortfeasor plaintiffs and
negligent defendants..3 54 The most notable red herring is the argu-
ment that comparison assures that each party is only liable for his fair
share of the harm, as though the apportionment process could parcel
all parties' fault into distinct and mutually exclusive shares.
Underneath the comparison rhetoric, comparisons create tangi-
ble effects in tort cases-specifically, reducing negligent and inten-
tiondl tortfeasors' liability to plaintiffs, reducing intentional
tortfeasors' share of liability for indemnity and contribution, and
changing jury standards and judicial review. An evaluation of these
effects suggests that, at most, a few are desired by the states that adopt
comparisons. Even if desired, the effects of comparison can be more
consistently and fairly achieved through direct substantive rules.
If policymakers could see that comparison is just one way of
achieving particular substantive objectives, perhaps they could decide
these issues directly, rather than burying their decisions behind a
mask of fairness rhetoric where not even they can always see the policy
choices that they are making.
353 Patricia W. Welch, Torts, CONN. L. TRIB., Mar. 8, 1999, at 19.
354 See supra Part I.
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